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Abstract
This thesis focuses on expressively rich languages that can formalise talk about
probability. These languages have sentences that say something about probabil-
ities of probabilities, but also sentences that say something about the probability
of themselves. For example:
The probability of the sentence labelled π is not greater than 1/2.(π)
Such sentences lead to philosophical and technical challenges. For example
seemingly harmless principles, such as an introspection principle:
If Ppϕq = x, then PpPpϕq = xq = 1
lead to inconsistencies with the axioms of probability in this framework.
This thesis aims to answer two questions relevant to such frameworks, which
correspond to the two parts of the thesis: “How can one develop a formal
semantics for this framework?” and “What rational constraints are there on an
agent once such expressive frameworks are considered?”. In this second part
we are considering probability as measuring an agent’s degrees of belief. In fact
that concept of probability will be the motivating one throughout the thesis.
The first chapter of the thesis provides an introduction to the framework.
The following four chapters, which make up Part I, focus on the question of how
to provide a semantics for this expressively rich framework. In Chapter 2, we
discuss some preliminaries and why developing semantics for such a framework
is challenging. We will generally base our semantics on certain possible world
structures that we call probabilistic modal structures. These immediately allow
for a definition of a natural semantics in restrictive languages but not in the
expressively rich languages that this thesis focuses on. The chapter also presents
an overview of the strategy that will be used throughout this part of the thesis:
we will generalise theories and semantics developed for the liar paradox, which
is the sentence:
The sentence labelled λ is not true.(λ)
In Chapter 3, we will present a semantics that generalises a very influential
theory of truth: a Kripke-style theory (Kripke, 1975) using a strong Kleene
evaluation scheme. A feature of this semantics is that we can understand it
as assigning sentences intervals as probability values instead of single numbers.
Certain axioms of probability have to be dropped, for example P=1pλ ∨ ¬λq
is not satisfied in the construction, but the semantics can be seen as assigning
non-classical probabilities. This semantics allows one to further understand
the languages, for example the conflict with introspection, where one can see
that the appropriate way to express the principle of introspection in this case
is in fact to use a truth predicate in its formulation. This follows a strategy
from Stern (2014a,b). We also develop an axiomatic system and show that it
is complete in the presence of the ω-rule which allows one to fix the standard
model of arithmetic.
In Chapter 4, we will consider another Kripke-style semantics but now based
on a supervaluational evaluation scheme. This variation is particularly interest-
ing because it bears a close relationship to imprecise probabilities where agents’
credal states are taken to be sets of probability functions. In this chapter, we
will also consider how to use this language to describe imprecise agents rea-
soning about one another. These considerations provide us with an argument
for using imprecise probabilities that is very different from traditional justifica-
tions: by allowing agents to have imprecise probabilities one can easily extend
a semantics to languages with sentences that talk about their own probability,
whereas the traditional precise probabilist cannot directly apply his semantics
to such languages.
In Chapter 5, a revision theory of probability will be developed. In this one
retains classical logic and traditional probability theory but the price to pay is
that one obtains a transfinite sequence of interpretations of the language and
identifying any particular interpretation as “correct” is problematic. In devel-
oping this we are particularly interested in finding limit stage interpretations
that can themselves be used as good models for probability and truth. We will
require that the limit stages “sum up” the previous stages, understood in a
strong way. In this chapter two strategies for defining the successor stages are
discussed. We first discuss defining (successor) probabilities by considering rel-
ative frequencies in the revision sequence up to that stage, extending ideas from
Leitgeb (2012). The second strategy is to base the construction on a probabilis-
tic modal structure and use the accessibility measure from that to determine
the interpretation of probability. That concludes Part I and the development of
semantics.
In Part II, we consider rationality requirements on agents who have beliefs
about self-referential probability sentences like π. For such sentences, a choice of
the agent’s credences will affect which worlds are possible. Caie (2013) has ar-
gued that the accuracy and Dutch book arguments should be modified because
the agent should only care about her inaccuracy or payoffs in the world(s) that
could be actual if she adopted the considered credences. We consider this sug-
gestion for the accuracy argument in Chapter 7 and the Dutch book argument
in Chapter 8. Chapter 6 acts as an introduction to these considerations. We
will show that these modified accuracy and Dutch book criteria lead to an agent
being rationally required to be probabilistically incoherent, have negative cre-
dences, fail to be introspective and fail to assign the same credence to logically
equivalent sentences. We will also show that this accuracy criterion depends
on how inaccuracy is measured and that the accuracy criterion differs from the
Dutch book criterion. We will in fact suggest rejecting Caie’s suggested modi-
fications. For the accuracy argument, we suggest in Section 7.3 that the agent
should consider how accurate the considered credences are from the perspective
of her current credences. We will also consider how to generalise this version
of the accuracy criterion and present ideas suggesting that it connects to the
vi
semantics developed in Part I. For the Dutch book argument, in Section 8.6 we
suggest that this is a case where an agent should not bet with his credences.
We finish the thesis with a conclusion chapter in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 What are we interested in and why?
This thesis will study frameworks where there are sentences that can talk about
their own probabilities. For example they can express the sentence π:
The probability of π is not greater than or equal to 1/2.(π)
Consider the following empirical situation that displays features similar to π,1
which is a modification of an example by Greaves (2013):
Alice is up for promotion. Her boss, however, is a deeply insecure type:
he will only promote Alice if she comes across as lacking in confidence.
Furthermore, Alice is useless at play-acting, so she will come across
that way iff she really does have a low degree of confidence that she’ll
get the promotion. Specifically, she will get the promotion exactly if
she does not have a degree of belief greater than or equal to 1/2 that
she will get the promotion.
This is a description of a situation where a sentence, Promotion, is true just
if her degree of belief in that very sentence satisfies some property. This is the
same as for π.
Such languages can be problematic. For example, contradictions can arise
between seemingly harmless principles such as probabilism and introspection.
A possible response to this is to circumvent such worries by preventing such
sentences from appearing in the language. However, we shall argue that the
result of doing that is that one cannot properly represent quantification or for-
malise many natural language assertions or interesting situations, so we think
that is the wrong path to take. Instead we will suggest that such self-referential
probability assertions should be expressible, but one should work out how to
deal with this language and how to circumvent such contradictions. In this
thesis we will do just that.
One important aspect of that is to develop semantics which tell us when such
self-referential sentences are true or not. This is what we will do in Part I. The
sentence π bears a close relationship to the liar paradox, which is a sentence that
says it is not true, and many of our considerations will bear close relationships
to considerations from the liar paradox.
1A discussion of how Promotion and π connect can be found on Page 6.
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1.1.1 Why should self-referential probability sentences be
expressible?
Probability and probabilistic methods are heavily used in many disciplines, in-
cluding, increasingly, philosophy. We will consider formal languages that can
talk about probability, so we will assume that they can formalise at least simple
expressions about probability such as:
The probability of the coin landing heads is 1/2.
We will work with a framework where probabilities are assigned to sen-
tences instead of to events, which are subsets of a sample space. Although
this is uncommon in mathematical study of probability, it is not uncommon in
philosophical work and will allow us to develop logics for probability. This is
also the approach that is often taken in computer science. We would then state
the axioms of probability sententially, so for example have the axiom:
If ϕ is a logical tautology, then p(ϕ) = 1.
There is typically a correspondence between probabilities assigned to sen-
tences and those assigned to events that are subsets of a space of all possible
models,2 with the correspondence
p(ϕ) = m{M ∈ Mod | M |= ϕ}.
In fact, for the work here it is not important that we assign probabilities
to sentences, instead it is important that the objects to which the probabilities
are assigned have sufficient syntactic-style structure. The sufficient structure
that we require is that operations analogous to syntactic operations can be de-
fined on the objects.3 Events, or subsets of the sample space, do not have this
sufficient structure. For simplicity, in this thesis we will assume that probabili-
ties are assigned to sentences. In the formal language we will in fact have that
probabilities are attached to natural numbers that act as codes of sentences.
Express higher order probabilities and quantification
We want to be able to express embeddings of probabilities, as this is useful
to express relationships between different notions of probability. Consider the
example from Gaifman (1988) who takes an example from the New Yorker of a
forecaster making the following announcement:
There is now 60% chance of rain tomorrow, but, there is 70% chance
that later this evening the chance of rain tomorrow will be 80%.
This expresses a fact about the current chances of rain, cht0(pRaint2q) = 0.6,
as well as a fact about the current chances of some later chances,
cht0(pcht1(pRaint2q) = 0.8q) = 0.7.
Other cases where one kind of probability is assigned to another can be found
in Lewis’s Principal Principle, (Lewis, 1980), which says that an agent should
2See Section 1.2.1.
3See Halbach (2014, ch. 2) for more information about this.
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defer to the objective chances. A bit more carefully, it says: conditional on that
the objective chance of A is r, one should set ones subjective credence in A to
also be r. We can then formulate this principle, for an agent, Tom, as:
PTom(A | pch(A) = rq) = r
Such embedded probabilities are also required to express agents’ beliefs
about other agents’ beliefs. For example:
Georgie is (probabilistically) certain that Dan believes to degree 1/2 that the
coin will land heads.
which can be formulated as:
PGeorgie(pPDan(pHeadsq) = 1/2q) = 1.
Since we are working in a sentential framework, we can express this sentence
and talk about it without first being aware of exactly when PDan(pHeadsq) = 1/2
is true, i.e. which set of worlds, or event, it corresponds to. This is particularly
important because determining which set of worlds a sentence corresponds to is
essentially to give a semantics, but we will see that developing semantics for self-
referential probabilities is not simple, so we shouldn’t build into the framework
that we already know which set of worlds it corresponds to.
We will therefore consider languages which can express such embedded prob-
abilities,4 so will allow constructions of the form:
PA(. . .PB(. . .PA . . .) . . .) . . .
We will furthermore allow for self-applied probability notions, or higher order
probabilities, namely constructions such as
PA(. . .PA . . .) . . .
These offer us two advantages. Firstly, they allow for a systematic syntax once
one wishes to allow for embedded probabilities, as one then does not need to
impose syntactic restrictions on the formulation of the language. Secondly, their
inclusion may be fruitful, as was argued for in Skyrms (1980). For example, we
can then formalise facts about the introspective abilities of an agent, or the
uncertainty or vagueness about the first order probabilities. One might disagree
and argue that they are trivial and collapse to the first level, however even
then one should still allow such sentences to be expressed in the language and
instead include an extra principle to state this triviality of the higher levels.
Such a principle would be an introspection principle, which is a formalisation
of:
4Gaifman (1988) assigns probabilities to members of an event space F ⊆ ℘(Ω) and he
makes the assumption on this that there is an operation PR with
PR : F × set of closed intervals → F
satisfying certain properties. So for each event A ∈ F and interval ∆ there is an event that,
informally, says that the true probability of A lies in the interval ∆. (We will relax this
interpretation and be interested in general relationships between probabilities, for example
in one agent’s attitudes towards another agent’s attitudes.) It is much easier to make the
assumption that we have such embedded probabilities in the sentential framework than in the
events framework because because in the events framework it is required that PR(A,∆) ⊆ Ω
but there is no analogous assumption for the sentential variety. We can define the language
first and then determine a semantics afterwards.
3
1. Introduction
If the probability of ϕ is > r,
then the probability of “The probability of ϕ is > r” is 1.
In fact we will see that this principle will lead to challenges once self-referential
sentences like π are allowed for.
There are two main ways of giving languages that can express higher order
probabilities but do not allow for self-referential probabilities. The first is to
consider a hierarchy of languages or a typed probability notion. This is given
by a language L0 that cannot talk about probabilities at all, together with
a metalanguage L1 that can talk about probabilities of the sentences of L0,
together with another metalanguage L2 that can talk about the probabilities of
sentences of L1 and L0, etc. This leads to a sequence of languages L0,L1,L2, . . .
each talking about probabilities of the previous languages. In ordinary language
we can talk about multiple probability notions, such as objective chance and
the degrees of beliefs of different agents, but the different notions should be
able to apply to all the sentences of our language and there should not be a
hierarchy of objective chance notions ch0, ch1, . . . applying to the different levels
of language. However that is what one would obtain by having the idea of a
hierarchy of languages, each containing their own probability notions that apply
to the previous languages. This would be the approach that corresponds to
Tarski’s proposal in response to the liar paradox (Tarski, 1956). Tarski’s solution
has been rejected for various reasons including the one analogous to that just
suggested: in ordinary language we don’t have a hierarchy of truth predicates,
but instead we have one truth predicate that can apply to all sentences of the
language (Kripke, 1975).
The second approach is to instead consider one language where the probabil-
ity notion is formalised by an operator. This is the approach taken in Aumann
(1999); Fagin et al. (1990); Ognjanović and Rašković (1996); Bacchus (1990),
amongst others. Each of these differ in their exact set-up but the idea is that
one adds a recursive clause saying: if ϕ is a sentence of the language then we
can form another sentence of the language that talks about the probability of
ϕ. For example in Aumann (1999) and Ognjanović and Rašković (1996), one
adds the clause:
If ϕ ∈ L then P>rϕ ∈ L
to the construction rules of the language L.5 In this language P>r acts syntac-
tically as an operator like ¬ instead of like a predicate so this is not a language
of first order logic but is instead an operator logic.
Both the typed and operator languages avoid self-referential probabilities,
but they cannot easily account for quantification over all of the sentences of the
language. So for example they cannot express:
All tautologies have probability 1. (1.1)
Artemisa is certain that Chris has some non-extremal degrees of belief. (1.2)
The former is an axiom of probability theory, so something we would like
to be able to write as an axiom in a formal language. Although this could be
expressed by a schema, i.e. a collection of sentences of the language, existential
5For some choice of values of r, for example the rational numbers.
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sentences like, “Chris has some non-extremal degrees of belief”, could not. Sen-
tence (1.2) is a statement of the interaction between two agents that we may
want to be able to express and discuss.
There is a language for reasoning about probabilities that can express this
quantification: one can formalise probability within standard first order logic
by either adding predicate symbols, P>r, or a function symbol, P. To have this
appropriately formalise probability, one needs to have the objects to which one
assigns probabilities, or representations thereof, in the domain of the first order
model. Typically this is done by assuming that we have available a background
of arithmetic and a way of coding the sentences of the language into numbers,
usually via a so-called Gödel coding, so for each sentence ϕ there will be some
natural number #ϕ which represents it, and the formal language will refer to
this by pϕq. For a formal introduction to this see Section 1.6. These are the
kinds of languages that we study in this thesis.
In these languages we can now easily formulate quantified claims like (1.1)
and (1.2) just by using usual first order quantification, e.g. by:
∀x(Prov(x)→ P=1(x)) (1.3)
PArtemisa=1 p∃x(PChris>0 (x) ∧ PChris<1 (x))q (1.4)
If one takes enough arithmetic as a background theory6 then one can derive
the diagonal lemma for this language and therefore result in admitting sentences
that talk about their own probabilities. So by formalising probability as a (type-
free) predicate, we can prove that sentences like π must exist. More carefully,
we can then see that there is a sentence, called π, where
π ↔ ¬P>1/2pπq
is arithmetically derivable. This is analogous to the situation in Gödel’s incom-
pleteness theorem where one shows that there must be a Gödel sentence G such
that
G↔ ¬ProvPApGq
is arithmetically derivable. Such self-referential probabilities therefore arise
when we consider languages that can express such quantification. This ability to
express quantification is a very persuasive argument in favour of the predicate
approach to probabilities.
One might try to instead account for this quantification by working with
operators and propositional quantification. However, if we give propositional
quantification a substitutional understanding it quickly becomes equivalent to
a truth predicate and self-reference becomes expressible (this argument is pre-
sented in Halbach et al., 2003; Stern, 2015b).
There is a further expressive resource which we may wish to obtain in our
formal language and which will result in self-referential probabilities: the ability
to refer back to expressions and talk about substitutions of these expressions
This is what happens when we say:
The probability of the sentence labelled π is not greater than 1/2.(π)
So having this ability will result in obtaining self-referential probability sen-
tences. Further, this is an expressive resource that is fundamental to natural
6Peano arithmetic will suffice. See Section 1.6.
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language so should also be available in a formal language. This line of argument
is taken from Stern (2015b, sec. 2.3.3).
So to sum up this discussion here: the idea is that if we want to be able
to have a formal language that can express higher order probabilities and have
the ability to express quantification into the probability notion, then such self-
referential probabilities end up being expressible.
What we can now express
Self-referential probabilities might themselves be useful to express certain situ-
ations.
The example of Alice and the promotion from Page 1 was a situation which
expresses self-reference. The sentence “Alice will get the promotion” is true if
and only if she has a low degree of belief in that very sentence. In the expres-
sively rich languages there is already a sentence with that feature, π, which can
be used to interpret Alice’s situation. In the operator language we would add
an additional axiom Promotion ↔ ¬P>1/2Promotion. What is ultimately im-
portant in our considerations of the language we should use is not whether it is
a predicate or operator language but instead whether it has such diagonal sen-
tences around. If one adds by force diagonal sentences to the operator language,
for example to represent Alice’s situation, then we are in the same ball-park as
when we consider predicate languages that already have such expressive power
inbuilt (because of the Diagonal Lemma) and the same problems will arise.7 So
if one thinks that situations like Alice’s are possible, one will be forced to worry
about these issues. By dealing with a framework that can already express all
these diagonal sentences (which we do by working with a first order language
for formulating probability) we obtain a framework where any (self-referential)
set-up can be easily considered. Of course, there is a place for studying restric-
tive frameworks, but the step to the expressive frameworks is important as they
can describe situations that might arise.
One might think that π doesn’t appropriately formalise Alice’s situation
because Alice’s situation doesn’t really express self reference. Alice might just
be unaware of her boss’s intentions then there is no problem, she can have some
credences in Promotion without knowing that that affects the truth value of
Promotion. For π, the equivalence between π and ¬P>1/2pπq holds whenever
arithmetic holds, which we will assume to hold everywhere. For Promotion,
the equivalence is imposed on the setup. If it is common knowledge8 that the
equivalence holds, i.e. where all agents are certain that all agents are certain
. . . that Promotion↔ ¬PAlice>1/2 pPromotionq, then we can model the situation by
only considering worlds where the equivalence holds. If that assumption is made
then π can appropriately formalise Promotion.
Egan and Elga (2005) argued that in a situation like Alice’s, she should
not believe the equivalence between Promotion and ¬PAlice>1/2 pPromotionq. They
therefore say that although it seems like Alice should have learned the equiv-
alence, that is in fact not the case since rational agents should never learn
that they are anti-experts, i.e. that their (all-things-considered) attitudes anti-
corrolate with the truth. Their argument is based on the inconsistency of be-
lieving this equivalence, being introspective and being probabilistically coherent.
7See Stern (2015b) and references therein for Diagonal Modal Logic.
8By which we mean common probabilistic certainty.
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Such a response isn’t available in the case of π, so we have to account for sit-
uations where the agent does believe that she is an anti-expert about π. Once
we then have to study that, we can also use these considerations for Promotion
and allow an agent to learn that she is an anti-expert about Promotion too.
Here is another example in a similar spirit, now modified from Carr (ms):
Suppose your (perfectly reliable) yoga teacher has informed you that
the only thing that could inhibit your ability to do a handstand is
self-doubt, which can make you unstable or even hamper your ability
to kick up into the upside-down position. In fact you will be able to
do a handstand just if you believe you will manage to do it to degree
greater than (or equal to) a half.
This is a situation where
Handstand↔ P>1/2pHandstandq
is stipulated to be true (and common knowledge). This situation is analogous
to the case of Alice and her promotion except it is now not an undermining
sentence but a self-supporting sentence.
There is a further way that one might come across self-referential sentences
in natural language or natural situations: In natural language we can assert
sentences that are self-referential or not depending on the empirical situation
and an appropriate formal language representing natural language should be
able to do this too.9
Consider the following example.
Suppose that Smith is a Prime Ministerial candidate and the candi-
dates are campaigning hard today. Smith might say:
I don’t have high credence in anything that the
man who will be Prime Minister says today.
(1.5)
Imagine further, that unknown to Smith, he will win the election and
will become Prime Minister.
Due to the empirical situation, (1.5) expresses a self-referential probability as-
sertion analogous to π, the self-referential probability example from Page 1. To
reject Smith’s assertion of (1.5) as formalisable would put serious restrictions
on the natural language sentences that are formalisable.
Truth as a predicate
Such discussions are not new. The possibility of self-reference is also at the
heart of the liar paradox, namely a sentence that says of itself that it is not
true. This can be expressed by:
λ is not true(λ)
In Kripke’s seminal paper he says:
9An example of empirical self-reference in the case of truth is Kripke’s Nixon example from
Kripke (1975, pg. 695).
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Many, probably most, of our ordinary assertions about truth or
falsity are liable, if our empirical facts are extremely unfavourable,
to exhibit paradoxical features.. . . it would be fruitless to look for an
intrinsic criterion that will enable us to sieve out—as meaningless,
or ill-formed—those sentences which lead to paradox. (Kripke, 1975,
p. 691–692)
Analogously, if we wish our formal language to represent our ordinary asser-
tions about probability, for example the case of Smith and his distrust in the
prime ministerial candidate, we should allow for the possibility of self-referential
sentences. We should then provide a clear syntax and semantics that can ap-
propriately deal with these sentences as well as providing an axiomatic theory
for reasoning about the language. This is one of the important goals of this
thesis, and it is what we will work on in Part I.
The fact that truth is usually understood to be a predicate leads us to a
further argument for understanding probability as a predicate: if possible, dif-
ferent notions, like truth and probability, should be formalised in a similar way.
This argument has also been used for formalising (all-or-nothing) modalities as
predicates.
It seems arbitrary that some notions are formalised as predicates,
while others are conceived as operators only. It also forces one to
switch between usual first-order quantification and substitutional
quantification without any real need. (Halbach et al., 2003, p. 181)
There has been work on arguing that modalities, such as belief, knowledge
or necessity, should be formulated as predicates, and these arguments will often
also apply to our setting where we suggest that probability should be formalised
by first order logic means, either by a predicate or function symbol.
Stress-test
Such self-referential probabilities are also interesting because they can provide
a stress test for accounts of probability. If an account or theory of probability
also works when self-referential probabilities are admitted into the framework,
then this shows that the theory is robust and can stand this stress test.
For example, in Caie (2013) such self-referential probabilities have recently
been used to argue that traditional analysis of rationality requirements on agents
does not appropriately apply to self-referential probabilities and that in such a
setting an agent may be rationally required to be probabilistically incoherent.
We will further study Caie’s proposal in Part II and reject his modification.
1.1.2 Some previous work on self-referential probabilities
In Leitgeb (2012), Leitgeb develops the beginnings of what might be called a
revision semantics for probability, though he only goes to stage ω. He also
provides a corresponding axiomatic theory. Our work in Chapter 5 can be seen
as an extension of the work in that paper.
In Caie (2013) and Caie (2014), Caie argues that traditional arguments for
probabilism, such as the argument from accuracy, the Dutch Book argument
and the argument from calibration, all need to be modified in the presence of
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self-referential probabilities, and that so modified they do not lead to the ra-
tional requirement for beliefs to be probabilistic. In Part II, which is in part
a development of Campbell-Moore (2015b), we more carefully consider Caie’s
suggested modifications of the rational requirements from accuracy and Dutch
book considerations. In Caie (2013), Caie also presents a prima facie argument
against probabilism by noticing its inconsistency with the formalised principles
of introspection when such self-reference is present. We will argue in this thesis
that one should reformulate an introspection principle by using a truth predi-
cate. Once one adopts a consistent theory of truth this will avoid inconsistency.
This is discussed in sections 3.4.1, 1.4 and 2.4.2. Initial work by Caie on this
topic is in his thesis, Caie (2011). There (p. 63) he provides a strong Kleene
Kripke style semantics which could be seen as a special case of our semantics
developed in Chapter 3,10 though I was unaware of his construction before de-
veloping the version here.
A probabilistic liar is also mentioned in Walsh (2013) who notes it can cause
a problem for a probabilistic account of confirmation, though leaves analysis of
this problem to future work.
Lastly, the unpublished paper Christiano et al. (ms) also considers the chal-
lenge that probabilism is inconsistent with introspection. In their paper Chris-
tiano et al. show that probabilism is consistent with an approximate version of
introspection where one can only apply introspection to open intervals of values
in which the probability lies. Their result is interesting, but in this thesis we
will discuss the alternative suggestion just mentioned that introspection should
be reformulated. These authors come from a computer science background and
believe that these self-referential probabilities might have a role to play in the
development of artificial intelligence.
Although there is not yet much work on self-referential probabilities, there
is a lot of work in closely related areas. There is a large amount of research into
theories of truth, which we will draw from for this thesis. Much of that setup
and framework is presented in (Halbach, 2014). There is also existing work on
the predicate approach to modality. Papers I have used heavily in the writing
of thesis are Halbach et al. (2003); Halbach and Welch (2009); Stern (2015b,
2014a,b, 2015a), where these authors consider frameworks with sentences that
can talk about their own necessity and use possible world framework to analyse
them. The semantics that we study that are based on probabilistic modal
structures can be seen as generalisations of their semantics.
1.2 What is the notion of probability for our
purposes?
In this thesis we are trying to capture the notion of probability in an expressively
rich language. Before we can get started on that we should carefully introduce
a formal notion of probability and then discuss interpretations of it.
10His semantics works with a single probability measure over W instead of measures for each
w, and his definitions don’t give the equivalent of the non-consistent evaluation functions.
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1.2.1 Probability axioms
We will talk about probability in two different, but related, ways. Firstly the
set-up that is common in the mathematical study of probability theory is to
consider probabilities attaching to events, or subsets of some sample space.
Definition 1.2.1. A probability space is some 〈Ω,F ,m〉 such that:
• Ω is a non-empty set, called the sample space.
• F is a Boolean algebra over Ω, i.e. F ⊆ ℘(Ω) such that:
– ∅ ∈ F , Ω ∈ F ,
– If A ∈ F then Ω \A ∈ F ,
– If A,C ∈ F , then A ∪ C ∈ F
– We call F a σ-algebra if it also satisfies: for any countable collection
{Ai}i∈N ⊆ F ,
⋃
i∈NAi ∈ F .
• m : F → R is a finitely additive probability measure (over F), i.e.:
– For all A ∈ F , m(A) > 0
– m(Ω) = 1
– If A,C ∈ F and A ∩ C = ∅, then m(A ∪ C) = m(A) +m(C)
– We call m countably additive if it also satisfies: for any countable
collection {Ai}i∈N ⊆ F of pairwise disjoint sets (i.e. for i 6= j, Ai ∩
Aj = ∅) if
⋃
i∈NAi ∈ F then m(
⋃
i∈NAi) =
∑
i∈Nm(Ai).
11
If m is not countably additive we may call it a merely finitely additive probability
measure.
In fact we will typically be considering probability spaces where F = ℘(Ω)
and where m is not assumed to be countably additive. This will generally be
possible because of the following well-known theorem:
Proposition 1.2.2. If 〈Ω,F ,m〉 is a probability space, then for any Boolean
algebra F∗ ⊇ F , there is an extension of m to m∗ which is a finitely additive
probability measure over F∗. In particular, it can always be extended to ℘(Ω).
We are generally interested in considering a logic describing probability and
as discussed in the introduction, for that purpose we will generally consider p
as a function assigning real number to sentences. We then define what it is for
some such p to be probabilistic. In fact this is what is often considered in logic
and philosophy.
Definition 1.2.3. Let ModL be the collection of all models of L.
p : SentL → R is probabilistically coherent, or probabilistic, iff for all ϕ,ψ ∈
SentL,
• If M |= ϕ for all M∈ ModL then p(ϕ) = 1
• p(ϕ) > 0
11By the Caratheodory extension theorem, such an m can always be extended to a countably
additive measure over the smallest σ-algebra extending F .
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• If M |= ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) for all M∈ ModL, then
p(ϕ ∨ ψ) = p(ϕ) + p(ψ)
Suppose L is a language extending the language of (Peano-)arithmetic, (LPA,
see Definition 1.6.1). p is N-additive iff12
p(∃xϕ(x)) = lim
n
p(ϕ(0) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ(n)).
We say p is probabilistic over a theory Γ if whenever Γ ` ϕ, p(ϕ) = 1. This
is equivalent to replacing ModL in the definition by all models of the language
L satisfying the theory Γ, ModΓL.
This definition of p being probabilistic is essentially saying that it is given
by a probability measure over the models.
Proposition 1.2.4. p : SentL → R is probabilistic iff there is some m which is
a finitely additive probability measure over 〈ModL, ℘(ModL)〉 such that
p(ϕ) = m{M ∈ ModL | M |= ϕ}.
p : SentL → R is probabilistic over Γ if there is some m a finitely additive
probability measure over 〈ModΓL, ℘(Mod
Γ
L)〉 such that
p(ϕ) = m{M ∈ ModΓL | M |= ϕ},
where ModΓL denotes the set of all L-models of the theory Γ.
Being N-additive in part captures the notion that m is countably additive,
but it also captures the idea that the domain is exactly 0, 1, 2 . . .. It was called σ-
additivity in Leitgeb (2008) and Leitgeb (2012). For the case where the language
is just LPA, this is the Gaifman condition (see, e.g. Scott and Krauss, 2000). We
have a corresponding result for N-additivity, which makes precise our claim that
N-additivity states σ-additivity and fixes the domain to be N.
Definition 1.2.5. Suppose L is a language extending LPA.
We say thatM is an N-model if the LPA-reduct ofM is the standard natural
number structure, N, i.e. if M interprets the arithmetic vocabulary as in the
standard model of arithmetic and has a domain consisting of the collection of
standard natural numbers.
Let ModNL denote the collection of N-models.
Proposition 1.2.6 (Gaifman and Snir, 1982, Basic Fact 1.3). Suppose L is a
language extending the language of (Peano-)arithmetic.
p is probabilistic and N-additive iff there is some m a countably additive
probability measure over 〈ModNL,F〉, where F is the σ-field generated by {{M ∈
ModNL | M |= ϕ} | ϕ ∈ SentL}, such that
p(ϕ) = m{M ∈ ModNL | M |= ϕ}.
12If the extended language also has a natural number predicate, we will then say that p is
N-additive if
p(∃x ∈ N ϕ(x)) = lim
n
p(ϕ(0) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ(n)).
11
1. Introduction
We will sometimes be considering non-classical probabilities where one may
drop the requirement that the models of the language be classical models. In
that case we might use an alternative axiomatisation. Those axioms are:
• p(>) = 1,
• p(⊥) = 0,
• p(ϕ ∧ ψ) + p(ϕ ∨ ψ) = p(ϕ) + p(ψ),
• If ϕ  ψ then p(ϕ) 6 p(ψ).
For the case where we consider logical consequence, , is as given in classical
logic, this is equivalent to the standard axiomatisation.
1.2.2 Which interpretation
Now we’ve presented certain axioms for probability, but probability is interesting
because it can be used to characterise something. There are many different
applications of the probability notion. Three very important and influential
ones are:
• Subjective probability, or the credences or degrees of belief of a (rational)
agent. This measures the strength of an agent’s beliefs.
• Objective chances. These identify some property of the world.
• Evidential probability, or logical probability. This measures the strength
of an argument for a conclusion.
The application of probability that I am particularly interested in is sub-
jective probability, or an agent’s degrees of belief. This interpretation will be
focused on throughout this thesis. The discussion in Part II is specific to this
interpretation. However much of what we will be saying in Part I won’t be
specific to that interpretation and will apply to the other notions, particularly
to the notion of objective chances.
If one is interested in subjective probability when developing a semantics,
one will want the flexibility to talk about different agent’s beliefs. We will
therefore generally add the probability facts directly into the model to allow
for this flexibility. We do this by basing the semantic construction on possible
world structures. This is the sort of semantics that we develop in Chapters 3
and 4 and Section 5.3. In these semantics we will generalise theories of truth
by adding in probability. These constructions don’t then tell us anything more
about truth.13
There is another aim that one might have when developing a semantics
for probability: to develop a notion of probability that can tell us something
additional about, for example, the liar-paradox, and how truth and self-reference
act. This may involve measuring how paradoxical a sentence is. One might then
work with an alternative interpretation or application of the probability notion.
We might call this interpretation:
13As presented in Section 3.4.3 for probabilistic modal structures which have no contingent
vocabulary, the semantics is then just the truth semantics with the probability being 1 if the
sentence is true, 0 if false and [0, 1] otherwise.
12
1.3 Connection to the Liar paradox
• Semantic probability
This would be closely related to a degrees of truth theory. It might, for example,
say that the probability of the liar sentence, λ, is 1/2.14 A semantics capturing
this use of probability is presented in Section 5.2, extending Leitgeb (2012)
where the approximate idea is that the probability of a sentence is given by
the proportion of the stages of the revision sequence in which the sentence is
satisfied. Another semantics that would fall into this category would be to take
the probability of a sentence to be determined by the “proportion of” the Kripke
fixed points in which it is true. We will not develop or further mention such a
semantics in this thesis.
1.3 Connection to the Liar paradox
The liar sentence is a sentence that says that it is not true.
In our formal framework, we will capture this by a sentence, called λ, for
which
λ↔ ¬Tpλq
is arithmetically derivable. As we have mentioned pϕq is a way for our language
to refer to the sentence ϕ, which it does by referring to a natural number that
is the code of the sentence. By the diagonal lemma such a sentence will exist in
the language LT, where T is added as a predicate to the base language L (see
Section 1.6 for further details).
The liar sentence causes a paradox because it leads to contradictions un-
der basic assumptions about truth. Tarski argued that the T-biconditionals,
Tpϕq ↔ ϕ, are constitutive of our notion of truth and it is these that lead to
contradiction due to the instance for the liar sentence: λ↔ Tpλq.
Proposition 1.3.1. The principles Tpϕq ↔ ϕ for all sentences ϕ ∈ SentLT
lead to inconsistencies in classical logic.
This paradox has led to a vast amount of research on the question of how
the truth predicate should work.
Our probabilistic liar, π, is taken to be a sentence such that
π ↔ ¬P>1/2pπq
is arithmetically derivable. Again, by the diagonal lemma, this will exist in a
language, LP>r where we add predicates P>r for some class of real numbers.15
There is just at first glance a syntactical similarity between λ and π. π
doesn’t lead to problems under such basic assumptions as λ does, but it does
lead to conflicts between seemingly harmless principles, for example a principle
of introspection, which we will present in the next section, or deference, which
we will present in Section 1.7.1.
Throughout this thesis we will be using techniques developed for dealing
with the liar paradox to help us deal with the probabilistic liar.
14And perhaps also: sentences that are grounded should receive probability 1 or 0 depending
on whether they are true or false.
15See Definition 1.6.7.
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1.4 The problem with introspection
There is a conflict between probabilism and introspection that has been dis-
cussed in Caie (2013); Christiano et al. (ms); Campbell-Moore (2015b). Al-
though one might not want to support introspection, it seems to be a bad
feature that it is contradictory in this way.
Theorem 1.4.1. p : SentLP>r → R
16 cannot satisfy all:
• p is probabilistic over Peano Arithmetic, PA, in particular:
– If PA ` ϕ↔ ψ, then p(ϕ) = p(ψ),
– p(ϕ) = 1 =⇒ p(¬ϕ) = 0.
• Introspection:
– p(ϕ) > r =⇒ p(P>rpϕq) = 1
– p(ϕ) 6> r =⇒ p(¬P>rpϕq) = 1
Where ϕ and ψ may be any sentences of LP>r .
Similarly, the following theory is inconsistent (over classical logic):
• – ProvPA(pϕ↔ ψq)→ (P>rpϕq↔ P>rpψq)
– P=1pϕq→ ¬P>1/2p¬ϕq
• – P>rpϕq→ P=1pP>rpϕqq
– ¬P>rpϕq→ P=1p¬P>rpϕqq
Proof. Consider π with
PA ` π ↔ ¬P>1/2pπq.
p(π) > 1/2 =⇒ p(P>1/2pπq) = 1
=⇒ p(¬P>1/2pπq) = 0
=⇒ p(π) = 0
p(π) 6> 1/2 =⇒ p(¬P>1/2pπq) = 1
=⇒ p(π) = 1
So any assignment of probability to π leads to a contradiction. The second
result holds because all this reasoning can be formalised by this theory.
We will discuss this later in Sections 2.4.2, 3.4.1 and 5.4.2. In particular we
will argue in Section 3.4.1 that this formalisation of the idea of introspection is
wrong and it should instead be formulated as:
TpP>(ϕ, prq)q→ P= (pP>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
and Tp¬P>(ϕ, prq)q→ P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
where one adopts a consistent (therefore non-transparent) theory for the truth
predicate.17 So we suggest rejecting the principle of introspection, but not by
rejecting the motivation behind it but instead by rejecting its formulation.
16SentLP>r
means the sentences of the language LP>r . See Section 1.6.3.
17In such a theory, Tp¬P>1/2pπqq↔ ¬P>1/2pπq cannot hold.
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A very similar result was used in Caie (2013) to argue that probabilism
should be rejected. In fact we do argue in Chapters 3 and 4 that probabilism
should be rejected but not in the way that Caie suggests, instead in a more
cautious way. We will reject probabilism by instead saying that an agent should
be non-classically probabilistically coherent.
In Egan and Elga (2005), closely related contradictions were taken to show
that in situations like Promotion an agent should not believe the biconditional
Promotion↔ ¬P>1/2Promotion, i.e. she cannot take herself to be an anti-expert.
In fact the contradiction does not require that the agent believe Promotion ↔
¬P>1/2Promotion, it just requires that she assigns the same degree of belief
to Promotion as she does to ¬P>1/2Promotion. As discussed in Section 1.1.1,
the analogous response isn’t available in the case of π. For the case of π,
the biconditional is arithmetically derivable so an agent should believe it (so
long as they are probabilistically certain about Robinson arithmetic).18 So
we have to account for a sentence like π where an agent cannot satisfy this
introspection principle and perhaps then we can apply such considerations to
cases like Promotion and allow an agent to learn they are an anti-expert.
1.5 Questions to answer and a broad overview
A very important question to answer when we have self-referential probabilities
is:
How can one develop a formal semantics for this language?
A semantics tells one when sentences are true and false. This is important to
do to better understand the languages that we are working with. This will also
help us see which principles are inconsistent in the self-referential framework and
how to modify principles that are inconsistent to allow them to be consistent.
When developing a semantics one should also look to develop axiomatic theories
for the language. We consider these questions in Part I.
In Part I there are four chapters. The first provides an introduction to the
challenge of providing a semantics and the strategy we will use in the other
chapters. This is to apply theories of truth to possible world structures, in
the form of probabilistic modal structures. These structures immediately allow
for a definition of a semantics in the operator language but we will show that
the analogous definition cannot be applied in the predicate setting as there are
often no Prob-PW-models. Chapters 3 and 4 develop Kripke-style theories of
probability which require one to move to non-standard probabilities but allows
one to obtain models which are in a certain sense stable. Chapter 5 develops a
revision theory of probability where we retain classical probabilities but result
in a transfinite sequence of models. A more detailed overview of these chapters
can be found in Section 2.6.
Another important question is:
What rationality constrains are there on an agent once such expressive
languages are considered?
18Furthermore, if we use the strong diagonal lemma we can show that there is some term t
of LPA such that PA ` t = p¬P>1/2tq, and therefore if we just assume that arithmetic is true,
then we have P>rt↔ P>rp¬P>1/2tq.
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and, relatedly,
To what degree should a rational agent believe a sentence that says
something about her own degrees of belief?
These questions focus on the subjective interpretation of probability. In Part II,
we consider these questions. For such self-referential sentences, a choice of the
agent’s credences will affect which worlds are possible. Caie (2013) has argued
that the accuracy and Dutch book arguments should be modified because the
agent should only care about her inaccuracy or payoffs in the world which could
be actual if she adopted the considered credences. We consider the accuracy
argument in Chapter 7 and the Dutch book argument in Chapter 8. Much of
Chapter 8 is taken to determining a criterion saying that an agent should try
to minimize his overall guaranteed losses, assuming he bets with his credences.
Both these accuracy and Dutch book criteria mean that an agent is rationally
required to be probabilistically incoherent (and not be representable in our
suggested semantics), have negative credences and to fail to assign the same
credence to logically equivalent sentences. We will also show that this accuracy
criterion depends on how inaccuracy is measured and that the accuracy criterion
differs from the Dutch book criterion.
This also has connections to the first question if we want our semantics to
be able to represent rational agents. If rationality considerations say that an
agent should be one way, our semantics should allow the probability notion
to be that way. In fact we will reject Caie’s suggested modifications. In the
final section of Chapter 7, Section 7.3, we reconsider the accuracy criterion and
instead suggest that the agent should consider how accurate her credences are
from the perspective of her current credences. We will also consider how to
generalise this version of the accuracy criteria and present ideas suggesting that
it connects to the semantics developed in Part I suggesting that our semantics
can represent rational agents. In the final section of Chapter 8, Section 8.6, we
suggest that this is a case where an agent should not bet with his credences.
Before starting on Part I, we will first present some technical preliminaries
and briefly mention conditional probabilities, which won’t generally be consid-
ered.
1.6 Technical preliminaries
Throughout the thesis we will be using formal languages that can express self-
referential sentences such as π. In analysing these sentences we will be using
much of the terminology, as well as techniques and tools developed for the liar
paradox. For example we will generally be following the notation from Halbach
(2014).
1.6.1 Arithmetisation
Setup 1. We will consider first order languages to have the logical constants
=, ∨, ¬ and ∃. The other connectives, ∧, ∀ and →, will be taken as defined as
usual, e.g. ϕ ∧ ψ := ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ).
For an introduction to first order logic, see any introductory logic textbook.
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We will often work with formal languages L that extend the language of
Peano Arithmetic. More generally we could allow L to just be able to code
arithmetic, but for simplicity we will simply assume that we have Peano arith-
metic directly available in our language.
Definition 1.6.1. LPA is a first-order language with identity with the constant
0, standing for zero, a one-place function symbol S standing for the successor
function taking n to n+ 1, and two pace function symbols + and × for addition
and multiplication. We shall also assume we have a number of special additional
(non-contingent) predicates and function symbols available in LPA as specified
in Definition 1.6.2.
A language L extends LPA if it adds additional vocabulary, which we will
sometimes refer to as contingent or empirical vocabulary. Sometimes we will
also allow that these languages contain a natural number predicate N , but if so
that will be explicitly stated.
The theory of Peano arithmetic, PA is given by the defining equations for
zero, successor, addition and multiplication as axioms. PA should also contain
the defining axioms for the additional predicates and function symbols added
to LPA (in Definition 1.6.2). Finally, PA contains the induction axioms, which
are all sentences of the form
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x(ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x)))→ ∀xϕ(x).
For a language L extending LPA the theory PAL extends the theory of PA
as the induction principle includes an instance for each ϕ a formula of L. If
the extended language contains a natural number predicate, N , then all the
quantifiers in the theory of PA are restricted to this predicate, for example, the
induction principle is then:
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x(N(x)→ (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x))))→ ∀x(N(x)→ ϕ(x)).
We will often drop the explicit reference to L, and when PA is talked about in
the context of an extended language PAL will be meant.
N refers to the standard model of PA. This contains just the numbers 0, 1,
2 etc and interprets the vocabulary as intended.
Robinson arithmetic, or Q, is the theory in LPA which replaces the induction
scheme by19
∀x(x 6= 0→ ∃z(z + x = y)).
We will use arithmetic to provide us with objects with which to refer to
sentences of the language and to assign probabilities to these sentences. An
assumption that we will have to make to be able to do this is that the language
that we work with is countable and that their syntax is recursive. This is an
assumption that we may wish to drop but we will then need an alternative
syntax-theory. To keep things simple we will therefore assume that every lan-
guage we discuss is countable and has recursive syntax and we will not generally
explicitly note this restriction.
Definition 1.6.2. Take some language L (that is countable with recursive
syntax).
19Again, if L contains a natural number predicate then all quantifiers in Q will be restricted
to N .
17
1. Introduction
We denote the set of sentences of L by SentL and the set of formulas of L by
FormL. In Section 1.6.3 we will introduce languages like LP,T extending some
base language, L with extra predicates etc to represent probability or truth. For
these languages, if L is clear from context we will drop the explicit reference
to it, for example writing SentP,T instead of to SentLP,T , or SentP> instead of
SentLP> , and similarly for Form.
We assume some coding # of expressions of L to N that is recursive and one-
to-one, so #ϕ stands for the number which codes ϕ. Details of coding can be
found in textbooks that include an account of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.
For ϕ ∈ FormL, we let pϕq denote the numeral20 corresponding to #ϕ .
We shall assume that we have predicates in LPA (strongly) representing SentL
and FormL, so for example SentL(n) is a theorem of PA iff n = #ϕ for some
ϕ ∈ SentL.21
If . is a syntactic operation we will denote its corresponding operation on
natural numbers by and assume that we have this as a function symbol .. in LPA
representing it. For example pϕq∨. pψq = pϕ∨ψq is a theorem of PA, and so is
¬. pϕq = p¬ϕq. Also, e.g. if P>r is a predicate in L, then P>r. pϕq = pP>rϕq is
a theorem of PA.
For a term t of LPA we denote the interpretation of the term t in the standard
model of arithmetic, N, by tN. For example (Sn)N = n + 1. We will also
represent the interpretation function by ◦, but this is understood not to be a
function symbol in our language. We therefore have that for any term t of LPA,
ptq◦ = ptNq is a true, non-atomic formula of LPA.
The substitution function will be represented by x(y/z), so pϕq(ptq/pvq) =
pϕ(t/v)q is a theorem of PA, where ϕ(t/v) denotes the formula ϕ with all in-
stances of the variable v replaced by the term t.
Using this notation and setup we present the Diagonal lemma which infor-
mally says that there must be sentences which talk about themselves.
Theorem 1.6.3 (Diagonal Lemma). Let L be a countable, recursive language
extending LPA. Let ϕ(v) be a formula of L with v the only free variable in ϕ.
Then there is a sentence δ such that:
PA ` δ ↔ ϕ(pδq)
Proof. Let sub be such that, if ψ(v) has only v free,
PA ` sub(pψ(v)q, n) = pψ(n)q.
Suppose ϕ has only v free. Then let δ := ϕ(sub(pϕ(sub(v, v))q, pϕ(sub(v, v))q)).
Now
PA `
δ ↔ ϕ(sub(pϕ(sub(v, v))q, pϕ(sub(v, v))q))
↔ ϕ(pϕ(sub(pϕ(sub(v, v))q, pϕ(sub(v, v))q))q)
↔ ϕ(pδq)
20The numeral of n is denoted n and it corresponds to the expression
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
S(. . . S(0) . . .).
21And otherwise ¬SentL(n) is a theorem of PA. I.e. it is strongly represented. This will
hold for all our representations here, but we will not explicitly mention that fact.
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Corollary 1.6.4. Suppose L extends LPA and contains a predicate P>1/2. Then
there must be a probabilistic liar, π, where
PA ` π ↔ ¬P>1/2pπq
And a probabilistic truthteller η, where
PA ` η ↔ P>1/2pηq
If the language has a predicate P=1, it will contain γ where
PA ` γ ↔ ¬∀n ∈ N
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
P=1pP=1p. . .P=1pγqqq .
If L extends LPA and contains a predicate T, there is a liar, λ, where
PA ` λ↔ ¬Tpλq.
And a truthteller, τ , where
PA ` τ ↔ Tpτq.
1.6.2 Reals
Since we are dealing with probabilities, which take values in R, we will some-
times work with languages that can refer to such probability values, typically
by assuming we have a language that extends LROCF. We will then also assume
that we have in the background the theory ROCF.
Definition 1.6.5. Let the language of real ordered closed fields, LROCF, be a
first order langauge with +, −, × (sometimes written as ·), 0, 1 and <.
Let R denote the intended model of this language. This has the real numbers
as the domain, and interprets the vocabulary as intended.
The theory ROCF is:
• Field axioms22
• Order axioms:
– ∀x, y, z(x < y → x+ z < y + z)
– ∀x, y, z((x < y ∧ 0 < z)→ x · z < y · z)
• Roots of polynomials23
– ∀x(x > 0→ ∃y(y2 = x)),
– for any n odd:
∀x0, . . . xn(xn 6= 0→ ∃y(x0 + x1 · y + x2 · y2 + . . .+ xn · yn = 0))
22See any introductory mathematical logic textbook (For example, Margaris, 1990, p. 115,
example 7. The theory ROCF can be found in example 11).
23yn is shorthand for
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
y · . . . · y.
19
1. Introduction
The rational numbers are all real numbers of the form m/n for m,n ∈ N.
The collection of all the rational numbers is denoted Q. Being equal to the
rational number r is definable in ROCF, so we will assume that LROCF has terms
denoting each rational number, r.
Let LPA,ROCF be the join of the two languages. We will then assume that we
have predicates N and R, where PA is restricted to N and ROCF is restricted
to R.24
In the language LP> , which we will introduce in Section 1.6.3, we will work
over arithmetic but refer to probability values by using a coding that also codes
the rational numbers. This will work as follows.
Definition 1.6.6. In the context of the language LP> we will assume that our
coding # codes not only the expressions of the language, but also the rational
numbers in a recursive one-to-one manner. So for r a rational number, we have
#r is a natural number which is the code of r. As for codings of the language,
we will use prq to denote the numeral corresponding to #r.
We use rat(n) to denote the rational number whose code is n. So rat(#r) = r.
We shall use Rat to denote the set of codes of rational numbers. We also
assume that we have this as a predicate available in LPA. So Rat(n) is a theorem
of PA iff there is some rational number r with n = #r.25
We shall represent operations on the rationals by the subdot notation as we
did for syntactic operations, for example we have a function symbol +. where
PA ` prq+. pqq = pr + qq. We shall use ≺ to represent the ordering on the
rational numbers, so #r ≺ #q ⇐⇒ r < q, and assume that ≺ is available in
our language. So prq ≺ pqq is a theorem of PA iff r < q.
1.6.3 The languages we consider
We now present the formal languages that will be considered throughout this
thesis.
Expressively rich probability languages
There are a few different options for how one can formulate probability within
a first order language. The first is to do something analogous to as is often
done in the operator case and add predicates P>r for each rational number, r.
The second is to consider adding a binary predicate P> and having rational
numbers, or representations thereof, also in the base language. The third is to
consider P as a function symbol.
We start with the first, and simplest, of these languages.
Definition 1.6.7. Let L be some (countable26) language extending LPA.
We will let LP>r denote the extension of L by the countably many unary
predicates P>r and P>r for each rational number r with 0 6 r 6 1.
24It is not important for our considerations if we have two copies of the common vocabulary
or if the single vocabulary of ROCF is also used to also interpret PA when restricted to the
predicate N . For simplicity we will assume we have distinct languages for the two domains.
25And PA ` ¬Rat(n) if not.
26Remember we have to assume the languages are countable for the Gödel numbering to
work. From now on we will not generally explicitly mention this in the specifications of our
languages but it will always be implicitly assumed.
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We can then take the other predicates like P6r to be defined:
Definition 1.6.8. Define:
• P6rt := P>1−r¬. t
• P<rt := P>1−r¬. t
• P=rt := P>rt ∧ P6rt
This style of definition of these derivative notions follows Heifetz and Mongin
(2001). One could also just take P>r as primitive and take P>r as defined by
P>rt := SentP>r (t) ∧ ¬P6rt. If we are dealing with an interpretation of prob-
ability that is classical then this will be equivalent, however, the advantage of
also having the primitive predicate P>r is that one can also use this language
in the non-classical settings where one can have for some ϕ and r with neither
P>rpϕq nor P6rpϕq being satisfied. This is, for example, the kinds of proba-
bilities which we study in Chapter 3. In that setup, ¬P6rpϕq will no longer
capture the intended meaning of P>rpϕq.
The predicate setting allows for greater expressive power, as discussed in
Section 1.1.1, as one can for example have a sentence
∃x(P>0x ∧ P<1x)
which would not be expressible in the operator framework. Note that this does
allow us to get higher order probabilities because the Gödel numbering will code
all sentences of the expanded language LP>r . We will also obtain self-referential
probabilities in this language via the Diagonal Lemma (Theorem 1.6.3). So for
example we have a sentence π where:
PA ` π ↔ ¬P>1/2pπq.
We will always take a certain amount of arithmetic as assumed when we
are considering LP>r because to use LP>r to express facts about probability we
need the objects to which probabilities are attached to be represented in this
language, which we do by means of Gödel coding as in Definition 1.6.2.
This is the language that we will generally work with, throughout this the-
sis, when we are interested in negative results saying that adding certain princi-
ples, like the introspection principle (Section 1.4) or a deference principle (Sec-
tion 1.7), leads to inconsistency when such self-referential sentences are around.
This is because the language is the simplest and expressively weakest of the
languages that we consider which can express such sentences, so this leads to
stronger inconsistency results: even in such a restrictive language these princi-
ples can lead to contradictions.
One important step from the operator to the predicate setting is this quan-
tificational ability. However this langauge LP>r still has limited quantificational
ability because it cannot quantify over the probability values. To allow for
such quantification we therefore need the probability values, or representations
thereof, to be present in the domain. The next language we present allows for
quantification over the probability values and it represents the probability val-
ues by just assuming that we have a domain containing the real numbers. This
language extends LP>r .
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Definition 1.6.9. Let L be some (countable) language extending LPA,ROCF.
Let LRP> denote the extension of L by a binary predicate P>(·, ·). Here
P>(pϕq, r) will stand for “the probability of ϕ is > r”.
Note that in this language we did not add P> as primitive, this is because
the quantificational ability present in LP> will allow us to define P> by:
P> (s, t)↔ ∃x > t P>(s, x)
then the usual instances of this defining equality are
P> (pϕq, r)↔ ∃x > r P>(pϕq, r)
Intended models of LRP> will always have domain interpreting R with R and
N with N.
In fact we will not be studying LRP> in this thesis, instead we will consider
a closely related language where instead of having real numbers as themselves
in the domain we work with natural number codes for real numbers. Such a
language will be used in Chapter 3. This allows us to just work with a theory of
natural numbers. Of course there are only countably many natural numbers and
uncountably many real numbers that we wish to represent, so we will instead
just code up the rational numbers.
Definition 1.6.10. Let L be some (countable) language extending LPA.
Assume we have a coding # that, as well as coding natural numbers, codes
the rational numbers into the naturals in a recursive way.
Let LP> denote the extension of L by a binary predicate P>(·, ·). Here
P>(pϕq, prq) will stand for “the probability of ϕ is > r”.
We can then again take the other facts about probability as defined, now
defining
P> (s, t)↔ ∃x  tP>(s, x)
where the usual instances are
P> (pϕq, prq)↔ ∃x  prq P>(pϕq, prq).
Here we only have codes for the rational numbers in our domain, but we may
still have models that are interpreted as assigning irrational probability values
to sentences. For example there may be a sentence ϕ where for each r <
√
2/2,
P>(pϕq, prq) is satisfied, and for each r >
√
2/2, P6 (pϕq, prq) is satisfied. The
restriction is just that P=
(
pϕq, p
√
2/2q
)
is not a sentence of the language.
Although the language is closely related to LRP> , it is different. For example,
in intended models of LRP> we will have
27
∀x(SentL(x)→ ∃yP= (x, y))
as true, whereas this will not be true in all intended models of LP> because
we may want models which we can interpret as assigning irrational numbers
27In this example we restrict attention to the probability of sentences in L. If we take
models of LRP> where the probability notion is taken to be a classical probability then we
will have this for all sentences of LRP> , however we do not do this so we can also apply these
considerations in Chapter 3 where we consider more generalised probabilities.
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to sentences though there is no variable assignment which can witness that
probability value as there is nothing in the domain standing for that irrational
number.
As we have already mentioned, we can use the above languages when we wish
to have a theory of probability for a generalised notion of probability where one
may assign ranges of probability values to single sentences. However, if that is
not of interest and one wishes to enforce from the begging that sentences assign
single point valued probability values, then one could formalise P as a function
symbol.
Definition 1.6.11. Let L be some (countable) language extending LPA,ROCF.
Let LP denote the extension of L by a function symbol P.
Here Ppϕq = r will stand for “the probability of ϕ is equal to r”.
In this language one can naturally write relationships between probability
values of different sentences, for example:
Ppϕ ∧ ψq+ Ppϕ ∧ ¬ψq = Ppϕq
or define
P(pϕq | pψq) := Ppϕ ∧ ψq
Ppψq
where the right hand side is now expressible in the language. This language is
basically equivalent to LRP> except it builds in this assumption that sentences
receive point valued probabilities. Suppose we have a theory in LRP> with a
theorem
∀x(SentP>R(x)→ ∃!yP= (x, y)),
then one can also express, e.g.
Ppϕ ∧ ψq+ Ppϕ ∧ ¬ψq = Ppϕq
in a natural way by
∃x, y, z(P= (pϕ ∧ ψq, x) ∧ P= (pϕ ∧ ¬ψq, y) ∧ P= (pϕq, z) ∧ x+ y = z).
When we want to make the assumption that sentences do receive point-
valued probablity values this is the most natural language to work with, so it
is what we use in Chapter 5. It is also used in Chapter 4 where probabilities
are interpreted as sets of probability functions, but there we work with a non-
classical semantics, so for some sentences none of the Ppϕq = r will be true.
Languages with probability operators
In the existing literature on logics for probability, probability operators have
been worked with. Such languages are restrictive and allow for higher order
probabilities but not self-referential probabilities. In this thesis we will some-
times discuss the connection between the languages that we work with and the
operator languages so we here present these operator languages.
There are a number of different operator languages that have been con-
sidered in the literature. (Aumann, 1999; Fagin et al., 1990; Ognjanović and
Rašković, 1996; Bacchus, 1990; Heifetz and Mongin, 2001). We will focus mostly
a language as set up in Heifetz and Mongin (2001). This is analogous to LP>r .
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Definition 1.6.12. Consider the extension of a (possibly propositional) lan-
guage L to LP>r given by:
• If ϕ is a sentence of L then it is a sentence of LP>r ,
• If ϕ and ψ are sentences of LP>r then so are:
– ϕ ∨ ψ,
– ¬ϕ,
– P>rϕ, for any rational number r, 0 6 r 6 1,
– P>rϕ, for any rational number r, 0 6 r 6 1.
Although we here have presented a language just with P>r we can consider
some other facts about the probability as defined. In this we follow Heifetz and
Mongin (2001). These parallel the definitions in the case for LP>r .
Definition 1.6.13. Define:
• P6rϕ := P>1−r¬ϕ
• P=rϕ := P>rϕ ∧ P6rϕ
• P<rϕ := P>1−r¬ϕ
We will also, in Section 3.3.2, use a more expressive operator language that
corresponds to LP> .
Definition 1.6.14. Let L be a language extending LPA.
Consider the extension of a language L to LP> given by:
• If ϕ is a formula of L then it is a formula of LP>r ,
• If ϕ and ψ are formulas of LP>r then so are:
– ϕ ∨ ψ,
– ¬ϕ,
– ∃xϕ(x),
– P>(ϕ, s), for any rational number r, 0 6 r 6 1, and s a term of L.
Languages with truth
Just as for probability, truth can be represented in a formal language either as
an operator or in a first-order way. For probability there were many options
for how probability could be represented in a first-order language, but for truth
there is only one natural way: to represent it using a unary predicate T.
Definition 1.6.15. Let LT denote the extension of L by adding a unary pred-
icate T, then Tpϕq will stand for “ϕ is true”.
The language with an operator for truth can be defined as usual operator
languages are defined:
Definition 1.6.16. For a language L, let LT denote the extension of L with an
operator T, defined by:
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• If ϕ is a sentence of L then it is a sentence of LT,
• If ϕ and ψ are sentences of LT then so are:
– ϕ ∨ ψ,
– ¬ϕ,
– Tϕ.
We will typically work with languages that can not only express truth but
which can express both truth and probability.
Languages with truth and probability
If we want to have both truth and probability in our language we need to ensure
that these notions can interact, so we can say things like:
“The probability of “0 = 0” is 1” is true
This will be a particular issue when we work with a language with both prob-
ability and truth as operators. If we just took an operator language, e.g. LP>r ,
and then added another operator to it, for example adding a truth operator
in the manner according to Definition 1.6.16, then certain interactions of these
notions would not be expressible, for example
P>1/2(T(0 = 0))
would not be a sentence according to the syntax rules. So instead if we want a
language with multiple operators we will need to define the language simulta-
neously. For example:
Definition 1.6.17. The syntax of LP>r,T is defined as:
• If ϕ is a sentence of L then it is a sentence of LP>r,T,
• If ϕ and ψ are sentences of the LP>r,T then so are:
– ϕ ∨ ψ,
– ¬ϕ,
– P>rϕ, for any rational number r, 0 6 r 6 1,
– P>rϕ, for any rational number r, 0 6 r 6 1,
– Tϕ.
When we have a language with both probability and truth represented as
predicates these considerations will automatically be taken care of by the as-
sumption that we are using a coding which codes all the sentences of the lan-
guage at stake. For example we can just define the syntax of LP>r,T as (LP>r )T,
which will then contain predicates P>r as well as a predicate T. In the syntax
itself there is no mention of coding, a sentence of LP>r might just be P>1/23.
The interpretation of this sentence as saying something about another sentence
comes in via the coding of sentences. In the context of this language, then we
assume that we have a coding which codes all sentences of LP>r,T. So there will
be a sentence:
TpP=1pTpP=1p0 = 0qqqq.
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We can also use the coding to take care of these issues if we have one of these
notions represented as a predicate and the other as an operator by defining the
joint language to be the predicate language closed under the recursive definition
of the operator language. E.g. then, we define the joint language LP>r,T as
(LP>r )T. Then the coding that we use when considering this again codes all
sentences, now of this language which includes an operator and some predicates.
Translations
Sometimes we are interested in translations between different languages. In
such a translation we need to translate not only the outer-occurrences of the
predicates but also occurrences “inside the codes”. This will not work by an
induction on formulas because there is no “deepest occurrence” of the predicate
which the induction can start with. Instead the codings are shown to exist by
using Kleene’s recursion theorem.
Theorem 1.6.18 (Halbach 2014, Lemma 5.2). Consider recursive first-order
languages L and L′ where L contains the predicates Qi, and L′ contains L except
that it may not contain the predicates Qi and L′ also extends PAL′ . Suppose
ψi(x) is a formula in L′ which we will translate Qi by.
There is a translation function ρ : FormL → FormL′ with:
ρ(ϕ) =

ψi(ρ.(t)) ϕ = Qit
ϕ ϕ atomic and not of the form Qit
¬ρ(ψ) ϕ = ¬ψ
ρ(ψ) ∧ ρ(χ) ϕ = ψ ∧ χ
∀xρ(ψ) ϕ = ∀xψ
where ρ. is some object level formula representing ρ, so PAL′ ` ρ.(pϕq) = pρ(ϕ)q.
Using this one could show the facts alluded to about the relationships be-
tween the above languages.
1.7 Conditional probabilities
In this thesis we will not consider conditional probabilities and also do no work
on determining an appropriate conditional for this language. Whenever we use
ϕ→ ψ in this thesis we mean the material implication that can also be defined
as ¬ϕ ∨ ψ. In this section, though, we will just mention one or two facts about
conditional probabilities in this framework.
1.7.1 Deference is inconsistent
Just as the principle of introspection is inconsistent with probabilism, so too is
a deference principle. Lewis’s principle principle mentioned in the introduction
is an example of a deference principle. The general structure of a deference
principle says that some notion of probability pA, for example an agent’s sub-
jective credences, should defer to another notion, pB, for example the objective
chances. So if pA is “aware of” what probability value is assigned to ϕ by pB,
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then pA should agree with that assignment. We will here take the principle
stating that A defers to B to imply:28
pA(ϕ | PB>1/2pϕq) > 1/2
pA(ϕ | ¬PB>1/2pϕq) 6> 1/2
Such a principle was first introduced by Miller (1966) and variants of it have
been considered in many different situations with different interpretations. Van
Fraassen’s reflection principle from Van Fraassen (1984) takes PA to be an
agent’s current probability and PB her future ones. In Lewis’s principal prin-
ciple from Lewis (1980) Lewis interprets PA as subjective probability and PB
as objective chance. In other places such a principle can express the fact that
agent A takes agent B to be an expert. Finally if A = B then this formalises
self-trust, a weakening of introspection.
Theorem 1.7.1. Let pA : LPB × LPB → R be a conditional probability func-
tion over arithmetic where LPB is some first order language extending LPA and
contains the predicate symbol PB>1/2. In particular, p
A should satisfy:
• pA(ϕ | ϕ) = 1 if pA(ϕ) 6= 0,
• pA(ϕ | ¬ϕ) = 0 if pA(¬ϕ) 6= 0,
• If pA(ϕ) = 0 then pA(¬ϕ) 6= 0,
• If PA ` ϕ↔ ψ and pA(ϕ) > 0 and pA(ψ) > 0, then pA(χ |ϕ) = pA(χ |ψ).
Then the following is unsatisfiable:
pA(ϕ | PB>1/2pϕq) > 1/2
pA(ϕ | ¬PB>1/2pϕq) 6> 1/2
Proof. Suppose pA(π) 6= 0.
1 = pA(π | π)
= pA(π | ¬PB>1/2pπq)
6> 1/2
This however does not deal with the case where pA(π) = 0 since then, at least
for some notions of conditional probability, pA(π | π) is undefined. However in
that case pA(¬π) = 1, or at least 6= 0, so pA(π | ¬π) is well defined. Then:
0 = pA(π | ¬π)
= pA(π | PB>1/2pπq)
> 1/2
28In fact that isn’t implied from the previous principle in the introduction, which was pA(ϕ|
PB=rpϕq) = r, but it does if instead we use a language like LRP> or LP> where one can quantify
over the real numbers, or codes thereof.
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So the principal principle, along with other analogous deference principles
are inconsistent in this framework. It is known that so-called undermining
chances can cause problems for the principal principle (see Lewis, 1994). An
undermining chance is some function ch0 such that it thinks another chance
function is possible. π could be seen to cause every chance function to be
undermining, since a non-undermining chance function would have to satisfy
introspection, which we saw to be impossible in Section 1.4.
It would be interesting to study this result in more detail, but we do not do
so in this thesis.
There are a number of further interesting questions that we would like to
consider but which are not considered in this thesis. For example, which prin-
ciples involving conditional probabilities are consistent? For example is
p(ϕ | Tpϕq) = 1 and p(Tpϕq | ϕ) = 1
consistent? I would guess not, but this should be studied.
These are questions that are left to future research. One reason for this
is that once higher order probabilities are allowed in the framework then the
traditional understanding of conditional probabilities, perhaps by the ratio for-
mula, seem to not appropriately formalise conditionalisation. So further analy-
sis should be done to understand how to formulate conditionalisation at all and
what we think it should satisfy before adding in extra principles involving truth
or probability.
1.7.2 Why we won’t consider them
In the language LP, one can state the ratio formula and could therefore hope to
just add a conditional probability function symbol defined by:
P(pϕq | pψq) := P(pϕ ∧ ψq)
P(pψq)
if P(pψq) > 0
One may therefore think that it would be a concept that would be easy to add to
our framework. But unfortunately things aren’t that simple. This is because the
ratio definition does not work in the intended way when ϕ itself says something
about probability.
Conditional probabilities are often used to capture updating. Under that
understanding, a conditional subjective probability p(ϕ |ψ) describes the degree
of belief that the agent would have in ϕ if she were to learn ψ. We will show,
that this is not given by the ratio formula.
We consider how intuitive this ratio formula is when we also have higher
order probabilities. We will suggest that it in fact is not the appropriate formal-
isation of updating in such a language. This is not due to any self-referential
probabilities like π as we can also observe this unintuitive feature in the operator
language.
Example 1.7.2. Suppose a fair coin is about to be tossed. Let L be a propo-
sitional language with just one propositional variable Heads which is true if the
coin will land heads. Consider the language LP>r where the probability notion
is supposed to refer to a particular agent’s degrees of belief. And consider that
agent’s conditional degrees of belief for sentences of this language. So we con-
sider p : LP>r × LP>r → R where p is supposed to be the same agent’s degrees
28
1.7 Conditional probabilities
of belief as the agent who is formalised in the language: she is reasoning about
herself.
Suppose a fair coin has been tossed and that the agent has learnt that the
coin landed heads. We might ask what her updated degree of belief that she is
certain that Heads is. If the agent’s conditional degree of belief captures what
her belief is after learning, then this question can also be expressed by:
p(P=1(Heads) |Heads) =?
Intuitively, if the agent learns Heads she should be certain of Heads so should
put p(Heads) = 1. It would therefore be intuitive if we have
p(P=1(Heads) |Heads) = 1 (1.6)
However, if we have a usual situation we would have that before the learning
the agent has p(Heads) = 1/2, and moreover, that she is certain of this fact.
Therefore, remembering that p represents the agent’s pre-learning degrees of
belief we would have
p(P=1/2(Heads)) = 1
and therefore
p(P=1(Heads)) = 0
So the ratio formula would evaluate to:
p(P=1(Heads) ∧Heads)
p(Heads)
=
0
p(Heads)
= 0 (1.7)
But if the ratio formula appropriately described updating we would need that
Eqs. (1.6) and (1.7) would evaluate to the same value.
This example will be made more formal and precise in Section 2.7.
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Part I
Developing a Semantics

Chapter 2
Preliminaries and
Challenges
The first part of this thesis focuses on developing a semantics for these lan-
guages with self-referential probabilities. A semantics will start off with some
structures, or models, and say which sentences are true or false.
We will start with models of the language without the probability notion, and
possibly some structure encoding certain facts about probability, and develop
constraints on good extensions of the probability predicate over these. We will in
fact use quite complicated background structures which will also embed certain
information about how the probability notion modelled should work.
2.1 Probabilistic modal structures
As already discussed in Section 1.2.2, this thesis will have a particular focus on
subjective probability, or the degrees of beliefs of agents, as the interpretation
of probability. Since we may have different agents who have different degrees
of belief we want to put these facts about the degrees of belief into the model
itself. We do this by using possible world structures, in the form of probabilistic
modal structures.
Many of our semantics will be based on such structures. Though not all of
them, for example in Section 5.2 we will present a semantics that does not use
such probabilistic modal structures. That semantics provides a different kind of
notion of probability: one that measures semantic behaviour of sentences.
This use of probabilistic modal structures will allow many of the technical
and conceptual advantages that probabilistic modal structures give us, as has
been witnessed in the rise of modal logic (the analogous comment was made for
the case of all-or-nothing modalities in Halbach et al. (2003)). We will answer
the question of how such structures can be used to determine a semantics in
these expressively rich languages.
2.1.1 What they are
Probabilistic modal structures are defined as follows.
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Definition 2.1.1 (Probabilistic Modal Structure). Fix some group of agents
Agents. A probabilistic modal structure, M for some language L is given by a
frame and a valuation:
A frame is some (W, {mAw|w ∈W,A ∈ Agents}) where W is some non-empty
set and mAw is some finitely additive probability measure over the powerset of
W ,1 We call the mAw accessibility measures.
An valuation, M assigns to each world w, a classical model for the language
L. When we consider a language extending LPA we will implicitly always assume
that each M(w) is an N-model.
We will use the un-boldface version of M, M, for a single L-model. More
generally, we will use a boldface version of a symbol to denote something that
assigns to each world one of the non-boldface items. For example, the metavari-
able for a function from sentences to reals that is being used as the extension of
P is p, so we use p for a probabilistic evaluation function, which assigns to each
world some such p. Occasionally we use M for a function assigning to each
world a model of the extended language, M, and T to assign to each world an
interpretation of T, T.
To see how these probabilistic modal structures work and how they are
supposed to model particular set-ups consider the following example.
Example 2.1.2. Suppose we have an urn filled with 90 balls, 30 of which are
yellow, 30 blue and 30 red. Suppose that a random ball is drawn from the urn
and the agent is told whether it is yellow or not. We will give a probabilistic
modal structure that represents the agent’s degrees of belief once the ball has
been drawn and she has been told whether it is yellow or not. To formalise
this example we use a language, L, with propositional variables Yellow, Blue
and Red, which will stand for the propositions that a yellow, blue or red ball is
drawn, respectively. We consider three worlds that will be used to represent the
colour of the ball drawn, so we take W = {wYellow, wBlue, wRed} where wYellow
is actual if a yellow ball was drawn, wBlue for the blue ball and wRed for the red.
The valuation function M describes what these worlds are like, for example the
model M(wYellow) assigns the truth-value true to Yellow and false to Blue and
Red. The other component we need to finish our description of the probabilistic
modal structure are the functions mw representing how much our agent thinks
the other worlds are possible if she is actually in the world w. If a yellow ball is
actually drawn, i.e. the agent is in the world wYellow, then she is told that the
ball is yellow, so she is certain that she is in wYellow. We therefore have that
mwYellow({wYellow}) = 1, mwYellow({wBlue}) = 0 and mwYellow({wRed}) = 0. Since
there are only finitely many worlds this is enough information to determine the
full mwYellow .
2 If a blue ball is drawn, i.e. the agent is in wBlue, then she is told
that the ball is not yellow so the only worlds she considers as still possible are
wBlue and wRed. The agent thinks it is as likely that a blue ball is drawn as a
red ball, so we will have that mwBlue({wYellow}) = 0, mwBlue({wBlue}) = 1/2 and
mwBlue({wRed}) = 1/2, which is again enough to determine the full mwBlue . The
1Assuming that this is defined on the whole powerset does not in fact lead to any additional
restriction when we deal with merely-finitely additive probability measures, since a finitely
additive probability measure on some Boolean algebra can always be extended to one defined
on the whole powerset, see Proposition 1.2.2.
2Which will be given by: mwYellow (A) =
∑
w∈AmwYellow (w).
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case when a red ball is drawn is the same from the agent’s perspective as if a
blue ball is drawn so mwBlue = mwRed .
We can represent this probabilistic modal structure by the figure in Fig. 2.1.
wBlue
wYellow
wRed
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1
Figure 2.1: Representation of a finite probabilistic modal structure. Exam-
ple 2.1.2.
In this example the space is finite so we can represent the measures by
degree of accessibility relations, which we have done by the labelled arrows in
the diagram. We have omitted the the arrows that would be labelled by 0.
If the frame is finite and the agent(s) are introspective3 then we can fur-
ther simplify the diagram representing this probabilistic modal structure. For
example, as follows:
wBlue
1/2
wYellow
1
wRed
1/2
Figure 2.2: Since Example 2.1.2 is finite and the agent is introspective we can
also represent it this way.
To see how this diagram works, one has that mw is determined by the weights
of the worlds in the box in which mw is a part. For any v not in the box
containing w we put mw{v} = 0.
In the previous example, each of the worlds had a different “state of affairs”
assigned to it, given by the M. But this is not always true. Consider for example
the following probabilistic modal structure:
Example 2.1.3. A fair coin is tossed and Suzanne is not told the result of the
toss. Suzanne isn’t sure whether Ed has been told the result of the toss or not.
3By which we mean that the frame is strongly introspective. See Section 2.3.1 for a formal
definition.
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She thinks it is equally likely that he has been told that he has not. We would
represent this as in Fig. 2.3
Tails
S :
1
E :
1/4 Heads
S :
1
E :
1/4
Tails
S :
1/2
E :
1/4 Heads
S :
1/2
E :
1/4
Figure 2.3: The red (solid) information on this diagram captures Suzanne’s
accessibility measure, the blue (dashed) information captures Ed’s.
There is one particularly interesting probabilistic modal structure which we
will consider throughout this thesis:
Definition 2.1.4. M is omniscient if W is a singleton.
w 1
Figure 2.4: Momn.
Let Momn denote some omniscient probabilistic modal structure.
In the finite case these are easy generalisations of Kripke models (as stud-
ied in modal logic), where the accessibility relation is replaced by degree-of-
accessibility relations. In the infinite case the accessibility relations from Kripke
models are replaced by general accessibility measures which have information
about how w is connected to a set of worlds as well as how it is connected to
each individual world v. I present these in a way that is analogous to the Kripke
models because my use of them to determine semantics for a language with self-
referential probabilities is closely connected to work in Halbach et al. (2003);
Halbach and Welch (2009); Stern (2015b, 2014a,b) where they use Kripke mod-
els to consider modality conceived of as a predicate.
Except for some details, these are the same as what are called Aumann
structures following Aumann (1999), and are also the same as type spaces,
at least in some of the presentations of such spaces, e.g. Heifetz and Mongin
(2001). In the type-spaces literature the accessibility measures are almost always
assumed to be countably additive and it is also often assumed that the structures
are introspective, i.e. that
mw{v |mv = mw} = 1,
though those would generally be called a Harysani type space. The type-spaces
literature typically just studies the universal type-space, which is a type-space
into which any other can be embedded. However, the existence of such a uni-
versal type-space requires the assumption of σ-additivity and don’t exist if we
only assume finite additivity (Meier, 2006).
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We do not assume that the structures are countably additive for a few rea-
sons:
Firstly, there are many arguments that subjective probabilities should be
finitely additive, and finite additivity is supported by many authors, but the
extension to being countably additive has weaker justifications and has been
rejected by a number of authors, most notably de Finetti. By assuming count-
ably additivity one restricts the possible probability measures, for example there
are no countably additive uniform measures over the natural numbers and no
extension of the Lebesgue measure that measures all subsets of the unit interval.
Furthermore, we will show in Section 2.4.2 that the assumption of countable
additivity rules out the possibility of using the structure in the intuitive way to
assign probabilities to sentences, because there are then no Prob-PW-models,
whereas that hasn’t been ruled out if we only assume finite additivity. Since
finite additivity may be appropriate for representing subjective probabilities it
would be interesting to determine if any (merely-finitely-additive) structures do
support Prob-PW-models.
We in fact assumed that the accessibility measure was defined on the whole
powerset, which can be done with finitely additive measures but not generally
with countably additive measures unless the underlying space is finite. Much
of what is said in this thesis can be said without the assumption that the ac-
cessibility measure be defined on the whole powerset, it is generally used just
as a technical assumption that makes the presentation easier. However, in the
fixed point semantics, e.g. Chapter 3, the assumption is required if one wishes to
study arbitrary fixed points, as these require arbitrary subsets to have measures
attached to them. For example our axiomatisation characterises the collection
of fixed points, so we have to allow any of these fixed points to be well-defined.
If instead one is only interested in the minimal fixed point, then one could pro-
vide an account of which sets are required to be measurable, but since we are
interested in more than that we do not restrict the measurable sets.
These probabilistic modal structures allow us to define an easy and natural
semantics for an operator language.
2.2 Semantics for an operator language using
probabilistic modal structures
These probabilistic modal structures can very simply be used to give a seman-
tics for an operator language for probability. We presented the language in
Definition 1.6.12 which contains probability operators P>r for each rational r.
We can now define which of such sentences are true or false at different
worlds in a given probabilistic modal structure.
Definition 2.2.1 (Semantics for LP). Fix some probabilistic modal structure
M. Define:
• For ϕ ∈ SentL, w |=M ϕ ⇐⇒ M(w) |= ϕ
• w |=M ϕ ∨ ψ ⇐⇒ w |=M ϕ or w |=M ψ
• w |=M ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ w 6|=M ϕ
• w |=M P>rϕ ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ϕ} > r
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• w |=M P>rϕ ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ϕ} > r
As in Definition 1.6.13 we can also talk about the other variant operators
like P6r. The way we defined these was good because it satisfies the following.
Proposition 2.2.2.
w |=M P6rϕ ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ϕ} 6 r
w |=M P=rϕ ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ϕ} = r
w |=M P<rϕ ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ϕ} < r
Proof. We only write the proof for the first property:
Remember we defined P6rϕ as P>1−r¬ϕ. So by using the definition of the
semantics for P>r¬ϕ it suffices to show:
mw{v | v |=M ϕ} = 1−mw{v | v |=M ¬ϕ}
because then
mw{v | v |=M ϕ} 6 r ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ¬ϕ} > 1− r.
Observe that {{v | v |=M ϕ}, {v | v |=M ¬ϕ}} is a partition of W . So since mw
is finitely additive, we have
mw{v | v |=M ϕ}+mw{v | v |=M ¬ϕ} = 1,
as required.
One can similarly give a semantics for the other considered operator lan-
guages. This semantics gives us some idea of how these probabilistic modal
structures are supposed to work.
In Section 2.4 we will discuss how one might use these structures to give
a semantics in the case where probability is formalised in the expressively rich
setting, i.e. as a predicate or function symbol. But first we will consider what
assumptions are being made by using these probabilistic modal structures and
identify some particularly interesting (classes of) probabilistic modal structures.
2.3 Assumptions in probabilistic modal struc-
tures
We have assumed that the mAw are all probability measures. This means that
agents who are representable in such structures must be probabilistically co-
herent. Also, they must be certain that all other agents are probabilistically
coherent. And so on. So they must have common certainty of probabilistic
coherence.
We can also add additional assumptions to narrow down the class of proba-
bilistic modal structures that are studied.
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2.3.1 Introspective structures
We have already discussed introspection as a principle
P>rϕ→ P=1P>rϕ
¬P>rϕ→ P=1¬P>rϕ
Which, in the predicate case, was inconsistent with probabilism. We can charac-
terise the probabilistic modal structures which satisfy these introspection prin-
ciples in the operator case.
Definition 2.3.1. A probabilistic modal frame (W, {mw |w ∈W}), or structure
M, is strongly introspective if for all w ∈W
mw{v |mv = mw} = 1
A probabilistic modal frame (W, {mw | w ∈ W}), or structure M, is weakly
introspective if for all w ∈W , A ⊆W and r 6 mw(A) < q,
mw{v | r 6 mv(A) < q} = 1
If the frame is countably additive then strong and weak introspection are
equivalent. However, if the frame is merely-finely-additive, then they may not
be equivalent, though being strongly introspective implies being weakly intro-
spective. Being strongly introspective is the standard definition, for example
as is found in Heifetz and Mongin (2001), due to the fact that usually only
countably additive frames are considered.
Proposition 2.3.2. Let L be any propositional or first order language with at
least one propositional variable, and LP>r as defined in Definition 1.6.12.
A probabilistic modal frame for LP>r , (W, {mw | w ∈ W}) is weakly intro-
spective iff for every M based on (W, {mw | w ∈W}) and for each w ∈W ,
w |=M P>rϕ→ P=1P>rϕ
w |=M ¬P>rϕ→ P=1¬P>rϕ
Proof. =⇒ : Suppose M is based on a weakly introspective frame. Then
w |= P>rϕ ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ϕ} > r
=⇒ mw{v′ |mv′{v | v |=M ϕ} > r} = 1
⇐⇒ mw{v′ | v′ |=M P>rϕ} = 1
⇐⇒ w |= P=1P>rϕ
w |= ¬P>rϕ ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ϕ} < r
=⇒ mw{v′ |mv′{v | v |=M ϕ} < r} = 1
⇐⇒ mw{v′ | v′ |=M ¬P>rϕ} = 1
⇐⇒ w |= ¬P=1P>rϕ
For ⇐= : suppose the RHS. Fix w and some A ⊆W . Suppose L contains the
propositional variable O. Consider a valuation M such that
M(v) |= O ⇐⇒ v ∈ A.
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Suppose r 6 mw(A) < q. Then w |=M P>rO and w |=M ¬P>qO. So w |=M
P=1P>rO and w |=M P=1¬P>qO, i.e. mw{v | r 6 mv(A)} = 1 and mw{v |
mv(A) < q} = 1. Since mw is finitely additive, we also have:
mw{v | r 6 mv(A) < q} = 1
Let us now start to look at the version where we don’t work with a probability
operator but instead a probability predicate.
2.4 Semantics in the predicate case
2.4.1 What is a Prob-PW-model
In Section 2.2 we have seen a semantics in the operator language. The natural
semantics to try to define for the predicate language would just work by applying
the same operator clauses but now to the predicate language.
We will work with LP>r , that extends any L with the predicates P>r for
each rational r.
Setup 2 (Section 2.4). Let L be some recursive first order language extending
LPA. We will work with LP>r as described in Definition 1.6.7.
We can attempt to define the semantics for LP>r as we did for the operator
case in Definition 2.2.1 by the clauses:
• For ϕ ∈ SentL, w |=M ϕ ⇐⇒ M(w) |= ϕ
• w |=M ϕ ∨ ψ ⇐⇒ w |=M ϕ or w |=M ψ
• w |=M ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ w 6|=M ϕ
• w |=M P>rpϕq ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ϕ} > r,
• w |=M P>rpϕq ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ϕ} > r.
In the operator case we worked with propositional logic but in this predicate
language we are dealing with predicate logic so we want to add an extra clause
dealing with the quantifiers as well as Leibnitz’s law.4
• w |=M ∃xϕ(x) ⇐⇒ for some n ∈ N, w |=M ϕ(n),
• w |=M t = s =⇒ (w |=M ϕ(t) ⇐⇒ w |=M ϕ(s)).
The problem with trying to use this as a definition is that we don’t have
a recursive specification of the formulas: P>rpϕq is just some P>rn and is an
atomic formula, however complex ϕ is. So this definition is not a recursive
definition and is therefore we are not guaranteed to have any |=M that satisfies
the attempted definition. And in fact it does often turn out to be unsatisfiable,
as we will now show.
We will first show that if these clauses hold for |=M then for each w, there
is a first order model that satisfies the same sentences as are satisfied at w
according |=M. Furthermore, these first order models take a particular form:
the L-component of the first order model is M(w), and the interpretation of
each of the probability predicates can be given by a prob-eval function.
4Instead of the general Leibnitz’s law, we could have just included the instances for ϕ of
the form P>rx and P>rx.
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Definition 2.4.1. A prob-eval function, p, assigns to each world a function
from SentP>r to R.
And we will use this to give a first-order model of LP>r at each world by:
Definition 2.4.2. (M,p)(w) = (M(w),p(w)) is the expansion of the L-model,
M(w), to a LP>r -model by
(M,p)(w) |= P>rpϕq ⇐⇒ p(w)(ϕ) > r
(M,p)(w) |= P>rpϕq ⇐⇒ p(w)(ϕ) > r
If there is no ϕ ∈ SentP>r with n = #ϕ, then
(M,p)(w) |= P>rn ⇐⇒ r 6 0
(M,p)(w) |= P>rn ⇐⇒ r < 0
In this, we take probability 0 to be the default value, so for all n, (M,p)(w) |=
P>0n. We do this to allow a smooth transition to the semantics we’ll provide
in Chapter 3, though this choice doesn’t make any essential difference.
Specifically, then, we will show that if |=M satisfies these clauses then there
is some prob-eval function, p, where w |=M ϕ ⇐⇒ (M,p)(w) |= ϕ. In fact
this first result hasn’t yet said much about the interpretation of the probability
predicate, and this can be seen by the fact that we don’t in fact need |=M to
satisfy the probability clauses to get this result, instead they only need to satisfy
some minimal clauses, for example we require that w |=M P>1/2pϕq =⇒ w |=M
P>1/4pϕq.
Proposition 2.4.3. Let M be such that each M(w) is an N-model.
|=M ⊆W × SentP>r satisfies:
• For ϕ ∈ SentL, w |=M ϕ ⇐⇒ M(w) |= ϕ
• w |=M ϕ ∨ ψ ⇐⇒ w |=M ϕ or w |=M ψ
• w |=M ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ w 6|=M ϕ
• w |=M ∃xϕ(x) ⇐⇒ for some n ∈ N, w |=M ϕ(n)
• w |=M t = s =⇒ (w |=M ϕ(t) ⇐⇒ w |=M ϕ(s)).
and is such that
• w |=M P>rn ⇐⇒ for all q < r, w |=M P>qn,
• w |=M P>rn ⇐⇒ there is some q > r, such that w |=M P>qn,
• If there is no ϕ ∈ SentP>r with n = #ϕ then w |=M P>0n ∧ ¬P>0n.
if and only if there is some prob-eval function p, such that
w |=M ϕ ⇐⇒ (M,p)(w) |= ϕ.
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Proof. ⇐= : We need to show that (M,p)(w) satisfies the relevant clauses.
The only interesting ones are those involving probability,5 which use the den-
sity of Q in R.
=⇒ : Define p(w)(ϕ) = sup{r | w |=M P>rpϕq}. One can show
w |=M ϕ ⇐⇒ (M,p)(w) |= ϕ
by induction on the complexity of ϕ.6
Choosing such a p allows |=M to satisfy the attemped definition clauses for
the connectives, but it is not yet guaranteed that it appropriately interprets the
probability predicates. To achieve that, we need p to also satisfy:
(M,p)(w) |= P>rpϕq ⇐⇒ mw{v | (M,p)(v) |= ϕ} > r,
(M,p)(w) |= P>rpϕq ⇐⇒ mw{v | (M,p)(v) |= ϕ} > r.
We ensure that p does this by turning the desired clause into a definition of an
operator taking p to another prob-eval function.
Definition 2.4.4. Let p be any prob-eval function. Define the prob-eval func-
tion ΘM(p) by:
ΘM(p)(w)(ϕ) := mw{v | (M,p)(v) |= ϕ}.
We need to pick some p with ΘM(p) = p, as it will then satisfy the relevant
clauses.
Proposition 2.4.5. p is such that
(M,p)(w) |= P>rpϕq ⇐⇒ mw{v | (M,p)(v) |= ϕ} > r,
(M,p)(w) |= P>rpϕq ⇐⇒ mw{v | (M,p)(v) |= ϕ} > r.
if and only if ΘM(p) = p.
So choosing such a fixed point p is essentially picking some interpretation of
|=M that satisfies the desired defining clauses.
Corollary 2.4.6. Let M be such that each M(w) is an N-model.
|=M ⊆ W × SentP>r satisfies:
• For ϕ ∈ L, w |=M ϕ ⇐⇒ M(w) |= ϕ
• w |=M ϕ ∨ ψ ⇐⇒ w |=M ϕ or w |=M ψ
• w |=M ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ w 6|=M ϕ
• w |=M ∃xϕ(x) ⇐⇒ for some n ∈ N, w |=M ϕ(n),
• w |=M t = s =⇒ (w |=M ϕ(t) ⇐⇒ w |=M ϕ(s)).
• w |=M P>rpϕq ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ϕ} > r,
5The ⇐= of the > clause and the =⇒ of the > clause.
6For the base cases ϕ = P>rt and P>rt we use the fact that there will be some n such that
M(w) |= t = n, so (M,p)(w) |= t = n and w |=M t = n.
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• w |=M P>rpϕq ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ϕ} > r.
• If there is no ϕ ∈ SentP>r with n = #ϕ then w |=M P>0n ∧ ¬P>0n.
if and only if there is some prob-eval function, p, such that
ΘM(p) = p,
and:
w |=M ϕ ⇐⇒ (M,p)(w) |= ϕ.
Proof. This follows from Propositions 2.4.3 and 2.4.5 using the fact that
• w |=M P>rpϕq ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ϕ} > r, and
• w |=M P>rpϕq ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ϕ} > r,
imply
• w |=M P>rn ⇐⇒ for all q < r, w |=M P>qn, and
• w |=M P>rn ⇐⇒ there is some q > r, such that w |=M P>qn,
due to the density of Q in R.
Such fixed point evaluation functions therefore allow the intuitive semantics
clauses to be applied consistently.
Note that ΘM(p) is probabilistic.
Definition 2.4.7. A probabilistic modal structure M supports a Prob-PW-
model if there is some prob-eval function p on M with p = ΘM(p).
A probabilistic modal frame (W, {mw |w ∈W}) supports a Prob-PW-model
if there is some M on (W, {mw | w ∈ W}) where M = (W, {mw | w ∈ W},M)
supports a Prob-PW-model.
We will show that not all probabilistic modal structures do support Prob-
PW-models. Due to the result in Proposition 2.4.3 that says that it is exactly
the Prob-PW-models that satisfy the attempted definition of |=M, this claim
is ultimately the same as that made at the beginning of this section: that
there are cases where the desired clauses for the semantics are not satisfiable.
It would be interesting to answer the further question of which probabilistic
modal structures do support Prob-PW-models, but this thesis will not answer
that. Instead we just identify certain classes of structures that do not support
a Prob-PW-model. In particular we will show this for any introspective, finite,
or countably additive structures.
2.4.2 Not all probabilistic modal structures support Prob-
PW-models
Momn does not support Prob-PW-models
Some probabilistic modal structures will not support Prob-PW-models. For
example:
Theorem 2.4.8. Momn does not support a Prob-PW-model.
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w0 1
Figure 2.5: Momn.
Proof. Suppose p were a Prob-PW-model on Momn. Consider
PA ` π ↔ ¬P>1/2pπq.
(M,p)(w0) |= π =⇒ mw0{v | (M,p)(v) |= π} = 1
=⇒ (M,p)(w0) |= P=1pπq
=⇒ (M,p)(w0) |= P>1/2pπq
=⇒ (M,p)(w0) |= ¬π
(M,p)(w0) |= ¬π =⇒ mw0{v | (M,p)(v) |= π} = 0
=⇒ (M,p)(w0) |= P=0pπq
=⇒ (M,p)(w0) |= ¬P>1/2pπq
=⇒ (M,p)(w0) |= π
In this case we essentially have the liar paradox again. Due to the setup,
and as was described in this proof, we would have that
(M,p)(w0) |= ϕ ⇐⇒ (M,p)(w0) |= P=1pϕq,
so P=1 acts like a truth predicate that satisfies the T-biconditionals, which we
know not to be possible due to the liar paradox.
Introspective structures do not support Prob-PW-models
Introspective frames do not support a Prob-PW-model as a direct consequence
of Theorem 1.4.1 which said that introspection and probabilism are inconsistent.
This is just another way to view that result.
Theorem 2.4.9. Suppose (W, {mw | w ∈ W}) is weakly introspective. Then it
does not support a Prob-PW-model.
Proof. We prove this by means of a lemma:
Lemma 2.4.9.1. Suppose M is weakly introspective and p = ΘM(p). Then
(M,p)(w) |=
P>rpϕq→ P=1pP>rpϕqq
∧ ¬P>rpϕq→ P=1p¬P>rpϕqq
∧ ProvPA(pϕ↔ ψq)→ (P>rpϕq↔ P>rpψq)
∧ P=1pϕq→ ¬P>1/2p¬ϕq
Proof. Showing that the introspection principles are satisfied is directly anal-
ogous to in Proposition 2.3.2. The other two are direct consequences of p(w)
being probabilistic over PA.
Observe that in Lemma 2.4.9.1 we showed if M is weakly introspective and
p = ΘM(p), then (M,p)(w) satisfies a theory which, in Theorem 1.4.1, we
showed to be inconsistent.
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Finite and countably additive frames do not support Prob-PW-models
There is a further large swathe of frames that do not support Prob-PW-models.
Theorem 2.4.10. If M is a probabilistic modal structure where each mw is
countably additive and each M(w) is an N-model, then M does not support a
Prob-PW-model.
Therefore, if M is a finite probabilistic modal structure and each M(w) is
an N-model, then it does not support a Prob-PW-model.
This will be because if there were a Prob-PW-model, then the agent would
have fully introspected certainty of being probabilistic and N-additive. But that
will turn out not to be possible because of a very influential result from McGee,
(McGee, 1985), involving a sentence
I do not have fully introspected certainty of γ.(γ)
The idea of the challenge for countable additivity as a result of this theorem
was given to me by Hannes Leitgeb.
We will use NAddPr (for “N-additive probability”) to say that P=1 satisfies
the properties required to come from some N-additive probability function P
(over Peano arithmetic, PA).7 IntroNAddPr (for “introspected N-additive prob-
ability”) will say something like that P has fully introspected certainty that it
is an N-additive probability function.
Definition 2.4.11. Let NAddPr denote the theory consisting of all instances
of the following schema for any ϕ,ψ ∈ SentP>r .
• P=1pϕ→ ψq→ (P=1pϕq→ P=1pψq),
• P=1p¬ϕq→ ¬P=1pϕq,
• ∀nP=1pϕq(n/x)→ P=1p∀xϕq.
Let IntroNAddPr be the minimal set of sentences of LP>r such that:
• IntroNAddPr is closed under first order logical consequence.
• If NAddPr ∪ PA ` ϕ then ϕ ∈ IntroNAddPr
• Whenever ϕ ∈ IntroNAddPr, P=1pϕq ∈ IntroNAddPr.
Theorem 2.4.12 (McGee (1985)). Let γ denote a sentence such that:8
PA ` γ ↔ ¬∀n
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
P=1pP=1p. . .P=1pγqqq .
Then
NAddPr ∪ PA ` γ.
Furthermore, IntroNAddPr contains the following sentences:
7Though in fact only Robinson arithmetic is needed.
8This is an informal ascription of the formula ¬∀x(N(x) → P=1(g(S(x), pγq))) where g
represents the primitive recursive function G(n, ϕ) = #
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
P=1p. . .P=1pϕq . . .q.
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• γ, and therefore ¬∀n
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
P=1pP=1p. . .P=1pγqqq
• P=1pγq
• P=1pP=1pγqq
• . . .
Before proving this, we will explicitly state the important corollary of this
theorem:
Corollary 2.4.13. IntroNAddPr is ω-inconsistent.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.12. The following is a derivation using NAddPr and PA:
¬γ → ∀n ∈ N
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
P=1pP=1p. . .P=1pγqqq
→ ∀n ∈ NP=1p
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
P=1pP=1p. . .P=1pγqqqq
→ P=1p∀n ∈ N
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
P=1pP=1p. . .P=1pγqqqq
→ ¬P=1p¬∀n ∈ N
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
P=1pP=1p. . .P=1pγqqqq
→ ¬P=1pγq
→ ¬∀n ∈ N
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
P=1pP=1p. . .P=1pγqqq
→ γ
so γ
So NAddPr ∪ PA ` γ therefore γ ∈ IntroNAddPr and so also
¬∀n ∈ N
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
P=1pP=1p. . .P=1pγqqq ∈ IntroNAddPr.
Therefore P=1pγq ∈ IntroNAddPr. Therefore P=1pP=1pγqq ∈ IntroNAddPr.
Etc.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.10. We prove this by using Theorem 2.4.12 and two ad-
ditional lemmas.
Lemma 2.4.14. Let M be a probabilistic modal structure where mw is count-
ably additive and each M(v) is an N-model. If p = ΘM(p) then
(M,p)(w) |= NAddPr ∪ PA
Proof. Suppose ϕ a theorem of Peano arithmetic. Then ϕ ∈ SentL so
(w, f) |=M ϕ ⇐⇒ M(w) |= ϕ. We assumed that for each w, M(w) in-
terprets the arithmetic vocabulary by the standard model of arithmetic, N,
so it must be that M(w) |= ϕ and so (M,p)(w) |= ϕ.
46
2.5 The strategy of ruling out probabilistic modal structures
because of inconsistencies
The interesting case for NAddPr is that for the quantifier, which is where we
use the countable additivity of mw:
To show ∀nP=1pϕq(n/x)→ P=1p∀xϕq:
(M,p)(w) |= ∀nP=1pϕq(n/x)
=⇒ for all n, (M,p)(w) |= P=1pϕ[n/x]q
=⇒ for all n, mw{v | (M,p)(v) |= ϕ[n/x]} = 1 p = ΘM(p)
=⇒ mw
(⋂
{v | (M,p)(v) |= ϕ[n/x]}
)
= 1 mw is countably additive
=⇒ mw{v | for all n, (M,p)(v) |= ϕ[n/x]} = 1
=⇒ mw{v | (M,p)(v) |= ∀xϕ} = 1
=⇒ (w,p) |= P=1p∀xϕq
Lemma 2.4.15. Let M be a probabilistic modal structure where each mw is
countably additive and each M(w) is an N-model. If p = ΘM(p), then for
each w ∈W ,
(M,p)(w) |= IntroNAddPr,
where IntroNAddPr is as defined in Theorem 2.4.12.
Proof. Suppose we have such a M and p = ΘM(p). We will work by induc-
tion on the construction of IntroNAddPr. By Lemma 2.4.14, if NAddPr∪PA `
ϕ, then for each w ∈W , (M,p)(w) |= ϕ.
{ϕ | (M,p)(w) |= ϕ} is closed under first-order logical consequence because
(M,p)(w) is just given by the first order model (M(w),p(w)).
Now for the inductive step: suppose ϕ ∈ IntroNAddPr. Then we have by the
induction hypothesis that for all v ∈W , (M,p)(v) |= ϕ. Therefore
mw{v | (M,p)(v) |= ϕ} = 1
and so, since p = ΘM(p), (M,p)(w) |= P=1pϕq.
This suffices for our result because since M(w) is a standard model of arith-
metic and so {ϕ | (M,p)(w) |= ϕ} must be ω-consistent. This therefore con-
tradicts Theorem 2.4.12. So if M is as described, then there can be no p with
p = ΘM(p). M therefore does not support a Prob-PW-model.
This rules out a large swathe of frames and in particular also all finite frames.
However, it is also important to note the limitation of this result: it does not
apply to frames that are merely-finitely-additive. We will generally restrict
our attention to frames which are finitely-additive and moreover often merely-
finitely-additive since we have assumed that the accessibility measure is defined
on the powerset algebra. This result therefore does not apply to the frames
that we will generally be focusing on in this thesis. However, we do not yet
have a result that says that any merely finitely additive frames do support a
Prob-PW-model.
2.5 The strategy of ruling out probabilistic modal
structures because of inconsistencies
In Section 1.4 we showed that the introspection principles in such an expressively
rich language (in particular, one including π) is inconsistent with the assumption
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of probabilistic coherence. In Caie (2013), Caie takes this as a prima facie
argument against probabilism. Egan and Elga (2005) consider related cases,
more like Promotion, and argue that an agent shouldn’t believe the equivalence
between the sentence and the facts about her degrees of belief. Such a response
isn’t available in the case of π since the equivalence π ↔ ¬P>1/2pπq is derivable
in arithmetic. A third option is to instead reject introspection.
The result in Section 2.4.2, that no weakly introspective probabilistic modal
structure supports a Prob-PW-model, was a statement of this conflict between
introspection and probabilism in the framework of probabilistic modal struc-
tures. And the option of rejecting introspection in this framework is to reject
probabilistic modal structures that do not support a Prob-PW-model. This
therefore provides a restriction on the class of admissible, or acceptable, prob-
abilistic modal structures.
However, Theorem 2.4.10 shows that a large class of probabilistic modal
structures do not support Prob-PW-models. So if we are to take this approach
we would have to also rule out any finite or countably additive structures, or at
least those where arithmetic is interpreted using the standard model of arith-
metic.9 This suggests that it is the wrong approach as it is too restrictive.
Instead we should not reject such structures, so should not reject the possibility
that agents are introspective, but should instead account for how we can deal
with such structures. This is the approach we will be taking in this thesis. In
fact we will provide semantics that differ from the Prob-PW-models and we will
show that then the principles expressing introspection should be reformulated
with a truth predicate.
2.6 Options for developing a semantics and an
overview of Part I
We have seen that there are challenges facing the development of a semantics
based on probabilistic modal structures. Since we also want to allow for struc-
tures that do not support Prob-PW-models, we need to provide some semantics
that works differently from just Prob-PW-models.
Probabilistic modal structures are useful for allowing varying interpretations
of probability and the flexibility required for modelling subjective probability
so we would like to come up with an alternative semantics that can still work
over such structures. So what alterations can we make to the naive definition?
The fact that some structures do not admit Prob-PW-models, and other chal-
lenges arising from self-referential probabilities, is very much connected to the
liar paradox. There has been a lot of work on the liar paradox, developing se-
mantics and theories of truth. We will generalise such semantics and theories
of truth to also apply to probability. There has also been work on predicate ap-
proaches to necessity, and other all-or-nothing modalities like knowledge, where
the semantics for truth have been generalised to apply over possible world struc-
tures in the form of Kripke spaces. Notable work in this is in Halbach et al.
(2003); Halbach and Welch (2009); Stern (2015b, 2014a,b). Some of the gener-
alisations that we present in this thesis will be similar in technical spirit to the
9And all introspective probabilistic modal structures, also those involving a non-standard
model of arithmetic.
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work in those papers. For example, in Halbach et al. (2003), Halbach, Leitgeb
and Welch consider the question directly analogous to the question of which
probabilistic modal structures support Prob-PW-models.
There are two very influential theories and semantics for truth which we
will be considering and generalising in this thesis. The first is a Kripke-style
semantics, the origins of which are in Kripke (1975), and the second is a revision
theory, conceived of by Herzberger and Gupta and presented in Gupta and
Belnap (1993). The generalisations that we consider typically work by also
adding the probabilistic modal structure.
In Chapters 3 and 4 we will consider the generalisation of the Kripke-style
semantics. A Kripke-style semantics drops certain aspects of classical logic, in
particular we may have that neither Tpλq nor Tp¬λq are satisfied, so classi-
cal logic doesn’t hold inside the truth predicate. Similarly we will adopt some
“non-classical” probabilities. In Chapter 3, the semantics developed is best
understood as assigning intervals of probability values to sentences. The inter-
vals assigned can be seen as the appropriate version of probabilities when one
adopts a strong Kleene evaluation schemes instead of classical logic. These, for
example will not have that λ ∨ ¬λ is assigned probability 1, but that will in-
stead be assigned the unit interval. In Chapter 4 we have imprecise probabilities
that interpret the probability notion by sets of probability functions. Interest
in imprecise probabilities has been growing in recent years and this provides
and interesting connection between self-referential probabilities and imprecise
probabilities, which could also be viewed as an alternative kind of argument for
imprecise probabilities.
In developing a Kripke-style semantics one needs to choose a partial evalu-
ation scheme and this choice is what distinguishes Chapter 3 from Chapter 4.
The scheme we focus on in Chapter 3 is a strong Kleeene evaluation scheme.
This is particularly interesting because we can obtain an axiomatisation of this
semantics that is complete if one assumes an ω-rule. In Chapter 4 the under-
lying logic is a supervaluation one. In these imprecise probabilities models we
have the nice feature that at fixed points every member of the credal state looks
best from some (possibly different) member’s perspective.
In Chapter 5 we will consider a revision theory of probability. In this chapter
we will consider two main variants, the first interprets the probability notion
by considering the relative frequency of the sentences being true and the second
is again based on probabilistic modal structures. For the first variant, the
probability notion developed should be interpreted as something like semantic
probability, see Section 1.2.2. The second variant can be used for subjective
probability, or objective chance, or any notion of probability that can be seen
to be appropriately modelled by probabilistic modal structures. This second
variant is therefore also much more closely related to the semantics of Chapters 3
and 4. In this chapter we will be particularly interested in what happens at the
limit stages and will give a definition which provides us with nice models at the
limit stage: they will interpret truth with a maximally consistent set of sentences
and interpret probability using a function that is probabilistically coherent.
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2.7 Conditional probabilities revisited
We discussed in Section 1.7 that the ratio formula may not appropriately cap-
ture conditionalisation in the higher-order setting. We can now make this idea
more formal by using the probabilistic modal structures to present a suggested
way that conditional probabilities should work. Within a probabilistic modal
structure, updating or conditionalisation can be understood as learning a par-
tition.10
2.7.1 Updating in a probabilistic modal structure
Suppose we start with a probabilistic modal structure M modelling some situ-
ation. Let’s just suppose that there is only one agent that is being modelled.11
A learning situation where the agent learns the partition Π is formulated by
moving to the new probabilistic modal structure MΠ which modifies M just by
altering the accessibility relation to:
mΠw(A) := mw(A | S)
for w ∈ S ∈ Π. This is always well defined if for every S ∈ Π and w ∈ S,
mw(S) > 0. It is ill-defined if an agent learns something where he is proba-
bilistically certain of its negation. Those are cases that we will not consider.
Definition 2.7.1. Let M be a probabilistic modal structure and Π a partition of
W such that mw(S) > 0 for every S ∈ Π and w ∈ S. Define MΠ = (W,mΠw,M)
where for w ∈ S ∈ Π:
mΠw(A) := mw(A | S).
Example 2.7.2 (Example 1.7.2 ctd.). Suppose we have a setup as in Exam-
ple 1.7.2, so an agent who is considering the outcome of a toss of a fair coin. We
can model her before any learning event by the probabilistic modal structure
Heads
1/2
Tails
1/2
Figure 2.6: Agent considering the toss of a fair coin before learning. M.
Here she just learns the outcome of the coin, so she learns the partition
Π = {{wHeads}, {wTails}}
So the new probabilistic modal structure is MΠ, presented in Fig. 2.7.
Here is a different example of learning where the agent does not learn exactly
which world she is in.
10Note that we are here focusing on just one agent modelled in a probabilistic modal struc-
ture, things become more complicated if multiple agents are considered.
11If one considers multiple agents, the learning proposed here characterises a public an-
nouncement, available to all agents.
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Heads
1
Tails
1
Figure 2.7: Agent considering the toss of a fair coin after learning the outcome
of the toss. MΠ.
Example 2.7.3. In Example 2.1.2, we modelled an agent where there is an urn
with 30 red balls, 30 blue and 30 red, and where a random ball is drawn and
the agent is told whether it is yellow or not.
This was modelled by the structure
wBlue
1/2
wYellow
1
wRed
1/2
Figure 2.8: Example 2.1.2, MΠ.
This probabilistic modal structure can be seen as formed from updating in
the suggested way.
Here, the partition that she learns is
Π = {{wYellow}, {wBlue, wRed}}
which is the information about whether the ball is yellow or not. If the original
probabilistic modal structure is given by M as in Fig. 2.9, then this new prob-
abilistic modal structure is exactly MΠ according to the definition of learning
formulated within a probabilistic modal structure.
wBlue
1/3
wYellow
1/3
wRed
1/3
Figure 2.9: Example 2.1.2 before learning, M.
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2.7.2 The ratio formula doesn’t capture updating
So using this idea of how updating works, we can now formalise the thought
presented in Section 1.7 that Bayes formula does not appropriately capture
updating.
Example 2.7.4 (Example 2.7.2 ctd.). We can use M and MΠ from our coin
tossing case to also calculate probabilities on the sentential level.
Using this structure we can now determine:
wHeads |=MHeads
wTails |=M¬Heads
wHeads |=MP=1/2(Heads)
wTails |=MP=1/2(Heads)
wHeads |=MP=0(P=1(Heads) |Heads)
Where the last, conditional probability is defined by the ratio formula, and
shows that Eq. (1.7) from Section 1.7 can be seen as determining, with the
ratio formula, the conditional probability in the pre-learning probabilistic modal
structure.
But, the (unconditional) probability in the updated structure, MΠ is given
by:
wHeads |=MΠHeads
wTails |=MΠ¬Heads
wTails |=MΠP=1(Heads)
wHeads |=MΠP=1(P=1(Heads))
which is a formalisation of Eq. (1.6).
And we see here that the conditional probability in the old structure as given
by the ratio formula does not equal the probability in the updated structure.
So the ratio formula is not appropriately formalising updating. This doesn’t
mean that what is expressed with the ratio formula is not useful. It may,
for example, appropriately express supposition. This might be the difference
already discussed: But this shows that it needs to be further studied and in this
thesis we will not discuss conditional probabilities.
The problem is that the worlds where P=1(Heads) is true changes between
M and MΠ.
{v ∈W | v |=M P=1(Heads)} 6= {v | v |=MΠ P=1(Heads)}.
For calculating the ratio formula we use the old interpretation of P=1(Heads),
whereas in the updated structure we look at the updated interpretation of
P=1(Heads).
We can get updating appropriately modelled in the object language by defin-
ing P=?(· || ·) to be what one actually gets from updating.
Definition 2.7.5. Consider a language LP>r(·||·) which adds a binary operator,
so if ϕ and ψ are sentences then so are P>r(ϕ || ψ) for any r rational.
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For ease of writing, we make the following definitions (which will only be
used in this section).
Definition 2.7.6. Define
[ϕ]M := {v | v |=M ϕ}.
Let
Mψ := M{[ψ]M,W\[ψ]M}.
So Mψ denotes the probabilistic modal structure after the agent has learned,
in each world, whether or not ϕ is the case.
We can now give the semantics for this language, with the important clause:
Definition 2.7.7. If w |=M ψ, we define:
w |=M P>r(ϕ || ψ) ⇐⇒ mw([ϕ]Mψ | [ψ]M) > r
This now does express what the probability would be if the agent were to
learn ψ by virtue of the following result.
Proposition 2.7.8. If w |=M ψ,
w |=M P>r(ϕ || ψ) ⇐⇒ w |=Mψ P>rϕ
2.7.3 Analysis of this language
One should then consider properties of this new conditional probability. We can
take this as primitive and drop the unconditional probability, defining:
Proposition 2.7.9.
w |=M P>rϕ ⇐⇒ w |=M P>r(ϕ || >)
But we do not have any rule like the ratio formula which would allow us to
just take unconditional probability as primitive and define conditional proba-
bility from it.
We might also ask: when does the ratio formula appropriately represent
updating, i.e. when is (· | ·) the same as (· || ·)? This will be the case if
mw([ϕ]Mψ | [ψ]M) = mw([ϕ]M | [ψ]M)
when w ∈ [ψ]M. If ϕ doesn’t talk about probabilities, then [ϕ]M = [ϕ]Mψ and
so then the equivalence will hold.
Proposition 2.7.10. If ϕ in L, then [ϕ]M = [ϕ]Mψ and so for any ψ ∈ LP>r
w |=M P>r(ϕ | ψ) ⇐⇒ w |=M P>r(ϕ || ψ)
So it is really the higher order probabilities in the target sentence which
cause the problem. Just having higher order probabilities in what is being
learned does not affect the appropriateness of the ratio formula for representing
updating. For example:
Example 2.7.11.
w |=M P>r(Heads | P=1/2(Heads)) ⇐⇒ w |=M P>r(Heads || P=1/2(Heads))
It should be investigated how this proposal connects to Romeijn (2012) and
to work in dynamic epistemic logic. But that lies outside the scope of this thesis.
For the rest of this thesis only unconditional probability will be considered.
53
2. Preliminaries and Challenges
54
Chapter 3
A Kripkean Theory
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will develop a Kripke-style theory of truth. This will gener-
alise a very influential theory of truth that originates in a paper by Saul Kripke
(1975). Kripke’s theory of truth was developed to account for a languages with
type-free truth predicates and can therefore express the liar sentence. In his
paper Kripke constructs an extension of the truth predicate by formalising the
procedure of evaluating a sentence. He uses three-valued evaluation schemes to
build up this extension, but the extension of the truth predicate can also be
used within classical logic to give a classical model of the language with a truth
predicate. In this semantics one will have that, for all sentences. For example,
for the liar sentence, neither Tpϕq nor Tp¬ϕq are satisfied.
In this chapter we shall present a generalisation of this semantics to also
account for probability predicates. The final semantics we propose will not de-
termine particular point valued probabilities for some sentences. For example
we might have that neither P> (pϕq, p0q) nor P< (pϕq, p1q), but the only infor-
mation that we have about the probability of ϕ is that both P>(pϕq, p0q) and
P6 (pϕq, p1q) are satisfied. In that case we would say that ϕ is assigned the
interval of values [0, 1].
Our generalisation follows ideas from Halbach and Welch (2009) where Hal-
bach and Welch develop a semantics for necessity, conceived of as a predicate,
by applying Kripke’s construction to “possible world” structures in the form of
Kripke models from modal logic. We will use probabilistic modal structures to
provide the background structure for our construction. This therefore allows
one to use the technical advantages of these structures which might have been
thought to only be available when the probability notion is conceived of as an
operator (see Halbach et al., 2003).
The language we will work with will have a truth predicate and a a probabil-
ity predicate. This language will formalise the probability notion as a predicate
that applies to the codes of sentences and rational numbers. We will have a
sentence like “P>(pϕq, prq)” whose intended interpretation is “The probability
of ϕ is > r”.
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Outline of the chapter
The chapter is structured as follows.
In Section 3.2, we will motivate and present our suggested semantics. As
suggested, this will generalise Kripke’s theory of truth by applying it over prob-
abilistic modal structures. The general strategy follows Halbach and Welch
(2009).
In Section 3.4 we give some observations regarding the developed semantics.
In Stern (2014a,b), Stern argues that when stating principles about necessity,
the job of quotation and disquotation should be done by a truth predicate. We
argue for the same thing here: we argue that principles such as the introspection
principles are properly expressed by using the truth predicate. In our language
the introspection principles will then be written as:
TpP>(pϕq, prq)q =⇒ P= (pP>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
Tp¬P>(pϕq, prq)q =⇒ P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
This allows one to avoid inconsistency and is well-motivated in this semantic
construction. In Section 3.4 we also consider countable additivity and show that
if the underlying probabilistic modal structure has countably additive probabil-
ity measures, then the resulting semantics will satisfy the version of N-additivity
that is appropriate in our framework. N-additivity says:
p (∃xϕ(x)) = lim
n−→∞
p
(
ϕ(0) ∨ ϕ(1) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ(n)
)
.
This is interesting because N-additivity has proved challenging in previous work
on self-referential probabilities. Both at the final stage of Leitgeb’s construction
and in the construction by Christiano et al., there is a formula ϕ(x) such that
P (∃xϕ(x)) = 0 but for each n P (ϕ(0) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ(n)) = 1. This shows that they
badly fail N-additivity.
In Section 3.5 we shall give an axiomatic theory that is intended to capture
the semantics. Such a theory is important because it allows one to reason about
the semantics. As was discussed in Aumann (1999), when one gives a possible
worlds framework to formalise a game theory context the question arises of what
the players know about the framework itself and this question is best answered
by providing a corresponding syntactic approach. Our theory is complete in
the presence of the ω-rule, which allows one to conclude ∀xϕ(x) from all the
instances of ϕ(n). This is needed to fix the standard model of arithmetic. To
show the completeness when the ω-rule is present we construct a canonical
model. This axiomatisation is substantially new research.
Finally, we finish the paper with some conclusions in Section 3.6.
3.2 A Kripke-style semantics
3.2.1 Setup: language and notation
We will use much of the setup from Section 1.6. The syntax of the language
which we focus on in this chapter with will be as follows:
Setup 3 (for Chapter 3). Let L be some language extending LPA. We allow
for the addition of contingent vocabulary but for technical ease we shall only
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allow contingent relation symbols (and propositional variables) and not function
symbols or constants.1 We also only allow for a countable number of contingent
vocabulary symbols in order for our language to remain countable so we can use
arithmetic for Gödel coding and for the completeness proof to work.
Let LP>,T extend this language by adding a unary predicate T and a binary
predicate P> (see Section 1.6.3).
We could consider languages with multiple probability notions, then we
would add the binary predicate PA> for each notion of probability, or agent
A, but our constructions will immediately generalise to the multiple probability
languages so we just focus on the language with one probability notion. We
have included the truth predicate since it is easy to extend the definition of the
semantics to deal with truth as well as probability, and it is nice to see that the
construction can give a joint theory of truth and probability. Additionally, we
shall rely on the truth predicate for our later axiomatisation and for expressing
principles such as introspection.
We will assume some Gödel coding of expressions and rational numbers, and
the corresponding notion, for example ¬. and 1−. , as set up in Definitions 1.6.2
and 1.6.6.
We now introduce the other probability predicates, which we use as abbre-
viations.
Definition 3.2.1. Define for terms t and s the following abbreviations:
• P> (t, s) := ∃x  s(P>(t, x))
• P6 (t, s) := P>(¬. t, 1−. s)
• P< (t, s) := P> (¬. t, 1−. s)
• P= (t, s) := P>(t, s) ∧ P6 (t, s)
In a model that interprets the arithmetic vocabulary by the standard model
of arithmetic we will have that P> (pϕq, prq) holds if and only if there is some
q > r such that P>(pϕq, pqq) holds.
3.2.2 The construction of the semantics
We will now move to developing our semantics.
Kripke’s construction (from Kripke, 1975) is motivated by the idea that
one should consider the process of evaluating a sentence to determine which
sentences can unproblematically be given a truth value.
To evaluate the sentence Tp0 = 0q one first has to evaluate the sentence
0 = 0. Since 0 = 0 does not mention the concept of truth it can easily be
evaluated so Tp0 = 0q can then also be evaluated. Kripke formalises this
process of evaluating sentences. We shall say evaluated positively (and evaluated
negatively) instead of evaluated as true (and evaluated as false) to make it clear
that this is happening at the meta-level.
To evaluate P>(pϕq, prq) we first need to evaluate ϕ not only in the actual
state of affairs but also in some other states of affairs. We therefore base our
1 This restriction could be dropped, but then tN (as will be defined in Definition 1.6.2)
would only be defined for terms of LPA instead of arbitrary terms of L and this would then
just complicate the presentation of the material.
57
3. A Kripkean Theory
construction on structures with multiple “possible worlds” and we evaluate the
sentences at all the worlds. We will assume that each world has a “degree of
accessibility” relation to the other worlds. This will be used to give us the
interpretation of P>.
To do this we will use the probabilistic modal structures as introduced in
Definition 2.1.1. Remember these were given by a frame and valuation. A frame
consists of a collection of “possible worlds”, W , and a collection of probability
measures mw over W . For simplification we are assuming in this chapter that
we only have one agent, so we only have a single mw for each world w. The
valuation assigns to each world a model of the language without probability or
truth, M(w). For this chapter we will assume that each M(w) has the natural
numbers as a domain and interprets the arithmetic vocabulary in the standard
way,2 so these essentially just give interpretations to the empirical predicates.
As before, we call such models N-models.
We now move to motivating our construction of the extension of the prob-
ability predicate. At the first stage we use M to see that Blue is evaluated
positively in wBlue and negatively in the other worlds. So using the frame we
see that at the second stage we should now evaluate P>(pBlueq, p1/2q) positively
in wBlue and wRed and negatively in wYellow.
To formalise the evaluation procedure we need to record how the sentences
have been evaluated at each world. We do this by using an evaluation function
that records the codes of the sentences that are evaluated positively. In doing
this we only focus on those sentences that are evaluated positively and see that
ϕ is evaluated negatively if and only if ¬ϕ is evaluated positively.
Definition 3.2.2. An evaluation function, f , assigns to each world, w, a set
f(w) ⊆ N.
If #ϕ ∈ f(w), we say that f evaluates ϕ positively at w.
This bears a close relationship to a prob-eval function. An evaluation func-
tion can be seen as a considered interpretation of the truth predicate at each
world, whereas a prob-eval function gave a considered interpretation of the
probability predicates. Here we are interested in the connection between truth
and probability and it will simplify matters to just consider the extension truth
predicate. We can then determine the extension of the probability predicates
from this by using the underlying probabilistic modal structure. In doing this
we are following the setup from Stern (2015a).
We can now proceed to give a formal analysis of the evaluation procedure.
We do this by developing a definition of Θ(f), which is the evaluation function
given by another step of reasoning. So if f gives the codes of the sentences that
we have so far evaluated positively, then Θ(f) gives the codes of the sentences
that one can evaluate positively at the next stage.
At the zero-th stage one often starts without having evaluated any sentence
either way. This can be given by an evaluation function f0 with f0(w) = ∅ for
all w.
A sentence that does not involve truth or probability can be evaluated pos-
itively or negatively by just considering M(w). So we define:
2This restriction of the domain allows us to have a name for each member of the domain
and therefore makes the presentation easier since we can then give the semantics without
mentioning open formulas and variable assignments. This restriction also helps for the ax-
iomatisation.
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• For ϕ a sentence of L, #ϕ ∈ Θ(f)(w) ⇐⇒ M(w) |= ϕ
• For ϕ a sentence of L, #¬ϕ ∈ Θ(f)(w) ⇐⇒ M(w) 6|= ϕ
This will give the correct evaluations to the sentences of L, for example #0 =
0 ∈ Θ(f)(w) and #¬0 = 1 ∈ Θ(f)(w).
To evaluate a sentence Tpϕq we first evaluate ϕ. If ϕ was evaluated positively
then we can now evaluate Tpϕq positively, and similarly if it was evaluated
negatively. However, if ϕ was not evaluated either way then we still do not
evaluate Tpϕq either way. This is described by the clauses:
• #Tpϕq ∈ Θ(f)(w) ⇐⇒ #ϕ ∈ f(w)
• #¬Tpϕq ∈ Θ(f)(w) ⇐⇒ #¬ϕ ∈ f(w)
For example we get that Tp0 = 0q ∈ Θ(Θ(f))(w) and ¬Tp0 = 1q ∈ Θ(Θ(f))(w).
To describe the cases for probability we consider the fragment of a proba-
bilistic modal frame that is pictured in Fig. 3.1. We consider how one should
evaluate P>(pψq, prq) for different values of r.
w0
w1
ψ evaluated positively by f
i.e. #ψ ∈ f(w1)
w2
ψ evaluated negatively by f
i.e. #¬ψ ∈ f(w2)
w3 ψ evaluated neither way by f
1/3
1/3
1/3
Figure 3.1: A fragment of a probabilistic modal structure representing the in-
formation required to evaluate P>(pψq, prq) in Θ(f)(w0).
P>(pψq, p0.3q) will be evaluated positively by Θ(f) because the measure of
the worlds where ψ is evaluated positively is 13 = 0.333 . . ., which is larger than
0.3.3 P>(pψq, p0.7q) will be evaluated negatively by Θ(f) because however ψ
will be evaluated in w3 there are be too many worlds where ψ is already eval-
uated negatively for the measure of the worlds where it is evaluated positively
to become larger than 0.7, while the evaluation function remains consistent this
measure could at most become 0.666 . . . = 1 −mw{v |#¬ψ /∈ f(v)}. We eval-
uate P>(pψq, p0.5q) neither way because if ψ was to become evaluated in w3
the measure of the worlds where ψ is evaluated positively would become either
0.333 . . . or 0.666 . . . so we need to retain the flexibility that P>(pψq, p0.5q)
can later be evaluated either positively or negatively depending on how ψ is
evaluated at w3.
We therefore give the definition
• #P>(pϕq, prq) ∈ Θ(f)(w) ⇐⇒ mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} > r
3One should really say “the measure of the set of the worlds where ψ is evaluated posi-
tively”, but that would be cumbersome.
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• #¬P>(pϕq, prq) ∈ Θ(f)(w) ⇐⇒ mw{v |#¬ϕ ∈ f(v)} > 1− r
Consistent evaluation functions are ones where no sentence and its negation
both appear in f(w) for any w. For a more precise definition see Definition 3.2.8.
These evaluation functions are of particular interest, and for these we have:4
#¬P>(pϕq, prq) ∈ Θ(f)(w)
⇐⇒ for all g consistent extending f , mw{v |#ϕ ∈ g(v)} 6> r
In this example we saw that the probability of ψ is given by a range. This
is described pictorially in Fig. 3.2.
# · ∈ Θ(f)(w):
] (
0 1 r
mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} 1−mw{v |#¬ϕ ∈ f(v)}
= mw{v |#¬ϕ /∈ f(v)}
P>(pϕq, prq)
¬P< (pϕq, prq)
¬P>(pϕq, prq)
P< (pϕq, prq)
Figure 3.2: How Θ(f)(w) evaluates the probability of ϕ.
We lastly need to give the definitions for the connectives and quantifiers. For
example we need to say how ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ should be evaluated if ϕ is itself evaluated
neither way. For this we directly use the strong Kleene three valued evaluation
scheme, which is the scheme that Kripke focused on and there has been a lot of
work following him in this. This scheme has that #ϕ∨ψ ∈ Θ(f)(w) ⇐⇒ #ϕ ∈
Θ(f)(w) or #ψ ∈ Θ(f)(w), so if ϕ is evaluated neither way then ϕ∨¬ϕ will also
be evaluated neither way. The advantage of this scheme over, for example, one
4 This result shows that the semantics developed in (Caie, 2011, Section 4.2.1) is a special
case of ours.
This observation holds because:
#¬P>(pϕq, prq) ∈ Θ(f)(w)
⇐⇒ mw{v |#¬ϕ ∈ f(v)} > 1− r
⇐⇒ mw{v |#¬ϕ /∈ f(v)} < r
⇐⇒ For all g consistent extending f, mw{v |#ϕ ∈ g(v)} < r
The left-to-right of this last step works by: if g is consistent extending f then
{v |#¬ϕ /∈ f(v)} ⊇ {v |#¬ϕ /∈ g(v)} as g extends f ,
⊇ {v |#ϕ ∈ g(v)} as g is consistent.
The right-to-left works by constructing a g consistent extending f with
#ϕ ∈ g(v) ⇐⇒ #¬ϕ /∈ f(v),
#¬ϕ ∈ g(v) ⇐⇒ #¬ϕ ∈ f(v).
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based on supervaluational logic is that it is truth functional so the evaluation
of ϕ ∨ ψ depends only on how ϕ and ψ have been evaluated.
This fully defines Θ(f). We only used the question of whether ϕ can now be
evaluated positively, i.e. if ϕ ∈ Θ(f), as motivating the definition. We formally
understand it as a definition of a three valued semantics (w, f) |=SKPM and we will
later define (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ ⇐⇒ #ϕ ∈ Θ(f). This is common when working
with Kripke’s theory of truth. We sum up our discussion in the formal definition
of (w, f) |=SKPM .
Definition 3.2.3. For M a probabilistic modal structure, w ∈ W and f an
evaluation function, define (w, f) |=SKPM by induction on the positive complexity
of the formula as follows.
• (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ ⇐⇒ M(w) |= ϕ for ϕ an atomic sentence of L
• (w, f) |=SKPM ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M(w) 6|= ϕ for ϕ an atomic sentence of L
• (w, f) |=SKPM Tt ⇐⇒ tN ∈ f(w) and tN ∈ SentP>,T
• (w, f) |=SKPM ¬Tt ⇐⇒ ¬. tN ∈ f(w) or tN 6∈ SentP>,T
• (w, f) |=SKPM P>(t, s) ⇐⇒ mw{v | tN ∈ f(v)} > rat(sN) and sN ∈ Rat
• (w, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(t, s) ⇐⇒ mw{v |¬. tN ∈ f(v)} > 1−rat(sN)5 or sN 6∈ Rat
• (w, f) |=SKPM ¬¬ϕ ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ
• (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ ∨ ψ ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ or (w, f) |=SKPM ψ
• (w, f) |=SKPM ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ¬ϕ and (w, f) |=SKPM ¬ψ
• (w, f) |=SKPM ∃xϕ(x) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ[n/x] for some n ∈ N.
• (w, f) |=SKPM ¬∃xϕ(x) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ¬ϕ[n/x] for all n ∈ N
The only difference to the standard definition is the addition of the clauses
for probability.
As a consequence of our definition we obtain the following results for the
other probability variants.
Proposition 3.2.4. For any probabilistic modal structure M, evaluation func-
tion f and world w the following hold.
(w, f) |=SKPM P> (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} > r
(w, f) |=SKPM P6 (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ mw{v |#¬ϕ /∈ f(v)} 6 r
(w, f) |=SKPM P< (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ mw{v |#¬ϕ /∈ f(v)} < r
(w, f) |=SKPM P= (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒
mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} > r
and mw{v |#¬ϕ /∈ f(v)} 6 r
5Which is ⇐⇒ mw{v | ¬. tN /∈ f(v)} < rat(sN)
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More concisely: if f is consistent (see Definition 3.2.8) we have: for . ∈ {>
, >,6, <,=},
(w, f) |=SKPM P.(pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒
mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} . r
and mw{v |#¬ϕ /∈ f(v)} . r
To see the equivalence between this and the above, we observe that for f consis-
tent, mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} 6 mw{v |#¬ϕ /∈ f(v)}.
We can also observe facts about the negated notions as follows: Suppose
#ϕ ∈ f(v) ⇐⇒ #¬¬ϕ ∈ f(v),6 then:
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(t, s) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P< (t, s) , or sN /∈ Rat
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬P> (t, s) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P6 (t, s) , or sN /∈ Rat
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬P6 (t, s) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P> (t, s) , or sN /∈ Rat
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬P< (t, s) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P>(t, s), or sN /∈ Rat
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬P= (t, s) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P> (t, s) ∨ P< (t, s) , or sN /∈ Rat
we also have:
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬Tt ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM T¬. t or tN 6∈ SentP>,T
Proof. Remember the definition of these from Definition 3.2.1:
• P> (t, s) := ∃x  s(P>(t, x))
• P6 (t, s) := P>(¬. t, 1−. s)
• P< (t, s) := P> (¬. t, 1−. s)
• P= (t, s) := P>(t, s) ∧ P6 (t, s)
The only interesting case for both of these is the case for P>. However we
will write out all the proofs because the results will be used in the proof of
soundness and completeness later.
(w, f) |=SKPM P> (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ∃x  prq(P>(pϕq, x))
⇐⇒ ∃n, (w, f) |=SKPM n  prq ∧ P>(pϕq, n)
⇐⇒ ∃q > r, (w, f) |=SKPM P>(pϕq, pqq)
⇐⇒ ∃q > r, mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} > q
which, by the density of Q in R, is:
⇐⇒ mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} > r
(w, f) |=SKPM P6 (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P>(p¬ϕq, p1− rq)
⇐⇒ mw{v |#¬ϕ ∈ f(v)} > 1− r
⇐⇒ mw{v |#¬ϕ /∈ f(v)} 6 r
6Which will be the case after one application of Θ. This is required for the results for ¬P6,
¬P< and ¬P=.
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P< works exactly analogous, so lastly:
(w, f) |=SKPM P= (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P>(pϕq, prq) ∧ P6 (pϕq, prq)
⇐⇒
mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} > r
and mw{v |#¬ϕ /∈ f(v)} 6 r
For the results with negations we use the fact that mw{v | #¬ϕ ∈ f(v)} =
1−mw{v |#¬ϕ /∈ f(v)}.
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ mw{v |#¬ϕ /∈ f(v)} < r
⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P< (pϕq, prq)
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬P> (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ¬∃x  prq(P>(pϕq, x))
⇐⇒ ∀q > r, (w, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(pϕq, pqq)
⇐⇒ ∀q > r, mw{v |#¬ϕ /∈ f(v)} 6 q
⇐⇒ mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} 6 r
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬P6 (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ mw{v |#¬ϕ ∈ f(v)} > 1− r
⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P> (pϕq, prq)
P< works exactly analogous, so lastly:
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬P= (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(pϕq, prq)
or (w, f) |=SKPM ¬P6 (pϕq, prq)
⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P< (pϕq, prq) ∨ P> (pϕq, prq)
This shows that our choice of definitions of the derivative probability notions
was a good one and that we labelled the diagram of probability ranges as in
Fig. 3.2 appropriately.
We now give the definition of Θ in terms of (w, f) |=SKPM .
Definition 3.2.5. Define ΘM a function from evaluation functions to evaluation
functions by
ΘM(f)(w) := {#ϕ | (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ}
When M is clear from context we will drop reference to it.
We now consider an example of how this works for the “unproblematic”
sentences.
Example 3.2.6. Consider again the example in Example 2.1.2 where there is
an urn with 30 red, 30 yellow and 30 blue balls and where we are modelling an
agent’s beliefs after a ball is picked from an urn and the agent is told whether
it’s yellow or not.
Take any f . Observe that:
(wBlue, f) |=SKPM Blue and (wRed, f) |=SKPM ¬Blue
so:
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#Blue ∈ Θ(f)(wBlue) and #¬Blue ∈ Θ(f)(wRed).
Therefore:
(wBlue,Θ(f)) |=SKPM P= (pBlueq, p1/2q) and similarly for wRed.7
so:
#P= (pBlueq, p1/2q) ∈ Θ(Θ(f))(wBlue) and similarly for wRed.
Then by similar reasoning:
(wBlue,Θ(Θ(f))) |=SKPM P= (P= (pBlueq, p1/2q) , p1q)
so:
#P= (P= (pBlueq, p1/2q) , p1q) ∈ Θ(Θ(Θ(f)))(wBlue).
These sentences can be seen as translations of sentences from the operator
language. Such sentences will be given point-valued probabilities and be eval-
uated positively or negatively by some Θ(Θ(. . .Θ(f) . . .)). This is described
formally in Section 3.3.1.
If one starts with each f(w) = ∅ and iteratively applies Θ, then Θ will only
give evaluations to sentences that were previously evaluated neither way, it will
not change the evaluation of a sentence. This is because Θ is monotone.
Lemma 3.2.7 (Θ is monotone). If for all w f(w) ⊆ g(w), then also for all w
Θ(f)(w) ⊆ Θ(g)(w).
Proof. Take some evaluation functions f and g such that f(w) ⊆ g(w) for all
w. It suffices to prove that if (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ then (w, g) |=SKPM ϕ. This can be
done by induction on the positive complexity of ϕ.
This is partly due to our observation in Proposition 3.2.4 that the negated
notions in fact express positive facts.
This fact ensures that there are fixed points of the operator Θ, i.e., evaluation
functions f with f = Θ(f). These are evaluation functions where the process
of evaluation doesn’t lead to any new “information”.
Definition 3.2.8. f is called a fixed point evaluation function if Θ(f) = f .
f is called a consistent evaluation function if for each w ∈ W and n ∈ N, it
is not the case that n ∈ f(w) and ¬. n ∈ f(w).
Corollary 3.2.9 (Θ has fixed points). For every M there is some consistent
fixed point evaluation function f .
Proof. Start with f0(w) = ∅ for all w. Let Θα(f) denote the iteration of Θ
α-many times to f . Construe each evaluation function as a subset of W × N.
Then by Lemma 3.2.7, Θα(f0) ⊆ Θα+1(f0). So by cardinality considerations,
there must be some β where Θβ(f0) = Θ
β+1(f0), i.e. a fixed point.
To show that the minimal fixed point is consistent, one works by induction on
α. The only interesting part of this is to show that if Θα(f0) is consistent then
so is Θα+1(f0).
7Remember “P= (pBlueq, p1/2q)” is an abbreviation for “P>(pBlueq, p1/2q) ∧
P>(p¬Blueq, p1− 1/2q)”
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Definition 3.2.10. Let lfp denote the evaluation function which is the least
fixed point of Θ.
If ϕ is grounded in facts that are not about truth or probability then this
process of evaluation will terminate in such facts and the sentence will be evalu-
ated appropriately in a fixed point. Such sentences will also therefore be given a
point-valued probability as is desired. This will cover sentences that are express-
ible in the operator language, therefore showing that this semantics extends an
operator semantics, a minimal adequacy requirement for any proposed seman-
tics (see Section 3.3.1). However we will get more, for example 0 = 0 ∨ λ isn’t
expressible in the operator language, but it will be evaluated positively in each
world and so be assigned probability 1, i.e. P= (p0 = 0 ∨ λq, p1q) will also be
evaluated positively.
The fixed points have some nice properties:
Proposition 3.2.11. For f a fixed point of Θ we have:
#ϕ ∈ f(w) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ
Therefore we have
(w, f) |=SKPM Tpϕq ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬Tpϕq ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ¬ϕ
(w, f) |=SKPM P>(pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ mw{v | (v, f) |=SKPM ϕ} > r
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ mw{v | (v, f) 6|=SKPM ¬ϕ} < r
...
And other analogous properties as in Proposition 3.2.4.
Proof. Follows immediately from Definitions 3.2.3 and 3.2.5.
It is these fixed points which we propose as providing the (non-classical)
semantics for the language. lfp is a particularly interesting one of these fixed
points.
These will not be classical, i.e. there will be some ϕ, for example λ, such
that ¬ϕ ∈ f(w) 6⇐⇒ ϕ /∈ f(w) and (w, f) |=SKPM ¬ϕ 6⇐⇒ (w, f) 6|=SKPM ϕ. If
we do have some f which is classical for the sentences not involving truth8 and
a fixed point, we will exactly have a Prob-PW-model from Section 2.4. But
we saw that for a frame that is omniscient, introspective, finite or countably
additive, the frame will not support a Prob-PW-model, so there cannot be any
such classical fixed point f in any of these frames.
3.2.3 The classical semantics
Particularly when we provide an axiomatisation, we will also be interested in a
classical variant of these semantics. In this we use the interpretation of T and P
that (w, f) |=SKPM gives us to determine a classical model for the language LP>,T.
This is common when working with Kripke’s theory, the resulting model often
8In the sense that (w, f) |=SKPM ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ (w, f) 6|=
SKP
M ϕ.
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being called the “closed-off model”. The axiomatisation that we will provide will
be an axiomatisation in classical logic and will be axiomatising these classical
variants of the semantics.
We will define the induced model given by M and f at w, IMM[w, f ], by
“closing off” the model by putting the unevaluated sentences outside of the
extension of T and P. This is described pictorially by altering Fig. 3.2 to Fig. 3.3.
IMM[w, f ] |= . . .:
] (
0 1 r
mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} 1−mw{v |#¬ϕ ∈ f(v)}
P>(pϕq, prq)
¬P< (pϕq, prq)
¬P>(pϕq, prq)
P< (pϕq, prq)
¬P>(pϕq, prq)
¬P< (pϕq, prq)
Figure 3.3: How IMM[w, f ] evaluates the probability of ϕ
It is defined formally as follows:
Definition 3.2.12. Define IMM[w, f ] to be a (classical) model for the language
LP>,T that has the domain N, interprets the predicates from L as is specified
by M(w), and interprets the other predicates by:
• IMM[w, f ] |= Tn ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM Tn
• IMM[w, f ] |= P>(n, k) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P>(n, k)
This will satisfy:
Proposition 3.2.13. For M a probabilistic modal structure, f an evaluation
function and w ∈W ,
• IMM[w, f ] |= P> (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P> (pϕq, prq)
• IMM[w, f ] |= P6 (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P6 (pϕq, prq)
• IMM[w, f ] |= P< (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P< (pϕq, prq)
• IMM[w, f ] |= P= (pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P= (pϕq, prq)
Although these equivalences hold, IMM[w, f ] |= differs from (w, f) |=SKPM
because IMM[w, f ] is classical, for example we might have that IMM[w, f ] |=
¬P>(pϕq, prq) but (w, f) 6|=SKPM ¬P>(pϕq, prq).
As a corollary of the previous Proposition, we also have:
Corollary 3.2.14. For M a probabilistic modal structure, f a fixed point eval-
uation function and w ∈W ,
• IMM[w, f ] |= TpP>(pϕq, prq)q↔ P>(pϕq, prq)
• IMM[w, f ] |= TpP> (pϕq, prq)q↔ P> (pϕq, prq)
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• etc for all the positive principles.
And for the negative principles, we have:
• IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬P>(pϕq, prq)q↔ P< (pϕq, prq)
• etc for all the negative principles, see Proposition 3.2.4.
Proof. To show this, one starts by assuming the left hand side of each equiv-
alence required, then uses Definition 3.2.12, then the result from Proposi-
tion 3.2.11 that for f a fixed point, (w, f) |=SKPM Tpϕq ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ
and then, at least for the negated principles, Proposition 3.2.4 and finally
Proposition 3.2.13 to show that therefore the right hand side is satisfied in the
induced model.
These induced models, for consistent fixed points f , are our proposal for the
semantics of the language.
Although these models are models of classical logic, the truth and probabil-
ity notions do not act classically. For example, for f a consistent fixed point
we will have ¬Tpλq, ¬Tp¬λq, ¬P> (pλq, p0q) and ¬P< (pλq, p1q) all satisfied
in IMM[w, f ]. Furthermore, some tautologies of classical logic are not in the
extension of the truth predicate and not assigned probability 1, for example
λ ∨ ¬λ.9
3.2.4 P is an SK-probability
The underlying evaluation scheme we used to develop this construction was a
strong Kleene scheme and we will show that the models we have developed can
be seen to provide probabilities over logics arising from strong Kleene evalua-
tions. So although traditional probabilism has been dropped, we have instead
just modified it to be the appropriate version of probabilism over these non-
classical logics.
One way in which the traditional probabilistic framework is rejected in our
construction is that some sentences are assigned probability ranges. We there-
fore see that we have two functions to consider, p(w,f) and p(w,f):
Definition 3.2.15. Fix some probabilistic modal structure M, evaluation func-
tion f and world w. Define
p(w,f)(ϕ) := sup{r ∈ Q | IMM[w, f ] |= P>(pϕq, prq)}
p(w,f)(ϕ) := inf{r ∈ Q | IMM[w, f ] |= P6 (pϕq, prq)}
For f consistent we let p as given by M, w and f denote:
• p(w,f)(ϕ), if p(w,f)(ϕ) = p(w,f)(ϕ),
• [p(w,f)(ϕ),p(w,f)(ϕ)] otherwise.
This can be seen as in Fig. 3.4.
Using this definition (also by comparing Fig. 3.4 to Fig. 3.3) we have the
following equivalent characterisations of p(w,f) and p(w,f)
9In Chapter 4 we will consider a variant of the this construction where such classical-logical
tautologies are assigned (point-valued) probability 1.
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IMM[w, f ] |=:
] (
0 1 r
p(w,f)(ϕ) p(w,f)(ϕ)
P>(pϕq, prq)
¬P< (pϕq, prq)
¬P>(pϕq, prq)
P< (pϕq, prq)
¬P>(pϕq, prq)
¬P< (pϕq, prq)
Figure 3.4: Definition of p(w,f)(ϕ) and p(w,f)(ϕ)
Proposition 3.2.16.
p(w,f)(ϕ) = sup{r | (w, f) |=SKPM P>(pϕq, prq)}
= mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)}
p(w,f)(ϕ) = inf{r | (w, f) |=SKPM P6 (pϕq, prq)}
= 1−mw{v |#¬ϕ ∈ f(v)}
If f is a fixed point, then also,
p(w,f)(ϕ) = mw{v | (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ}
p(w,f)(ϕ) = 1−mw{v | (w, f) |=SKPM ¬ϕ}
= mw{v | (w, f) 6|=SKPM ¬ϕ}
We will sometimes then say p(ϕ) = [p(w,f)(ϕ),p(w,f)(ϕ)], and if p(w,f)(ϕ) =
p(w,f)(ϕ) = r then we will say p(ϕ) = r.
Both these functions lose nice properties one would expect from classical
probabilities, for example p(w,f)(λ∨¬λ) = 0, and p(w,f)(λ∧¬λ) = 1. However,
one can show that p(w,f) is a non-classical probability over Kleene logic K3,
which is defined by truth preservation in Kleene evaluations, in the sense of
Williams (2014), and p(w,f) is a non-classical probability over LP -logic, which
is defined by falsity anti-preservation in Kleene evaluations. We will further
analyse this connection in Section 7.3.4.
3.3 Connections to other languages
In this section we will present connections between this semantics and other
languages. For general details about translations between such languages, see
Section 1.6.3. There are two results we show in this section, the first is that the
construction extends the operator semantics and the second is that a probability
predicate can be reduced to a probability operator and a truth predicate.
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3.3.1 Minimal adequacy of the theory
A minimal constraint on a predicate approach to probability is that it should
be conservative over the operator approach. Our construction satisfies this
constraint because if a sentence has a corresponding sentence in the operator
language then the evaluation procedure for the sentence will terminate. Such
sentences will therefore be assigned a truth value in the minimal fixed point,
and so in any fixed point. Moreover it is easy to check that they receive the
same truth value as the corresponding sentence in the operator approach.
For a language L as in Setup 3, consider the language LP>r,T defined as in
Definition 1.6.17 And extend the definition of the semantics from Definition 2.2.1
by:
w |=M Tϕ ⇐⇒ w |=M ϕ
The language LP>,T ‘extends’ LP>r,T by the natural translation, ρ as defined
in the next theorem.
Theorem 3.3.1. There is some ρ : SentLP>r,T → SentLP>,T such that
ρ(ϕ) =

ϕ ϕ ∈ L
P>(pρ(ϕ)q, prq) ϕ = P>r(ψ)
Tpρ(ϕ)q ϕ = Tψ
¬ρ(ψ) ϕ = ¬ψ
ρ(ψ) ∧ ρ(χ) ϕ = ψ ∧ χ
This theorem is a corollary of the result in Section 1.6.3.
Definition 3.3.2. For ϕ ∈ LP>r,T, define depth(ϕ) to be:
• 0 if ϕ ∈ L,
• depth(ψ) + 1 for ϕ = Tψ
• depth(ψ) + 1 for ϕ = P>rψ
• depth(ψ) for ϕ = ¬ψ
• max{depth(ψ), depth(χ)} for ϕ = ψ ∨ χ
Theorem 3.3.3. For each evaluation function f ,
w |=M ϕ ⇐⇒ (w,Θdepth(ϕ)(f)) |=SKPM ρ(ϕ)
Proof. By induction on the positive complexity of ϕ.
ϕ in L is easy because then ρ is identity and the semantic clauses are the same.
Connective cases are fine.
w |=M T(ψ) ⇐⇒ w |=M ψ
⇐⇒ (w,Θdepth(ψ)(f)) |=SKPM ρ(ψ)
⇐⇒ (w,Θdepth(ψ)+1(f)) |=SKPM Tpρ(ψ)q
⇐⇒ (w,Θdepth(ϕ)(f)) |=SKPM ρ(T(ψ))
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w |=M ¬T(ψ) ⇐⇒ w |=M ¬ψ
⇐⇒ (w,Θdepth(ψ)(f)) |=SKPM ρ(¬ψ)
⇐⇒ (w,Θdepth(ψ)+1(f)) |=SKPM ¬Tpρ(ψ)q
⇐⇒ (w,Θdepth(ϕ)(f)) |=SKPM ρ(¬T(ψ))
w |=M P>r(ψ) ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ψ} > r
⇐⇒ mw{v | (v,Θdepth(ψ)(f)) |=SKPM ρ(ψ)} > r
⇐⇒ mw{v | ρ(ψ) ∈ Θdepth(ψ)+1(f)(v)} > r
⇐⇒ (w,Θdepth(ϕ)(f)) |=SKPM P>(pρ(ϕ)q, prq)
w |=M ¬P>r(ψ) ⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ψ} < r
⇐⇒ mw{v | v |=M ¬ψ} > 1− r
⇐⇒ mw{v | (v,Θdepth(ψ)(f)) |=SKPM ρ(¬ψ)} > 1− r
⇐⇒ mw{v | ¬ρ(ψ) ∈ Θdepth(ψ)+1(f)(v)} > 1− r
⇐⇒ (w,Θdepth(ϕ)(f)) |=SKPM ¬P>(pρ(ϕ)q, prq)
For every ϕ ∈ SentLP>r,T , depth(ϕ) < ω, so:
Corollary 3.3.4. For each evaluation function f ,
w |=M ϕ ⇐⇒ (w,Θω(f)) |=SKPM ρ(ϕ)
Therefore, for every fixed point evaluation function f ,
w |=M ϕ ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ρ(ϕ)
3.3.2 Probability operators and a truth predicate
Halbach and Welch (2009) show that a modal operator and truth predicate are
adequate for the language with the necessity predicate by translating a necessity
predicate into “necessarily true”, where this latter necessity is formalised as a
modal operator, as standard in modal logic. Halbach and Welch view this as a
defence of the operator approach against the charge of expressive weakness be-
cause this result shows that in fact the expressive power of a predicate language
for necessity can be recovered within the operator setting if we also have a truth
predicate. However, note that one has to still define a strong Kleene variant of
the operator semantics and the resulting construction is just as complicated as
the predicate construction. Stern (2015a) argues that this result can be alter-
natively viewed as a defence of the predicate approach against the backdrop of
paradoxes, which in his context is particularly Montague’s theorem, as it shows
that the paradoxes can be reduced to paradoxes of truth.
We can show that a similar result holds in our construction.
Definition 3.3.5. Let L be any language as in Setup 3, let LT be the extension
of that language with an added predicate, T. Let LP>,T be defined as in Defini-
tion 1.6.12 over the base language LT, so adding operators P> and allowing for
quantifiers.
So there are sentences in this language like10
P>(Tp∀xP>(ϕ(x), p1q)q, p1/2q).
10As discussed in Section 1.6.3, the Gödel coding would code all sentences of the language
LP>,T so allowing probabilities to appear inside the truth predicate.
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We can construct a translation from the language with a probability predi-
cate to one with a probability operator (and a truth predicate) by translating
P>(pϕq, prq) as P>(Tpϕq, prq) (at least for ϕ ∈ L). This might be described as
translating “the probability of ϕ is r” to “the probability that ϕ is true is r”.
Theorem 3.3.6. There is ρ : FormP>,T → FormP>,T such that
ρ(ϕ) =

ϕ ϕ ∈ LT atomic
P>(Tρ.(t), s) ϕ = P>(s, t)
Tρ.(t) ϕ = Tt
¬ρ(ψ) ϕ = ¬ψ
ρ(ψ) ∧ ρ(χ) ϕ = ψ ∧ χ
∀xρ(ψ) ϕ = ∀xψ
′ else
where ρ. is object level formula representing ρ, i.e. ρ.(#ϕ) = pρ(ϕ)q.
One can then construct a semantics for LP>,T in the same way as we did for
LP>,T, by altering |=SKPM to |=SKPM as follows:
Definition 3.3.7. For f ∈ ℘(cSentP>,T)W and w ∈W , define |=SKPM inductively
on the positive complexity of ϕ. Cases are as in the definition of |=SKPM except
the cases for P> and ¬P> are replaced by:
• (w, f) |=SKPM P>(ϕ, r) iff mw{v | (v, f) |=SKPM ϕ} > r
• (w, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(ϕ, r) iff mw{v | (v, f) |=SKPM ¬ϕ} > 1− r
Definition 3.3.8. ΘP(f)(w) := {#ϕ | (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ}
One can then observe that ΘP is monotone, and therefore that there is a
fixed point of ΘP.
We can then state the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.3.9. If lfpP is the minimal fixed point of Θ and lfpP is the minimal
fixed point of ΘP then
(w, lfpP) |=SKPM ϕ ⇐⇒ (w, lfpP) |=SKPM ρ(ϕ)
Proof. One can show that this in fact holds at all stages in the construction
of lfp. Let fP0 (w) = f
P
0 = ∅ for all w ∈ W . Let fPα be the result of α-many
applications of Θ to fP0 , and similarly let f
P
α denote α-many applications of ΘP
to fP0 .
We will show that the equivalence holds at each α by induction on α. There
must be some α where fPα = lfpP and Θ
P
α = lfpP by standard results on inductive
definitions (see, e.g., Moschovakis, 1974).
This holds for α = 0 trivially.
For the successor step, the induction hypothesis is that
(w, fPα) |=SKPM ϕ ⇐⇒ (w, fPα) |=SKPM ρ(ϕ)
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and we need to show this equivalence for α+1 which we do by a sub-induction
on the positive complexity of ϕ.
For t a closed term we have: If there is no ϕ ∈ SentP>,T such that tN = #ϕ
then:
(w, fPα+1) |=SKPM ¬Tt,
and (w, fPα+1) |=SKPM ¬ρ(Tt),
and (w, fPα+1) |=SKPM ¬P>(t, s),
and (w, fPα+1) |=SKPM ¬ρ(P>(t, s)).
For s a closed term we have: If there is no r such that sN = #r then:
(w, fPα+1) |=SKPM ¬P>(t, s),
and (w, fPα+1) |=SKPM ¬ρ(P>(t, s)).
So we only need to consider the cases for tN = #ϕ and sN = #r. All the
cases for Tpϕq, ¬Tpϕq, P>(pϕq, prq) and ¬P>(pϕq, prq) are similar. We just
present the cases for Tpϕq and ¬P>(pϕq, prq)
(w, fPα+1) |=SKPM Tpϕq
⇐⇒ #ϕ ∈ fPα+1(w)
⇐⇒ (w, fPα) |=SKPM ϕ
⇐⇒ (w, fPα) |=SKPM ρ(ϕ)
⇐⇒ #ρ(ϕ) ∈ fPα+1(w)
⇐⇒ (w, fPα+1) |=SKPM Tpρ(ϕ)q
⇐⇒ (w, fPα+1) |=SKPM ρ(Tpϕq)
(w, fPα+1) |=SKPM ¬P>(pϕq, prq)
⇐⇒ mw{v |#¬ϕ ∈ fPα+1(v)} > 1− r
⇐⇒ mw{v | (v, fPα) |=SKPM ¬ϕ} > 1− r
⇐⇒ mw{v | (v, fPα) |=SKPM ¬ρ(ϕ)} > 1− r
⇐⇒ mw{v | (v, fPα+1) |=SKPM ¬Tpρ(ϕ)q} > 1− r
⇐⇒ (w, fPα+1) |=SKPM ¬P>(Tpρ(ϕ)q, prq)
⇐⇒ (w, fPα+1) |=SKPM ρ(¬P>(pϕq, prq))
The inductive steps for this sub-induction on the positive complexity of ϕ are
simple because the definition of |=SKPM and |=SKPM are exactly the same for
these and the translation function commutes with these operations.
Now suppose µ is a limit ordinal. Then the argument is very similar to the
successor stage and again works by a subinduction on the positive complexity
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of ϕ. For example for the base case P>(pϕq, prq):
(w, fPµ ) |=SKPM P>(pϕq, prq)
⇐⇒ mw{v |#ϕ ∈ fPµ (v)} > r
⇐⇒ mw
(⋃
α<µ
{v |#ϕ ∈ fPα(v)}
)
> r
⇐⇒ mw
(⋃
α<µ
{v | (v, fPα) |=SKPM Tpϕq}
)
> r
⇐⇒ mw
(⋃
α<µ
{v | (v, fPα) |=SKPM Tpρ(ϕ)q}
)
> r
⇐⇒ mw
(⋃
α<µ
{v |#ρ(ϕ) ∈ ΘαP (f0)}
)
> r
⇐⇒ mw{v |#ρ(ϕ) ∈ ΘµP(f0)} > r
⇐⇒ mw{v | (v, fPµ) |=SKPM Tpρ(ϕ)q} > r
⇐⇒ (w, fPµ) |=SKPM P>(Tpρ(ϕ)q, prq)
⇐⇒ (w, fPµ) |=SKPM ρ(P>(pϕq, prq))
3.4 Specific cases of the semantics
We will now discuss what happens when we consider particular probabilistic
modal structures. In doing this we consider the property of introspection and N-
additivity, the latter holding in probabilistic modal structures that have count-
ably additive accessibility measures.
3.4.1 Introspection
Studying introspection in languages that allow for self-referential probabilities
is interesting because if it is naively formulated it is inconsistent, a problem
discussed by Caie (2013) and Christiano et al. (ms) and presented in Section 1.4.
Introspective probabilistic modal structures satisfy
P>rϕ→ P=1P>rϕ
and ¬P>rϕ→ P=1¬P>rϕ
Introspective structures do not satisfy the direct translations of these in our
semantics:
P>(pϕq, prq)→ P= (pP>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
and ¬P>(pϕq, prq)→ P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
But they do satisfy varients of these expressed using a truth predicate:
TpP>(ϕ, prq)q =⇒ P= (pP>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
and Tp¬P>(ϕ, prq)q =⇒ P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
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Proposition 3.4.1. Let M be weakly introspective (a mild weakening of the
condition: mw{v |mv = mw} = 1 for all w). Then for any evaluation function
f and world w,
• If (w, f) |=SKPM P>(pϕq, prq),
then (w,Θ(f)) |=SKPM P= (pP>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
• If (w, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(pϕq, prq),
then (w,Θ(f)) |=SKPM P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
And similarly for P>,P6 etc.
By the definition of IMM[w, f ] we therefore have:
11
• IMM[w,Θ(f)] |= TpP>(pϕq, prq)q→ P= (pP>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q))
• IMM[w,Θ(f)] |= Tp¬P>(pϕq, prq)q→ P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q))
And similarly for P> etc.
Therefore for f a fixed point evaluation function,
• IMM[w, f ] |= TpP>(pϕq, prq)q→ P= (pP>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q))
• IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬P>(pϕq, prq)q→ P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q))
And similarly for P> etc.
Proof.
(w, f) |=SKPM P>(pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} > r
=⇒ mw{v′ |mv′{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} > r} = 1
⇐⇒ mw{v′ | (v′, f) |=SKPM P>(pϕq, prq)} = 1
⇐⇒ mw{v′ |#P>(pϕq, prq) ∈ Θ(f)} = 1
⇐⇒ (w,Θ(f)) |=SKPM P= (pP>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
(w, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ mw{v |#¬ϕ ∈ f(v)} > 1− r
=⇒ mw{v′ |mv′{v |#¬ϕ ∈ f(v)} > 1− r} = 1
⇐⇒ mw{v′ | (v′, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(pϕq, prq)} = 1
⇐⇒ mw{v′ |#¬P>(pϕq, prq) ∈ Θ(f)} = 1
⇐⇒ (w,Θ(f)) |=SKPM P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
And similar arguments hold for P>,P6 etc. The other characterisations are
just easy consequences of this.
We also have the converse result which works very similarly to Proposi-
tion 2.3.2.
11In fact the quantified versions
• IMM[w,Θ(Θ(f))] |= ∀a∀x(TP>. (x, a)→ P>(P>. (x, a) , p1q))
• IMM[w,Θ(Θ(f))] |= ∀a∀x(T¬. P>. (x, a)→ P>(¬. P>. (x, a) , p1q))
are satisfied but we do not present this because it is not important for our point.
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Proposition 3.4.2. Let L contain at least one empirical symbol. Then a prob-
abilistic modal frame (W, {mw}) is weakly introspective if and only if for every
M based on it, and every fixed point evaluation function f ,
• IMM[w, f ] |= TpP>(pϕq, prq)q→ P= (pP>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q))
• IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬P>(pϕq, prq)q→ P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q))
or, equivalently,
• If (w, f) |=SKPM P>(pϕq, prq),
then (w, f) |=SKPM P= (pP>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
• If (w, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(pϕq, prq),
then (w, f) |=SKPM P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
Proof. We have shown =⇒ in Proposition 3.4.1. The “equivalently” works
by Propositions 3.2.11 and 3.2.13.
⇐= : Suppose the RHS. Fix w and some A ⊆W . WLOG suppose L contains
the propositional variable O. Consider a valuation M such that
M(v) |= O ⇐⇒ v ∈ A.
Observe that for f a fixed point,12
#O ∈ f(v) ⇐⇒ v ∈ A
#¬O ∈ f(v) ⇐⇒ v /∈ A.
Suppose r 6 mw(A) < q.
Then (w, f) |=SKPM P>(pOq, prq) and (w, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(pOq, pqq). So
(w, f) |=SKPM P>(pP>(pOq, prq)q, p1q)
so mw{v |#P>(pOq, prq) ∈ f(v)} > 1
so mw{v | (v, f) |=SKPM P>(pOq, prq)} > 1
so mw{v |mv{v′ |#O ∈ f(v′)} > r} > 1
so mw{v |mv(A) > r} > 1
and
(w, f) |=SKPM P>(p¬P>(pOq, pqq)q, p1q)
so mw{v |#¬P>(pOq, pqq) ∈ f(v)} > 1
so mw{v | (v, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(pOq, pqq)} > 1
so mw{v |mv{v′ |#¬O ∈ f(v′)} > 1− q} > 1
so mw{v |mv(W \A) > 1− q} > 1
so mw{v |mv(A) < q} > 1
Since mw is finitely additive, we therefore have:
mw{v | r 6 mv(A) < q} = 1
12In fact just requires that f = Θ(g) for some g.
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In fact in this setting, we can also formulate a version of these introspection
principles that does not involve reference to the truth predicate. That is by the
principles:
P>(pϕq, prq)→ P= (pP>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
P< (pϕq, prq)→ P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q) (3.1)
Which are equivalent to the principles:13
TpP>(pϕq, prq)q→ P= (pP>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
Tp¬P>(pϕq, prq)q→ P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
The reason that Eq. (3.1) is weaker than the principle which cannot be satisfied:
¬P>(pϕq, prq)→ P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q) (3.2)
is that for the problematic sentences (w, f) 6|=SKPM P>(pϕq, prq) and (w, f) 6|=SKPM
¬P>(pϕq, prq), so neither antecedent of the consistent principles will be satisfied
in IMM[w, f ], though ¬P>(pϕq, prq) will be.
This bears some connection to discussions in epistemology where the neg-
ative introspection principles are rejected, often because of the possibility of
suspending judgement. Stating our antecedents with the truth predicate means
that the introspection principle will not be applied to sentences where neither
TpP>(pϕq, prq)q nor Tp¬P>(pϕq, prq)q. So whereas the usual rejection of in-
trospection involves a suspension of judgement by the agent, our alteration here
is due to the “suspension” by the truth predicate.
Although we have this alternative form without the truth predicate in this
setting we will not in general focus on that as a solution because it is not system-
atic and general. As we will see in Chapter 5, and in particular Section 5.4.2,
the strategy of expressing the principles using a truth predicate is a general
strategy and also applies when other theories of truth are being considered as.
This strategy can also be applied to other principles, as we will discuss in
Section 5.4.2, though further work should be done to give a general result about
how to express these principles.
This strategy comes from Stern (2014a) where he applies the strategy in
frameworks where all-or-nothing modalities are conceived of as predicates. In
that article he describes the strategy as “avoiding introduction and elimination
of the modal predicate independently of the truth predicate” and suggests that
this might in general allow one to avoid inconsistency and paradox, at least if
one accepts a consistent theory of truth. Moreover he says:
[This strategy] seems to be well motivated if one adopts the de-
flationist idea that quotation and disquotation are the function of
the truth predicate. Consequently, quotation and disquotation of
sentences is not the task of the modal predicate and in formulat-
ing modal principles we should therefore avoid the introduction or
elimination of the modal predicates without the detour via the truth
predicate. (Stern, 2014a, p. 227)
13This can be seen using Corollary 3.2.14.
76
3.4 Specific cases of the semantics
That, then, is our proposal for expressing the introspection principles. The
result that our formulation of the introspection principles exactly pin down the
weakly introspective probabilistic modal structures is a very strong argument
in favour of this formulation of the principles.
We next show a nice feature of the construction, namely that it can account
for N-additivity. This will not follow the strategy outlined in the preceeding
section because in N-additivity there is no introduction or elimination of the
modal notions. However, there are still some points to note because we can
interpret our semantics as assigning sentences probability ranges instead of point
values.
3.4.2 N-additivity
We introduced N-additivity in Section 1.2.1, it said
p(∃xϕ(x)) = lim
n
p(ϕ(0) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ(n))
and captures the idea that p is countably additive and that the domain is N. In
our semantics here, sentences are sometimes given ranges of probability values
instead of points, so the definition of N-additivity needs to be reformulated to
account for this.
Previous work on self-referential probability has faced a challenge from N-
additivity, both Christiano’s requirements (Christiano et al., ms) and the final
stage of Leitgeb’s construction (Leitgeb, 2012) lead to a formula ϕ(x) such that
for each n p(ϕ(0) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ(n)) = 0 but p(∃xϕ(x)) = 1. 14 A big difference
between our semantics in this chapter and their analysis is that they always
assumed that the probabilities assigned point values to each sentence (satisfying
the usual classical probability axioms), whereas we allow for these ranges. In
this way we are able to avoid the problems that they faced.
In fact, as a consequence of our result in Section 2.4.2, we see that this
use of ranges is essential in frames where each M(w) is an N-model (which is
an assumption for all our frames in this chapter) and each mw is countably
additive. In that section we showed that there were no Prob-PW-models for
such structures, so instead there must be some sentences which do not receive
a single point valued probability. This is because we are provided with a Prob-
PW-model by finding a fixed point evaluation function where for every sentence,
ϕ there is some r where P= (pϕq, prq) is satisfied.
The way we reformulate the N-additivity criterion is to apply it to the end
points of the ranges of probability values assigned.
Definition 3.4.3. We say that p as given by M, w, f is N-additive if
p(w,f)(∃xϕ(x)) = lim
n
p(w,f)(ϕ(0) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ(n))
14The failure of N-additivity in Leitgeb’s theory is closely related to McGee’s ω-inconsistency
result from McGee (1985), presented in Theorem 2.4.12. For Leitgeb a sentence displaying
the bad failure of N-additivity is: ¬
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
TpTp. . .Tpδq . . .qq where δ is the McGee sentence with
truth, namely is a sentence with the property that PA ` δ ↔ ∃n¬
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
TpTp. . .Tpδq . . .qq. For
Christiano et al. this is given by Ppεq 6 1 − 1/n+1 where ε is a sentence with the property
PA ` ε ↔ Ppεq < 1; the fact that Christiano et al. face a challenge from N-additivity was
pointed out to me by Hannes Leitgeb.
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and similarly for p(w,f).
If we consider a probabilistic modal structure where the measure mw is
countably additive then p will be N-additive.
Theorem 3.4.4. If M is such that mw is countably additive,
15 and f is a fixed
point, then P as given by M, w, f will be N-additive.
Proof. By the definition of (w, f) |=SKPM , we have:
{v | (w, f) |=SKPM ∃xϕ(x)} =
⋃
n
{v | (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ(0) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ(n)}
So since mw is countably additive,
mw{v | (w, f) |=SKPM ∃xϕ(x)} = lim
n
mw{v | (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ(0) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ(n)}
This suffices for the result for p(w,f) because by Proposition 3.2.16 we have
p(w,f)(ψ) = mw{v | (w, f) |=SKPM ψ}.
{v | (w, f) |=SKPM ¬∃xϕ(x)} =
⋂
n
{v | (w, f) |=SKPM ¬(ϕ(0) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ(n))}
So
mw{v | (w, f) |=SKPM ¬∃xϕ(x)} = lim
n
mw{v | (w, f) |=SKPM ¬(ϕ(0) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ(n))}
This suffices for the result for p(w,f) because by Proposition 3.2.16 we have
p(w,f)(ψ) = 1−mw{v | (w, f) |=SKPM ¬ψ}.
This is the form of N-additivity that is appropriate in a context where one
deals with interval-valued probabilities. We therefore see that if we don’t restrict
ourselves to merely finitely-additive probabilities then we can account for N-
additivity.
3.4.3 This extends the usual truth construction
This construction we have presented extends the usual construction just for the
truth predicate. In fact, if M is constant, i.e. assigns the same valuation to each
world, then the construction is just equivalent to the construction for truth. In
that case sentences either receive probability 1, if they are true in the usual
Kripkean construction, or 0 if they are false, or [0, 1] if neither.
Theorem 3.4.5. 16 If M is a probabilistic modal structure with M constant,17
then for each w
15We can drop the condition that mw be defined on the whole powerset of W and instead
ask just that it is defined an algebra of subsets containing the sets of the form {v | n ∈ f(v)}.
16Question was from Stanislav Speranski.
17I.e. for all w, v ∈W , M(w) = M(v).
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1. (w, lfp) |=SKPM ϕ ⇐⇒ (v, lfp) |=SKPM ϕ, for all v,
2. Let p be as given by M, w and lfp (see Definition 3.2.15). For all ϕ ∈
SentP>,T, either p(ϕ) = 0, p(ϕ) = 1 or p(ϕ) = [0, 1],
3. p(ϕ) = 1 ⇐⇒ (w, lfp) |=SKPM Tpϕq
4. IMM[w, lfp] |= ∀x(P> (x, p0q)↔ Tx)
Proof. We can prove that these the first hold for each fα in the construction
of the least fixed point. For the induction step we do a sub-induction on the
positive complexity of ϕ.
The other properties also hold for each stage and follow from the first property.
Definition 3.4.6. Define ρ : SentP>,T → SentT with
ρ(ϕ) =

ϕ ϕ ∈ L atomic
Tρ. (t) ϕ = Tt
s  p0q ∨ (s  p0q ∧ Tρ. (t)) ϕ = P>(t, s)
¬ρ(ψ) ϕ = ¬ψ
ρ(ψ) ∧ ρ(χ) ϕ = ψ ∧ χ
∀xρ(ψ) ϕ = ∀xψ
′ else
Such a ρ exists.
Theorem 3.4.7. Then #ϕ ∈ lfp(w) ⇐⇒ #ρ(ϕ) ∈ lfpT.
Proof. We induct on the construction of the fixed point as in Theorem 3.3.9.
As in Theorem 3.3.9, let fP0 (w) = ∅ = fT0 and let fPα denote the evaluation
function from α-many applications of Θ to fP0 . Let f
T
α denote the subset of N
resulting from α-many applications of Γ to ∅.
We will show: n ∈ fPα(w) ⇐⇒ ρ.n
N ∈ fTα for all r and w. For the induction
step: Suppose it holds for r, then it suffices to show that
(w, fPα) |=SKPM ⇐⇒ fTα |=SKTM ϕ
by induction on the positive complexity of ϕ. If ϕ ∈ L is atomic or negated
atomic then
(w, fPα) |=SKPM ϕ ⇐⇒ M(w) |= ϕ ⇐⇒ MT |= ϕ ⇐⇒ fPα |=SKTM ϕ
For ϕ = Tt,
(w, fPα) |=SKPM Tt ⇐⇒ tN ∈ fPα(w) and tN ∈ SentLP>,T
⇐⇒ ρ. t
N ∈ fTα and ρ. t
N ∈ SentLT
⇐⇒ fPα |=SKTM Tρ. t
Similarly for ¬Tt
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For ϕ = P>(t, s), suppose s
N  0.
(w, fPα) |=SKPM P>(t, s) ⇐⇒ sN ∈ Rat and mw{v | tN ∈ fPα(v)} > rat(sN)
⇐⇒ tN ∈ fPα(w)
⇐⇒ ρ. t
N ∈ fTα
⇐⇒ fPα |=SKTM Tρ. t
⇐⇒ fPα |=SKTM s  p0q ∨ (s  p0q ∧ Tρ. t)
Suppose sN  0.
(w, fPα) |=SKPM P>(t, s) ⇐⇒ sN ∈ Rat and mw{v | tN ∈ fPα(v)} > rat(sN)
⇐⇒ >
⇐⇒ fPα |=SKTM s  p0q ∨ (s  p0q ∧ Tρ. t)
For sN /∈ Rat, (w, fPα) 6|=SKPM P>(t, s) and fPα 6|=SKTM s  p0q ∨ (s  p0q ∧ Tρ. t).
For ϕ = ¬P>(t, s), if sN /∈ Rat,
(w, fPα) |=SKPM ¬P>(t, s)
and
fPα |=SKTM ¬(s  p0q ∨ (s  p0q ∧ Tρ. t)).
For sN  0,
(w, fPα) 6|=SKPM ¬P>(t, s)
and
fPα 6|=SKTM ¬(s  p0q ∨ (s  p0q ∧ Tρ. t)).
For s  0,
(w, fPα) |=SKPM ¬P>(t, s) ⇐⇒ mw{v | ¬. tN ∈ fPα(v)} > 1− rat(sN)
⇐⇒ ¬. tN ∈ fPα(w)
⇐⇒ ¬. ρ. t
N ∈ fTα
⇐⇒ fPα |=SKTM ¬Tρ. t
⇐⇒ fPα |=SKTM ¬(s  p0q ∨ (s  p0q ∧ Tρ. t))
The inductive steps are clear.
Not all sentences are assigned either probability {0}, {1}, [0, 1]. We now give
an example of such a situation. Consider an agent’s degrees of belief in the toss
of a fair coin.
Heads
1/2
Tails
1/2
Figure 3.5: Agent considering the toss of a fair coin.
For f the minimal fixed point, at wHeads, p(Heads ∨ λ) = [0.5, 1].
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3.4.4 Other special cases
Question 3.4.8. 18 What happens in the pms M = 〈N, {mn},M〉 where
mn({i}) =
{
1
n i 6 n
0 otherwise
Answer. Define f(w)(#ϕ) :=
{
1 #ϕ ∈ f(w)
0 otherwise
(n, f) |=SKPM P>(pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒
f(0)(#ϕ) + . . .+ f(n)(#ϕ)
n
> r
(n, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒
f(0)(#¬ϕ) + . . .+ f(n)(#¬ϕ)
n
> 1− r
3.5 An axiomatic system
In the last section of this chapter we present an axiomatic theory for this se-
mantic construction. This will allow one to better reason about this semantics.
3.5.1 The system and a statement of the result
We now present the axiomatic system.
Definition 3.5.1. Remember we introduced the following abbreviations:
• P> (t, s) := ∃a  s(P>(t, a))
• P6 (t, s) := P>(¬. t, 1−. s)
• P< (t, s) := P> (¬. t, 1−. s)
• P= (t, s) := P>(t, s) ∧ P6 (t, s)
Define ProbKF to be given by the following axioms, added to an axiomatisation
of classical logic.19
• KF, the axioms for truth:
1 PA
LP>,T the axioms of Peano Arithmetic with the induction schema
extended to LP>,T.
2 ∀x, y ∈ cClTermLPA(Ty=. x↔ y◦ = x◦)
3 ∀x, y ∈ cClTermLPA(T¬. y=. x↔ ¬y◦ = x◦)
4 ∀x1 . . . xn ∈ cClTermLPA(TQ. x1 . . . xn ↔ Qx
◦
1 . . . x
◦
n) for each n-ary
predicate Q of L
5 ∀x1 . . . xn ∈ cClTermLPA(T¬.Q. x1 . . . xn ↔ ¬Qx
◦
1 . . . x
◦
n) for each n-ary
predicate Q of L
6 ∀x(SentP>,T(x)→ (T¬.¬. x↔ Tx)
18I was asked this question by Stanislav Speranski
19In particular `ProbKF, and later `ωProbKF∪Σ, should be a classical deducibility relation in
the sense of Goldblatt (2014).
81
3. A Kripkean Theory
7 ∀x(SentP>,T(x∨. y)→ (Tx∨. y ↔ (Tx ∨ Ty))
8 ∀x(SentP>,T(x∨. y)→ (T¬. x∨. y ↔ (T¬x. ∧ T¬y. ))
9 ∀x(SentP>,T(∃.vx)→ (T∃.vx↔ ∃y(x(y/v)))
10 ∀x(SentP>,T(∃.vx)→ (T¬. ∃.vx↔ ∀y(¬. x(y/v)))
11 ∀x ∈ cClTermLPA(TT. x↔ Tx◦)
12 ∀x ∈ cClTermLPA(T¬. T. x↔ (T¬. x◦ ∨ ¬SentP>,T(x◦))
13 ∀x(Tx→ SentP>,T(x))
• InteractionAx, the axioms for the interaction of truth and probability:20
14 ∀x, y ∈ cClTermLPA(TP>. (x, y)↔ P>(x
◦, y◦)))
15 ∀x, y ∈ cClTermLPA(T¬. P>. (x, y)↔ (P< (x
◦, y◦) ∨ ¬Rat(y◦))))
• The axioms which give basic facts about P>:
16 ∀a(∃xP>(x, a)→ Rata)
17 ∀x(P> (x, p0q)→ SentP>,Tx)
18 ∀x∀a ∈ Rat(P>(x, a)↔ ∀b ≺ aP>(x, b))
• Axioms and a rule which say that P>r acts like a probability21:
19 P>(p0 = 0q, p1q) ∧ ¬P> (p0 = 0q, p1q)
20 P>(p¬0 = 0q, p0q) ∧ ¬P> (p¬0 = 0q, p0q)
21 ∀x∀y(SentP>,T(x) ∧ SentP>,T(y)→(
∀a ∈ Rat
(
(∀b∀c( P>(x, b) ∧ P>(y, c) → b+. c  a ))
↔ (∀d∀e( P>(x∧. y, d)∧ P>(x∨. y, e)→ d+. e  a ))
))
22
Tt→ Ts
∀a(P>(t, a)→ P>(s, a))
We say Γ `ProbKF ϕ if Rule 22 is used before any members of Γ are used.22
These axioms are sound, i.e. all induced models satisfy the axiomatisation.
Theorem 3.5.2 (Soundness of ProbKF). Let M be a probabilistic structure, f
a fixed point and w ∈W , and suppose Γ `ProbKF ϕ, then
IMM[w, f ] |= Γ =⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on the length of the proof in ProbKF. Most of the ax-
ioms follow from Definition 3.2.3 using the fact that since f is a fixed point
IMM[w, f ] |= Tpϕq ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ.
20These should be seen as the appropriate way of extending KF to the language LP>,T, but
we include them separately to highlight them.
21We use the axioms for 2-additive Choquet capacities because our underlying structure
might be a lattice not a Boolean algebra.
22Further details of this constraint can be found in Definition 3.5.3.
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We would additionally like to have a completeness component to the axioma-
tisation. To do this we will expand the result from Feferman that (N, S) |= KF
iff S is a fixed point. This result was extended to the modal case by Stern
(2014b), where Stern shows that KF extended by axioms for the interaction of
truth with a necessity and possibility predicate analogous to Axioms 14 and 15
allows one to pick out the fixed points. Lemma 3.5.30 is a minor modifications
of Stern’s result.
The adequacy of KF relies on the fact that we work with a standard model
of arithmetic. So, for us to use this theorem we need to ensure that arithmetic
is fixed. To do this we add an ω-rule to the axiomatisation. This allows one to
conclude ∀xϕ(x) from all the instances of ϕ(n).
In doing this we have to be a little careful about contexts because the ω-rule
can be used with non-empty context, whereas the rule, 22, can only be used with
empty context. The ω rule is therefore treated like a rule like Modes Ponens.
It really acts like an axiom but we cannot state it as an axiom simply because
our language is finitary so we don’t have the syntactic resources to do so.
So, more carefully, the axiomatic system is as follows:
Definition 3.5.3. The ω-rule is:
ϕ(0) ϕ(1) . . .
∀xϕ(x)
We say Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ if there is a derivation using ProbKF, Σ and the ω-rule,
where Rule 22 and any rules from Σ are used before any members of Γ.23 I.e. Γ
are local premises, Σ and ProbKF are global premises.
More carefully, we say that Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ iff there is sequence of formulas
(that is possibly transfinitely long) which is split into two parts, a “global part”
and a “local part”, satisfying the following criteria:
In either part of the proof, the lines of the proof can:
• Be an axiom of classical logic,
• Follow from all preceding lines by a rule of classical logic,
• Follow from all preceding lines by an application of the ω-rule.
– More explicitly, the line can be ∀xϕ(x), if each ϕ(n) appears some-
where beforehand,
In addition, in the first, global, part of the proof, lines can:
• Be an axiom from ProbKF or Σ,
• Follow from all preceding lines by a rule from ProbKF,
– More explicitly, the line can be ∀a(P>(t, a) → P>(s, a)), if Tt → Ts
appears somewhere beforehand,
• Follow from the preceding lines by a rule from Σ.
In addition to the axioms and rules that can be used anywhere, in the second,
local part of the proof, lines can:
23But note that the ω-rule can be used anywhere.
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• Be an axiom from Γ,
• Follow from all preceding lines by a rule from Γ.
This result is proved by a canonical model construction. The fact that
we can produce a canonical model is independently interesting since it gives a
systematic structure which one can use when working with with these semantics.
The definition of the canonical model can be found on Page 88 and will be such
that:
• WΣc is the set of w such that w is a maximally finitely `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent
set of formulas that is closed under the ω-rule.
• M(w) is an N-model of L with M(w) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w, for ϕ ∈ SentL.
• fΣc (w) := {n | Tn ∈ w}.
• For each w ∈WΣc , mw : ℘(WΣc )→ R is probabilistic such that
mw({v ∈WΣc | Tn ∈ v}) = sup{r | P>(n, prq) ∈ w}.
Σ is being used as global premises, so for a probabilistic modal structure,
with evaluation function, to satisfy Σ requires that the model at every world
satisfies Σ.
Definition 3.5.4. We say IMM[f ] |= Σ, where Σ is a collection of rules and
axioms, if:
• For each axiom ϕ in Σ, for each w ∈W , IMM[w, f ] |= ϕ, and
• For each rule Λ ; ϕ in Σ, if for every w ∈ W , IMM[w, f ] |= Λ, then for
each w ∈W , IMM[w, f ] |= ϕ.
We will then show:
Theorem 3.5.5 (Soundness and Completeness). The following are equivalent:
1. Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ,
2. For every w ∈WΣc , IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= Γ =⇒ IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= ϕ.
3. For every probabilistic modal structure M with fixed point f , such that
IMM[f ] |= Σ, we have that for each w ∈W ,
IMM[w, f ] |= Γ =⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= ϕ.
We will also have the following forms of the result:
Theorem 3.5.6. Let M be a LP>,T-model.
1. The following are equivalent:
(a) M |= Γ =⇒ M |= ϕ whenever Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ,
(b) Theory(M) is `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent,
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(c) There is a probabilistic structure M and fixed point f where IMM[f ] |=
Σ, and there is some w ∈W such that M is elementarily equivalent
to IMM[w, f ].
24
2. Suppose M is an N-model.25 Then the following are equivalent:
(a) M |= ϕ for each `ωProbKF ϕ,
(b) Theory(M) is finitely `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent,
(c) There is a probabilistic structure M and fixed point f where IMM[f ] |=
Σ, and there is some w ∈W with M = IMM[w, f ].
3.5.2 Proof of the soundness and completeness of ProbKFω
We first mention a lemma and then work through the soundness and then the
completeness results.
Lemma 3.5.7. Fix M a probabilistic modal structure. f is a fixed point iff each
f(w) ⊆ SentP>,T and for every ϕ,
IMM[w, f ] |= Tpϕq ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ
Proof. Suppose each f(w) ⊆ SentP>,T.
#ϕ ∈ f(w) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM Tpϕq ⇐⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= Tpϕq
#ϕ ∈ Θ(f)(w) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ
Therefore each
IMM[w, f ] |= Tpϕq ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ
holds iff f is a fixed point.
Suppose f(w) 6⊆ SentP>,T. By construction Θ(f)(w) ⊆ SentP>,T, therefore
Θ(f)(w) 6= f(w), i.e. f is not a fixed point.
Soundness
Theorem 3.5.8 (Soundness). Suppose Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ. Let M be a probabilistic
structure, f a fixed point such that IMM[f ] |= Σ. Then for each w ∈W :
IMM[w, f ] |= Γ =⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= ϕ.
Proof. Fix M a probabilistic modal structure and f a fixed point such that
IMM[f ] |= Σ. Work by transfinite induction on the depth of the proof of
Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ to show that for each w ∈W ,
IMM[w, f ] |= Γ =⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= ϕ
24I.e. M and IMM[w, f ] satisfy all the same LP>,T-sentences.
25We still need this assumption because by assumption all IMM[w, f ] are N-models, but
even adding the ω-rule does not fix the standard model of arithmetic, it only fixes the theory
of the standard model of arithmetic.
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The base case are the logical axioms and the axioms of ProbKF and Σ. The
logical axioms are satisfied by IMM[w, f ] |= wf because it is a classical model.
The axioms of Σ are satisfied by assumption on M. We reason for the ProbKF
axioms as follows.
Axiom 1 holds because IMM[w, f ] is an N-model by definition.
The KF axioms Axioms 2 to 10 can be seen as directly following from the
semantic clauses of Definition 3.2.3 using Lemma 3.5.7. For example:
• Axiom 7:
IMM[w, f ] |= Tpϕ ∨ ψq
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ ∨ ψ Lemma 3.5.7
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ or (w, f) |=SKPM ψ Definition 3.2.3
iff IMM[w, f ] |= Tpϕq ∨ Tpψq Lemma 3.5.7
Therefore: IMM[w, f ] |= ∀x, y(SentP>,T(x∨. y)→ (Tx∨. y ↔ (Tx ∨ Ty))
• Axiom 10:
IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬∃xϕ(x)q
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ¬∃xϕ(x) Lemma 3.5.7
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ¬ϕ(n) for all n Definition 3.2.3
iff IMM[w, f ] |= ¬ϕ(n) for all n Lemma 3.5.7
iff IMM[w, f ] |= ¬∃xϕ(x)
Axiom 13: By Lemma 3.5.7, f(w) ⊆ SentP>,T. Therefore IMM[w, f ] |= Tt =⇒
tN ∈ SentP>,T.
Axioms 11, 12, 14 and 15 follow directly from Lemma 3.5.7, Definition 3.2.12,
and Proposition 3.2.4. For example:
• Axiom 11:
IMM[w, f ] |= TpTtq
iff (w, f) |=SKPM Tt Lemma 3.5.7
iff IMM[w, f ] |= Tt Definition 3.2.12
• Axiom 15:
IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬P>(t, s)q
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(t, s) Lemma 3.5.7
iff (w, f) |=SKPM P> (¬. t, 1−. s) or sN 6∈ Rat Proposition 3.2.4
iff IMM[w, f ] |= P> (¬. t, 1−. s) ∨ ¬Rat(s) Definition 3.2.12
For Axioms 16 to 21 and Rule 22, individual arguments need to be given.
• Axiom 16:
IMM[w, f ] |= P>(n, k)
⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P>(n, k) Definition 3.2.12
=⇒ k ∈ Rat Definition 3.2.3
Therefore for each k, n ∈ N, IMM[w, f ] |= P>(n, k) → Rat(k) and so
IMM[w, f ] |= ∀a(∃xP>(x, a) → Rat(a)) since IMM[w, f ] is a standard
model.
• Axiom 17:
IMM[w, f ] |= P> (n, p0q)
⇐⇒ mw{v | n ∈ f(v)} > 0 Definitions 3.2.3 and 3.2.12
=⇒ {v | n ∈ f(v)} 6= ∅
=⇒ n ∈ SentP>,T
Lemma 3.5.7
and that f is a fixed point.
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• Axiom 18: We prove the “→” and “←” separately.
First “→”:
IMM[w, f ] |= P>(n, prq) and r > q
=⇒ mw{v | n ∈ f(v)} > r > q Definitions 3.2.3 and 3.2.12
=⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= P>(n, pqq) Definitions 3.2.3 and 3.2.12
Since IMM[w, f ] |= ∀b(b ≺ prq→ Rat(b)) this suffices.
Now for “←”:
IMM[w, f ] |= ∀b ≺ prqP>(n, b)
=⇒ for all rationals q < r, Definitions 3.2.3 and 3.2.12
mw{v | n ∈ f(v)} > q
=⇒ mw{v | n ∈ f(v)} > r Q is dense in R
=⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= P>(n, prq) Definitions 3.2.3 and 3.2.12
• Axiom 19
For each v ∈W , (v, f) |=SKPM 0 = 0
Definition 3.2.3,
and M(v) is an N-model
so For each v ∈W , #0 = 0 ∈ f(v) Proposition 3.2.11
so mw{v |#0 = 0 ∈ f(v)} = mw(W ) = 1
Therefore (w, f) |=SKPM P>(p0 = 0q, p1q) using this and Definition 3.2.3.
Also for each r > 1, (w, f) 6|=SKPM P>(p0 = 0q, prq). By using Defi-
nition 3.2.12 and the definition of P> (t, s) we have that IMM[w, f ] |=
P>(p0 = 0q, p1q) ∧ ¬P> (p0 = 0q, p1q).
• Axiom 20 The argument is analogous to that of Axiom 19 but we now
show that mw{v |#¬0 = 0 ∈ f(v)} = mw(∅) = 0.
• Axiom 21:
For ϕ ∈ SentP>,T let
[ϕ] := {v | (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ}.
By using Definitions 3.2.3 and 3.2.12, one can see that IMM[w, f ] |=
P>(pϕq, prq) ⇐⇒ mw[ϕ] > r.
By Definition 3.2.3,
[ϕ] ∪ [ψ] = [ϕ ∨ ψ] and [ϕ] ∩ [ψ] = [ϕ ∧ ψ]
so mw[ϕ] +mw[ψ] = mw[ϕ ∨ ψ] +mw[ϕ ∧ ψ]
so ∀r ∈ Q, (mw[ϕ] +mw[ψ] 6 r ⇐⇒ mw[ϕ ∨ ψ] +mw[ϕ ∧ ψ] 6 r)
Now,
mw[ϕ] +mw[ψ] 6 r
⇐⇒ ∀q, γ ∈ Q(mw[ϕ] > q ∧mw[ψ] > γ → q + γ 6 r)
⇐⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= ∀b, c(P>(pϕq, b) ∧ P>(pψq, c)→ b+. c  prq)
Similarly,
mw[ϕ ∧ ψ] +mw[ϕ ∨ ψ] 6 r
⇐⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= ∀d, e(P>(pϕ ∧ ψq, d) ∧ P>(pϕ ∨ ψq, e)→ d+. e  prq)
Therefore,
IMM[w, f ] |=(∀b, c(P>(pϕq, b) ∧ P>(pψq, c)→ b+. c  prq)
↔ (∀d, e(P>(pϕ ∧ ψq, d) ∧ P>(pϕ ∨ ψq, e)→ d+. e  prq)
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That suffices to prove the base case. Now for the induction step: for this we
need to consider the logical rules,26Rule 22 and the ω-rule.
The logical rules hold because we are only working with classical models.
For Rule 22: Suppose the last step of Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ was an application of
Rule 22. Then it must in fact be that Γ = ∅ by Definition 3.5.3. So t and s
must therefore be such that
`ωProbKF∪Σ Tt→ Ts.
Then using the induction hypothesis it must be that for all v ∈W , IMM[v, f ] |=
Tt→ Ts. But therefore
{v | sN ∈ f(v)} ⊆ {v | tN ∈ f(v)}
by Definitions 3.2.3 and 3.2.12. So
mw{v | sN ∈ f(v)} > r =⇒ mw{v | tN ∈ f(v)} > r.
So
(w, f) |=SKPM P>(s, prq) =⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM P>(t, prq)
And therefore
IMM[w, f ] |= P>(s, prq)→ P>(t, prq).
Lastly we consider the ω-rule. Suppose the last step of Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ was an
application of the ω-rule. Then we must have that ϕ = ∀xψ(x) and that for
each n, Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ψ(n) by a shorter proof. So by the induction hypothesis
we have that IMM[w, f ] |= Γ =⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= ψ(n) for each n. Now suppose
that in fact IMM[w, f ] |= Γ. Then because IMM[w, f ] is an N-model we have
that IMM[w, f ] |= ∀xψ(x).
We can now turn to the more interesting completeness direction. We prove
this by a canonical model construction.
Definition of the canonical model and showing it is well-defined
Definition 3.5.9. For each Σ, define a probabilistic structure MΣc and evalua-
tion function fΣc as follows:
• WΣc is the set of w such that w is a maximally finitely `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent
set of formulas27 that is closed under the ω-rule.2829
• Define each M(w) as an N-model of L with M(w) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w, for
ϕ ∈ SentL.
• fΣc (w) := {n | Tn ∈ w}.
26These would usually be modes ponens and ∀-generalisation.
27I.e. there is no finite ∆ ⊆ w with ∆ `ωProbKF∪Σ ⊥
28I.e. whenever {ϕ(n) | n ∈ N} ⊆ w then ∀xϕ(x) ∈ w.
29In fact such w are exactly the maximally `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent set of formulas. But proving
that would take us too far afield. It can be seen as a corollary of Lemma 3.5.29 and Theo-
rem 3.5.8.
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• For each w ∈WΣc , find mw : ℘(WΣc )→ R probabilistic such that
mw({v ∈WΣc | Tn ∈ v}) = sup{r | P>(n, prq) ∈ w}.
We will now show that this canonical model is well defined. To do this
we need to show that we can pick such an M(w) and mw. We do that in
Lemma 3.5.11 and Theorem 3.5.28.
We first state some facts about `ωProbKF∪Σ and the w ∈WΣc that we will use
in our proof without further comment.
Lemma 3.5.10. `ωProbKF∪Σ has the following properties:
1. If Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ and Γ ∪ {ϕ} `ωProbKF∪Σ ⊥ implies Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ⊥
2. Γ ∪ {¬ϕ}30 is `ωProbKF∪Σ-inconsistent31 iff Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ.
3. If Γ is `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent and Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ then Γ∪ {ϕ} is `ωProbKF∪Σ-
consistent.
4. If Γ is finitely `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent then so is either Γ∪{ϕ} or Γ∪{¬ϕ}.
For each w ∈WΣc :
5. ¬ϕ ∈ w ⇐⇒ ϕ /∈ w.
6. If `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ then ϕ ∈ w.
7. Γ `cl ϕ32 and Γ ⊆ w then ϕ ∈ w.
8. ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ w ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ w and ψ ∈ w.
9. ∀xϕ(x) ∈ w iff for all k ∈ N, ϕ(k) ∈ w.
To pick such an M(w) we could use the result that a theory has an N-model
if it is closed under the ω-rule (e.g. Chang and Keisler, 1990, Proposition 2.2.12).
We prove the result directly here.
Lemma 3.5.11. For each w ∈WΣc , there is some M(w) an N-model of L with
M(w) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w, for ϕ ∈ SentL.
Proof. Define M(w) as follows:
Domain is N. Interprets the arithmetic vocabulary as in the standard model of
arithmetic. For Q a contingent n-ary relation symbol take 〈k1, . . . kn〉 ∈ QM(w)
iff Q(k1, . . . , kn) ∈ w.
We prove by induction on the complexity of ϕ that M(w) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w.
For ϕ atomic: If ϕ is an atomic sentence of LPA, the result holds because
ProbKF extends PA because of Axiom 1.
M(w) |= ϕ =⇒ N |= ϕ =⇒ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ =⇒ ϕ ∈ w.
M(w) 6|= ϕ =⇒ N 6|= ϕ =⇒ `ωProbKF∪Σ ¬ϕ =⇒ ¬ϕ ∈ w =⇒ ϕ /∈ w.
30I.e. ϕ is a classical logical consequence of Γ.
31I.e. Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ⊥.
32Where `cl denotes derivability in classical logic.
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If ϕ is non-arithmetic, atomic, then ϕ = Q(t1, . . . , tn) with ti closed terms.
M(w) |= Q(t1, . . . , tn) ⇐⇒ M(w) |= Q(tN1 , . . . , tNn)
⇐⇒ Q(tN1 , . . . , tNn) ∈ w
⇐⇒ Q(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ w,
the last equivalence holding because of Item 7.
The induction steps are easy, using Items 5, 8 and 9
The axioms in Axioms 16 to 21 and Rule 22 allow us to find such an mw.
To show this we first present a few lemmas.
The following theorem is already known. It’s statement can be found, for
example, in Zhou (2013). I am currently unaware of where the theorem is from
and what its existing proofs are.
Theorem 3.5.12. Let Ξ ⊆ ℘(W ) be a lattice,33 i.e. a collection of subsets of
W closed under ∪ and ∩ and containing ∅ and W . For a set Λ ⊆ ℘(W ), let
B (Λ) be the Boolean closure of Λ.34 Let m be a monotone 2-valuation on Ξ,
i.e. m : Ξ→ [0, 1] satisfying:
• m (W ) = 1, m (∅) = 0,
• Monotonicity: A ⊆ C =⇒ m (A) 6 m (C)
• 2-valuation: m (A ∪ C) +m (A ∩ C) = m (A) +m (C)
Then there is a function m∗ : B (Ξ)→ R which is a (finitely additive) probability
function that extends m.
Proof.
Lemma 3.5.13. If {Ai | i ∈ I} is a finite partition of W and ai > 0 with∑
i∈I ai = 1 then there is a unique probability function m
∗ : B ({Ai | i ∈ I})→
R
Definition 3.5.14. We let
⋂
∅ denote W . For ∆ ⊆ Λ ⊆ ℘(W ), define:
EΛ∆ :=
⋂
∆ \
⋃
(Λ \∆).
This gives the event which is exactly in all the events of ∆ and nothing else.
For example E
{A,C}
{A} = A \ C is the shaded component:
A C
33Since the powerset algebra is distributive, this is then a distributive lattice.
34I.e. the smallest set ∆ ⊇ Λ closed under ∪, ∩ and taking complements, and containing ∅
and W .
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Lemma 3.5.15. {EΛ∆ |∆ ⊆ Λ} partitions W . And each EΛ∆ ∈ B (Λ).
Moreover, each member of B (Λ) is a disjoint union of some of the EΛ∆:
Lemma 3.5.16. For each A ∈ B (Λ) and each EΛ∆, either EΛ∆ ⊆ A, or EΛ∆ ⊆
W \A.
Proof. By induction on the Boolean construction.
Suppose A ∈ Λ. We can show: if A ∈ ∆ then EΛ∆ ⊆ A, and if A 6∈ ∆ then
EΛ∆ ⊆W \A.
Suppose EΛ∆ 6⊆ A ∪ C. Then it is 6⊆ A, so is ⊆ W \ A using the induction
hypothesis. And similarly for C. So EΛ∆ ⊆ (W \A)∩ (W \C) = W \ (A∪C).
Suppose EΛ∆ 6⊆ W \ A. Then using the induction hypothesis it is ⊆ A =
W \ (W \A).
Corollary 3.5.17. For each A ∈ B (Λ) A =
⋃
EΛ∆⊆A
EΛ∆
So we just need to pick aΛ∆ which will act as the probability of E
Λ
∆ in a way
that will give a probability function that extends m.
Definition 3.5.18. Fix m : Ξ→ R where Ξ is a lattice of subsets of W .
For each Λ ⊆ Ξ finite, define:
aΛ∆ := m
(⋂
∆
)
−m
(⋂
∆ ∩
⋃
(Λ \∆)
)
We gave this definition because if m∗ is a probability function then
m∗(EΛ∆) = m
∗
(⋂
∆ \
⋃
(Λ \∆)
)
= m∗
(⋂
∆
)
−m∗
(⋂
∆ ∩
⋃
(Λ \∆)
)
where all the components on the right hand side are in Ξ. So this should get us
a probability function that extends m if we choose m∗ such that m∗(EΛ∆) = a
Λ
∆.
For the rest of the proof we shall assume that m satisfies:
• m (W ) = 1, m (∅) = 0,
• A ⊆ C =⇒ m (A) 6 B (C)
• m (A ∪ C) +m (A ∩ C) = m (A) +m (C)
Observe that for ∆ ⊆ Λ, EΛ∪{D}∆ = EΛ∆ \D and E
Λ∪{D}
∆∪{D} = E
Λ
∆ ∩D, so these
partition EΛ∆.
For example if Λ = {A,C} and ∆ = {A,C}, EΛ∪{D}∆ is the shaded part,
E
Λ∪{D}
∆∪{D} is the hashed part, and E
Λ
∆ is the union of these.
A
C
D
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So we would hope that a
Λ∪{D}
∆ + a
Λ∪{D}
∆∪{D} = a
Λ
∆, which we do in fact find:
Lemma 3.5.19. a
Λ∪{D}
∆ + a
Λ∪{D}
∆∪{D} = a
Λ
∆
Proof.
a
Λ∪{D}
∆ = m
(⋂
∆
)
−m
(⋂
∆ ∩ (
⋃
(Λ \∆) ∪D)
)
(3.3)
= m
(⋂
∆
)
−m
(
(
⋂
∆ ∩
⋃
(Λ \∆)) ∪ (
⋂
∆ ∩D)
)
(3.4)
= m
(⋂
∆
)
−m
(
(
⋂
∆ ∩
⋃
(Λ \∆))
)
−m
(
(
⋂
∆ ∩D)
)
+m
(
(
⋂
∆ ∩
⋃
(Λ \∆)) ∩ (
⋂
∆ ∩D)
) (3.5)
= m
(⋂
∆
)
−m
(
(
⋂
∆ ∩
⋃
(Λ \∆))
)
−m
(
(
⋂
∆ ∩D)
)
+m
(⋂
∆ ∩D ∩
⋃
(Λ \∆)
) (3.6)
The step from Eq. (3.3) to Eq. (3.4) just involves rearranging the expression.
The step from Eq. (3.4) to Eq. (3.5) works by applying the fact that m is a
2-valuation. Lastly to Eq. (3.6) is again just a rearrangement. We now add
this to a
Λ∪{D}
∆ :
a
Λ∪{D}
∆ + a
Λ∪{D}
∆∪{D} = m
(⋂
∆
)
−m
(
(
⋂
∆ ∩
⋃
(Λ \∆))
)
−m
(
(
⋂
∆ ∩D)
)
+m
(
(
⋂
∆ ∩D ∩
⋃
(Λ \∆))
)
+m
(⋂
∆ ∩D
)
−m
(⋂
∆ ∩D ∩
⋃
(Λ \∆)
)
= m
(⋂
∆
)
−m
(
(
⋂
∆ ∩
⋃
(Λ \∆))
)
= aΛ∆
This works just by cancelling terms.
Lemma 3.5.20. Each aΛ∆ > 0 and
∑
∆⊆Λ a
Λ
∆ = 1
Proof. ⋂
∆ ⊇
⋂
∆ ∩ (
⋃
Λ \∆)
so m
(⋂
∆
)
> m
(⋂
∆ ∩ (
⋃
Λ \∆)
)
so aΛ∆ = m
(⋂
∆
)
−m
(⋂
∆ ∩ (
⋃
Λ \∆)
)
> 0
by the monotonicity requirement on m.
For
∑
∆⊆Λ a
Λ
∆ = 1 we work by induction on the size of Λ. The base case is
92
3.5 An axiomatic system
clear because for Λ = {A},∑
∆⊆{A}
aΛ∆ = a
{A}
{A} + a
{A}
∅
= m(
⋂
{A})−m
(⋂
{A} ∩
⋃
({A} \ {A})
)
+m(
⋂
∅)−m
(⋂
∅ ∩
⋃
({A} \∅)
)
= m(A)−m (∅) +m (W )−m (A)
= m (W )−m (∅) = 1
For the induction step we use Lemma 3.5.19 to show
1 =
∑
∆⊆Λ
aΛ∆ =
∑
∆⊆Λ
(a
Λ∪{D}
∆ + a
Λ∪{D}
∆∪{D}) =
∑
∆⊆Λ∪{D}
a
Λ∪{D}
∆
Corollary 3.5.21. For each finite Λ ⊆ Ξ, there is a unique probability function
m∗Λ : B (Λ) → R such that for each ∆ ⊆ Λ, m∗Λ
(
EΛ∆
)
= aΛ∆. This is given by
for A ∈ B (Λ), m∗Λ (A) =
∑
EΛ∆⊆A
aΛ∆.
Lemma 3.5.22. If A ∈ B (Λ) then
EΛ∆ ⊆ A ⇐⇒ E
Λ∪{D}
∆ ⊆ A
and
EΛ∆ ⊆ A ⇐⇒ E
Λ∪{D}
∆∪{D} ⊆ A
Proof. For any ∆ ⊆ Λ, EΛ∪{D}∆ = EΛ∆ \D and E
Λ∪{D}
∆∪{D} = E
Λ
∆ ∩D. Therefore
EΛ∆ = E
Λ∪{D}
∆ ∪ E
Λ∪{D}
∆∪{D}.
Lemma 3.5.23. Let A ∈ B (Λ), then m∗Λ (A) = m∗Λ∪{D} (A).
Proof.
m∗Λ∪{D} (A) =
∑
{∆⊆Λ∪{D}|EΛ∪{D}∆ ⊆A}
m∗Λ∪{D}(E
Λ∪{D}
∆ )
=
∑
{∆⊆Λ|EΛ∪{D}∆ ⊆A}
m∗Λ∪{D}(E
Λ∪{D}
∆ )
+
∑
{∆⊆Λ|EΛ∪{D}
∆∪{D}⊆A}
m∗Λ∪{D}(E
Λ∪{D}
∆∪{D})
=
∑
{∆⊆Λ|EΛ∪{D}∆ ⊆A}
a
Λ∪{D}
∆ +
∑
{∆⊆Λ|EΛ∪{D}
∆∪{D}⊆A}
a
Λ∪{D}
∆∪{D}
=
∑
{∆⊆Λ|EΛ∆⊆A}
(a
Λ∪{D}
∆ + a
Λ∪{D}
∆∪{D})
=
∑
{∆⊆Λ|EΛ∆⊆A}
aΛ∆ (Lemma 3.5.19)
= m∗Λ(A)
93
3. A Kripkean Theory
Corollary 3.5.24. There is a unique finitely additive probability function m∗ :
B (Ξ)→ R such that for every finite Λ ⊆ Ξ and A ∈ B (Ξ), if A ∈ B (Λ) then
m∗(A) = m∗Λ(A).
Lemma 3.5.25. Such a m∗ extends m.
Proof. Suppose A ∈ Ξ. Then A ∈ B ({A}), and
m∗{A}(A) =
∑
EΛ∆⊆A
a
{A}
∆
= a
{A}
{A}
= m (A)−m (∅) = m (A)
To be able to use this theorem we will present a lemma telling us that we
can pick a monotone 2-valuation to then apply this theorem to get a mw. To
show we can pick some such monotone 2-valuation we first need a pre-lemma
that will generally be useful throughout the proof.
Lemma 3.5.26 (Goldblatt, 2014, Rich Extension III). If Γ is `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent
then there is some w ∈WΣc such that Γ ⊆ w.
Therefore if for every w ∈WΣc ϕ ∈ w, then `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ.
Proof. To prove this we use the Henkin method. Enumerate the formulas with
one free variable ϕ1(x), ϕ2(x), . . .. We work by induction to find {Γn} with
• Each Γn is `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent
• Γ = Γ0 ⊆ Γ1 ⊆ Γ2 ⊆ . . .
• Γn+1 decides the ω-rule for ϕn, i.e.
Either there is some k such that ¬ϕn(k) ∈ Γn+1 or ∀xϕn(x) ∈ Γn+1.
Suppose we have chosen Γn. Then suppose there is some k such that Γn ∪
{¬ϕn(k)} is `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent. Then let Γn+1 = Γn ∪ {¬ϕn(k)} for this k.
This clearly satisfies the requirements. If there is no such k, then for each k,
Γn ∪ {¬ϕn(k)} is `ωProbKF∪Σ-inconsistent. So for each k, Γn `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕn(k),
therefore Γn `ωProbKF∪Σ ∀xϕn(x) using the ω-rule. Therefore we can let Γn+1 =
Γn ∪ {∀xϕn(x)}, which is `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent because we assumed that Γn
was.
We can then use Lindenbaum’s lemma to show that
⋃
Γn has a maximally
finitely `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent extension w. This w will be closed under the
ω-rule by construction.
For the second part of the theorem: Suppose for each w ∈ WΣc , ϕ ∈ w, so
¬ϕ /∈ w. Therefore by the contrapositive of the first result {¬ϕ} is `ωProbKF-
inconsistent. So `ωProbKF ϕ.
We can now show that we can find a monotone 2-valuation that will be
extended to be the mw.
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Lemma 3.5.27. Fix w ∈WΣc , define
[ϕ] := {v ∈WΣc | Tpϕq ∈ v}
for n ∈ SentP>,T. Then {[ϕ] | ϕ ∈ SentP>,T} ⊆ ℘(WΣc ) is a distributive lattice
and that m : {[ϕ] |ϕ ∈ SentP>,T} → R by m([ϕ]) = sup{r |P>(pϕq, prq) ∈ w} is
a monotone 2-valuation on this.
Proof. We first show that this is a distributive lattice:
• By Axiom 2 for all v ∈WΣc Tp0 = 0q ∈ v, so [0 = 0] = WΣc .
• By Axiom 3 for all v ∈ WΣc ¬Tp¬0 = 0q ∈ v, so Tp¬0 = 0q 6∈ v, so
[¬0 = 0] = ∅.
• Observe that [ϕ] ∪ [ψ] = [ϕ ∨ ψ] because by Axiom 7 for all v ∈ WΣc ,
Tpϕ ∨ ψq ∈ v iff Tpϕq ∈ v or Tpψq ∈ v.
• We can also show that [ϕ]∩ [ψ] = [ϕ∧ψ] by showing that for all v ∈WΣc ,
Tpϕ∧ψq ∈ v iff both Tpϕq ∈ v and Tpψq ∈ v. To show this it suffices to
show that Tpϕ ∧ ψq↔ Tpϕq ∧Tpψq is derivable from the axioms of KF,
or equivalently Tp¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)q ↔ (Tpϕq ∧ Tpψq). This works by using
Axioms 6 and 8.
This has then shown that {[ϕ]|ϕ ∈ SentP>,T} ⊆ ℘(WΣc ) is a distributive lattice.
We now show that m is a monotone 2-valuation on it.
• To show m(WΣc ) = 1 it suffices to show that sup{r | P>(p0 = 0q, prq) ∈
w} = 1. By Axiom 19 P>(p0 = 0q, p1q) ∈ w, so m(WΣc ) > 1. Also by
Axiom 19, ¬P> (p0 = 0q, p1q) ∈ w, i.e. ¬∃a  p1qP>(p0 = 0q, a) ∈ w.
So for each r > 1, prq  p1q ∈ w, so ¬P>(p0 = 0q, prq) ∈ w.35 Therefore
m(WΣc ) = 1.
• The argument to show m(∅) = 0 is directly analogous using Axiom 20.
• We now need to show: [ϕ] ⊆ [ψ] =⇒ m[ϕ] 6 m[ψ]. Suppose [ϕ] ⊆ [ψ].
Then for each v ∈ WΣc , Tpϕq → Tpψq ∈ v. Then by Lemma 3.5.26,
`ωProbKF Tpϕq→ Tpψq, so using Rule 22 we have that `ωProbKF ∀a(P>(pϕq, a)→
P>(pψq, b)). So for any r, P>(pϕq, prq) ∈ w =⇒ P>(pψq, prq) ∈ w
i.e. m[ϕ] 6 m[ψ].
• Lastly we need to show: m([ϕ] ∪ [ψ]) +m([ϕ] ∩ [ψ]) = m([ϕ]) +m([ψ]).
∀b∀c(P>(pϕq, b) ∧ P>(pψq, c) → b+. c  prq) ∈ w iff r > m[ϕ] + m[ψ].
And similarly ∀d∀e(P>(pϕ ∧ ψq, d) ∧ P>(pϕ ∨ ψq, e)→ d+. e  a) ∈ w iff
r > m[ϕ ∨ ψ] +m[ϕ ∧ ψ]. Axiom 21 gives us for all r ∈ Q,
(∀b∀c( P>(pϕq, b) ∧ P>(pψq, c) → b+. c  prq ))
↔ (∀d∀e( P>(pϕ ∧ ψq, d)∧ P>(pϕ ∨ ψq, e)→ d+. e  prq ))
Using these we get that
{r ∈ Q | r > m[ϕ] +m[ψ]} = {r ∈ Q | r > m[ϕ ∨ ψ] +m[ϕ ∧ ψ]}
So m[ϕ] +m[ψ] = m[ϕ ∨ ψ] +m[ϕ ∨ ψ] as required.
35Because for each r > 1, ¬∃a  p1qP>(p0 = 0q, a) ` ¬P>(p0 = 0q, prq), so using Item 7.
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Using these two results we have our desired mw.
Theorem 3.5.28. For each w ∈WΣc we can find mw such that
mw({v ∈WΣc | Tn ∈ v}) = sup{r | P>(n, prq) ∈ w}.
Proof. Fix w ∈ WΣc . Using Theorem 3.5.12 and Lemma 3.5.27 we have that
there is some m defined on B
(
{[ϕ] | ϕ ∈ SentP>,T}
)
which is probabilistic and
extends µ as defined in Lemma 3.5.27. Such an m can then be extended to
mw defined on ℘(W
Σ
c ) by Proposition 1.2.2.
We need to show this mw satisfies the required property. If n ∈ SentP>,T,
mw({v ∈ WΣc | Tn ∈ v}) = sup{r | P>(n, prq) ∈ w} holds by definition of µ in
Lemma 3.5.27. Suppose n /∈ SentP>,T. Then by Axiom 13, {v | Tn ∈ v} = ∅,
so mw{v | Tn ∈ v} = 0. By Axiom 3, `ωProbKF∪Σ ¬Tp¬0 = 0q, so `ωProbKF∪Σ
Tp¬0 = 0q → Tn. By Rule 22, `ωProbKF∪Σ P>(p¬0 = 0q, p0q) → P>(n, p0q).
By Axiom 20, `ωProbKF∪Σ P>(p¬0 = 0q, p0q), so in fact `ωProbKF∪Σ P>(n, p0q).
Therefore sup{r | P>(n, prq) ∈ w} > 0. We just need to show that it is also
6 0. Suppose sup{r | P>(n, prq) ∈ w} > 0. Then there is some q > 0 with
P>(n, pqq) ∈ w. This contradicts Axiom 17, so we get the result we need.
We have now shown that MΣc is a well-defined probabilistic modal structure.
We will now show that it is canonical and that f is a fixed point.
MΣc is canonical and f is a fixed point
We can observe that this is canonical, in the following sense.
Lemma 3.5.29. For every ϕ ∈ SentP>,T and w ∈WΣc ,
IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ w
Proof. We work by induction on the complexity of the formula. The atomic
cases with ϕ ∈ SentL follow immediately from the definition of the canonical
model. For the induction step the universal quantifier can be shown by the
fact that IMM[w, f ] is an N-model and w is closed under the ω-rule. For the
connectives we use the fact that w is maximally consistent. For the Tt case
we use the definitions and Axiom 13. The most complex case is the P>(t, s)
case. If sN ∈ Rat and tN ∈ SentP>,T then we can just use the definitions and
Axioms 16, 18 and 18. If sN /∈ Rat we also need to use Axiom 16. For if
tN /∈ SentP>,T we also need to show: sup{r | P>(tN, prq) ∈ w} = 0, which we
show by using Axioms 3, 17 and 20 and Rule 22, and mw{v | Tn ∈ v} = 0,
which we do by using Axiom 13.
More carefully:
• ϕ atomic and in SentL:
IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= ϕ ⇐⇒ M(w) |= ϕ Definitions 3.2.3, 3.5.9 and 3.2.12
⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ w Definition 3.5.9
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• ϕ = Tt:
IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= Tt ⇐⇒ tN ∈ fΣc (w) and tN ∈ SentP>,T
⇐⇒ TtN ∈ w and tN ∈ SentP>,T (3.7)
⇐⇒ TtN ∈ w (3.8)
⇐⇒ Tt ∈ w
For Eq. (3.7) =⇒ Eq. (3.8): TtN ∈ w =⇒ Sent(tN) ∈ w by Axiom 13.
The result then follows because SentP>,T strongly represents the set in
PA.
• ϕ = P>(t, s):
IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= P>(t, s)
⇐⇒ mw{v | tN ∈ fΣc (v)} > rat(sN) and sN ∈ Rat
⇐⇒ mw{v | TtN ∈ v} > rat(sN) and sN ∈ Rat (3.9)
⇐⇒ sup{r | P>(tN, prq) ∈ w} > rat(sN) and sN ∈ Rat (3.10)
⇐⇒ P>(tN, prat(sN)q) ∈ w and sN ∈ Rat (3.11)
⇐⇒ P>(t, s) ∈ w (3.12)
For Eq. (3.10) =⇒ Eq. (3.11): Suppose sup{r |P>(tN, prq) ∈ w} > rat(sN)
and sN ∈ Rat. Then by the definition of supremum, for each q < rat(sN)
there is an r with q < r < rat(sN) with P>(tN, prq) ∈ w. By using this
and Axiom 18 we have that for all r < rat(sN), P>(tN, prq) ∈ w. So for
all n, (n ≺ prat(sN)q → P>(tN, n)) ∈ w. So since w is closed under the
ω-rule, ∀x(x ≺ prat(sN)q → P>(tN, x)) ∈ w. Therefore by Axiom 18,
P>(tN, prat(sN)q) ∈ w
For Eq. (3.12) =⇒ Eq. (3.11): Suppose P>(t, s) ∈ w. Then by Axiom 16
Rat(s) ∈ w. Since Rat strongly represents the corresponding set, sN ∈ Rat.
The equivalence Eq. (3.9)⇐⇒ Eq. (3.10) holds by Definition 3.5.9.
We then use the induction hypothesis to show:
• ϕ = ¬ψ:
IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= ¬ψ ⇐⇒ IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] 6|= ψ
⇐⇒ ψ /∈ w Induction hypothesis
⇐⇒ ¬ψ ∈ w
• ϕ = ψ ∧ χ:
IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= ψ ∧ χ ⇐⇒ IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= ψ and IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= χ
⇐⇒ ψ ∈ w and χ ∈ w
⇐⇒ ψ ∧ χ ∈ w
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• ϕ = ∀xψ(x):
IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= ∀xψ(x) ⇐⇒ IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= ψ(n) for all n ∈ N
⇐⇒ ψ(n) ∈ w for all n ∈ N
⇐⇒ ∀xψ(x) ∈ w
The last equivalence holds because w is closed under the ω-rule.
The following lemma, along with Lemma 3.5.29 allows us to conclude that fΣc
is a fixed point, and therefore that the constructed model is in fact a probabilistic
structure with a fixed point. This lemma is a slight modification of Stern (2014b,
Theorem 3.13).
Lemma 3.5.30. Let M be a probabilistic modal structure and f be an evaluation
function on M. Then:
f is a fixed point ⇐⇒ ∀w ∈W (IMM[w, f ] |= KF ∪ InteractionAx)
Proof. The =⇒ -direction follows from Theorem 3.5.2.
For the other direction, suppose IMM[w, f ] |= KF ∪ InteractionAx.
Suppose n ∈ f(w) so IMM[w, f ] |= Tn by Definitions 3.2.3 and 3.2.12. By
Axiom 17, we have IMM[w, f ] |= ∀x(Tx→ SentP>,T(x)), so n ∈ SentP>,T.
This shows that f(w) ⊆ SentP>,T. We will work by induction on the positive
complexity of ϕ to show that:
IMM[w, f ] |= Tpϕq ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ
By Lemma 3.5.7 this will suffice to conclude that f is a fixed point.
We show this by induction on the positive complexity of ϕ:
• ϕ ∈ L atomic, i.e. ϕ is s = t or ϕ = Q(t1, . . . , tn):
IMM[w, f ] |= Tpϕq
iff IMM[w, f ] |= ϕ Axioms 2 and 4,
iff M(w) |= ϕ Definition 3.2.12
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ Definition 3.2.3
• ϕ = ¬ψ with ψ ∈ L atomic:
IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬ψq
iff IMM[w, f ] |= ¬ψ Axioms 3 and 5
iff M(w) |= ¬ψ Definition 3.2.12
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ¬ψ Definition 3.2.3
• ϕ = P>(t, s)
IMM[w, f ] |= TpP>(t, s)q
iff IMM[w, f ] |= P>(t, s) Axiom 14
iff (w, f) |=SKPM P>(t, s) Definition 3.2.12
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• ϕ = ¬P>(t, s)
IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬P>(t, s)q
iff IMM[w, f ] |= P> (¬. t, 1−. s) ∨ ¬Rat(s) Axiom 15
iff IMM[w, f ] |= ∃a  1−. s(P>(¬t, a)) ∨ ¬Rat(s)
iff (there is some r > rat((1−. s)N) with IMM[w, f ] |= P>(¬. t, prq))
or sN /∈ Rat
iff (there is some r > rat((1−. s)N) with (w, f) |=SKPM P>(¬. t, prq))
or sN /∈ Rat
iff (there is some r > rat((1−. s)N) with mw{v | ¬. tN ∈ f(v)} > r)
or sN /∈ Rat
iff mw{v | ¬. tN ∈ f(v)} > 1− rat(sN) or sN /∈ Rat
Q is dense in R
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ¬P>(t, s)
• ϕ = Tt
IMM[w, f ] |= TpTtq
iff IMM[w, f ] |= Tptq◦ Axiom 11
iff IMM[w, f ] |= Tt definition of ◦
iff (w, f) |=SKPM Tt Definition 3.2.12
• ϕ = ¬Tt
IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬Ttq
iff IMM[w, f ] |= T¬. ptq◦ ∨ ¬SentP>,T(ptq◦) Axiom 12
iff (w, f) |=SKPM T¬. t or tN 6∈ SentP>,T Definition 3.2.12
iff ¬. tN ∈ f(w) or tN 6∈ SentP>,T Definition 3.2.3
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ¬Tt Definition 3.2.3
• ϕ = ¬¬ψ
IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬¬ψq
iff IMM[w, f ] |= Tpψq Axiom 6
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ψ induction hypothesis
• ϕ = ψ ∨ χ
IMM[w, f ] |= Tpψ ∨ χq
iff IMM[w, f ] |= Tpψq or IMM[w, f ] |= Tpχq Axiom 7
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ψ or (w, f) |=SKPM χ induction hypothesis
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ψ ∨ χ Definition 3.2.3
• ϕ = ¬(ψ ∨ χ)
IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬(ψ ∨ χ)q
iff IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬ψq and IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬χq Axiom 8
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ¬ψ and (w, f) |=SKPM ¬χ induction hypothesis
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ¬(ψ ∨ χ) Definition 3.2.3
• ϕ = ∃vψ
IMM[w, f ] |= Tp∃vψq
iff IMM[w, f ] |= ∃yTpψq(y/v) Axiom 9
iff there is some n with IMM[w, f ] |= Tpψ[n/v]q IMM[w, f ] is a standard model
by Definition 3.2.12
iff there is some n with (w, f) |=SKPM ψ[n/v] Induction Hypothesis
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ∃vψ Definition 3.2.3
• ϕ = ¬∃vψ
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IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬∃vψq
iff IMM[w, f ] |= ∀yTp¬ψq(y/v) Axiom 10
iff for all n, IMM[w, f ] |= Tp¬ψ[n/v]q IMM[w, f ] is a standard model
by Definition 3.2.12
iff for all n, (w, f) |=SKPM ¬ψ[n/v] induction hypothesis
iff (w, f) |=SKPM ¬∃vψ Definition 3.2.3
Corollary 3.5.31. fΣc is a fixed point.
Proof. For each ϕ ∈ KF ∪ InteractionAx, `ωProbKF ϕ, and each w ∈ WΣc is
maximally `ωProbKF-consistent, so for each w, KF∪ InteractionAx ⊆ w. Then by
Lemma 3.5.29, IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= KF∪ InteractionAx. So by Lemma 3.5.30, fΣc is
a fixed point, as required.
The completeness theorem
This has now led us to our desired soundness and completeness theorems. There
are a number of different forms that this can be written in.
Theorem 3.5.32. The following are equivalent:
1. ∆ is `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent
2. There is some w ∈WΣc , such that IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= ∆.
3. There is some probabilistic modal structure M with fixed point f , such that
IMM[f ] |= Σ, and for some w ∈W , IMM[w, f ] |= ∆
Proof. Item 1 =⇒ Item 2:
Suppose ∆ is `ωProbKF-consistent. Then by Lemma 3.5.26 there is some w ∈WΣc
such that ∆ ⊆ w. Then by Lemma 3.5.29 IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= ∆. Moreover we
have shown in Corollary 3.5.31 that fΣc is a fixed point. So we have our relevant
probabilistic modal structure, MΣc , fixed point f
Σ
c and w ∈WΣc which satisfies
∆.
Clearly Item 2 =⇒ Item 3.
For Item 3 =⇒ Item 1 we prove the contrapositive. Suppose ∆ is not `ωProbKF∪Σ-
consistent, i.e. ∆ `ωProbKF∪Σ ⊥. Then by Theorem 3.5.8 for every M proba-
bilistic modal structure and fixed point f with IMM[f ] |= Σ, it must be that
IMM[w, f ] |= ∆ =⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= ⊥. Since IMM[w, f ] 6|= ⊥ it must be that
IMM[w, f ] 6|= ∆. Therefore there is no such M, w, f with IMM[w, f ] |= ∆, as
required.
Corollary 3.5.33 (Theorem 3.5.5). The following are equivalent:
1. Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ,
2. For every w ∈WΣc , IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= Γ =⇒ IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= ϕ.
3. For every probabilistic modal structure M with fixed point f , such that
IMM[f ] |= Σ, we have that for each w ∈W ,
IMM[w, f ] |= Γ =⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= ϕ.
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Proof. By taking the negation of each of the equivalent clauses in Theo-
rem 3.5.32 we have that the following are equivalent.
1. Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} is `ωProbKF∪Σ-inconsistent
2. There is no w ∈WΣc , such that IMMΣc [w, f
Σ
c ] |= Γ ∪ {¬ϕ}.
3. There is no probabilistic modal structure M and fixed point f , such that
IMM[f ] |= Σ, and for some w ∈W , IMM[w, f ] |= Γ ∪ {¬ϕ}
The required equivalences directly follows from this.
Theorem 3.5.34 (Theorem 3.5.6). Let M be a LP>,T-model.
1. The following are equivalent:
(a) M |= Γ =⇒ M |= ϕ whenever Γ `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ,
(b) Theory(M) is `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent,
(c) There is an probabilistic structure M, fixed point f such that IMM[f ] |=
Σ, and there is some w ∈W such that M is elementarily equivalent
to IMM[w, f ].
36
2. Suppose M is an N-model.37 Then the following are equivalent:
(a) M |= ϕ for each `ωProbKF ϕ,
(b) Theory(M) is finitely `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent,
(c) There is an probabilistic structure M, fixed point fsuch that IMM[f ] |=
Σ, and there is some w ∈W with M = IMM[w, f ].
Proof. Item 1b⇐⇒ Item 1c directly follows from Theorem 3.5.32 taking ∆ =
Theory(M) and observing that IMM[w, f ] is elementarily equivalent to M iff
IMM[w, f ] |= Theory(M).
For Item 1a =⇒ Item 1b we can prove the contrapositive. Suppose Theory(M)
is `ωProbKF∪Σ-inconsistent. Then Theory(M) `ωProbKF∪Σ ⊥. NowM |= Theory(M),
and M 6|= ⊥, which suffices for the result.
For Item 1a⇐= Item 1b: Suppose Theory(M) is `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent,M |= Γ
and M 6|= ϕ. Then Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} is `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent, so Γ 6`ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ.
Item 2c =⇒ Item 2b is a direct corollary of Item 1c =⇒ Item 1b.
For Item 2b =⇒ Item 2a: Suppose Theory(M) is finitely `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent
and `ωProbKF∪Σ ϕ. IfM 6|= ϕ, then ¬ϕ ∈ Theory(M) but since ¬ϕ `ωProbKF∪Σ ⊥,
Theory(M) is finitely `ωProbKF∪Σ-inconsistent. Therefore in fact M |= ϕ.
For Item 2a =⇒ Item 2c: Suppose Item 2a and that M is an N-model. Then
Theory(M) is finitely `ωProbKF∪Σ-consistent (it is also maximally so because
for every ϕ, ϕ ∈ Theory(M) or ¬ϕ ∈ Theory(M)). It is also closed un-
der the ω-rule because it is an N-model. So Theory(M) ∈ WΣc . Therefore by
Lemma 3.5.29, IMMΣc [Theory(M), f
Σ
c ] |= Theory(M). So IMMΣc [Theory(M), f
Σ
c ]
and M are elementarily equivalent. Since they are both N-models they must
in fact be identical.
36I.e. M and IMM[w, f ] satisfy all the same LP>,T-sentences.
37We still need this assumption because by assumption all IMM[w, f ] are N-models, but
even adding the ω-rule does not fix the standard model of arithmetic, it only fixes the theory
of the standard model of arithmetic.
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3.5.3 Adding additional axioms – consistency and intro-
spection
The axiom system KF is often stated with a consistency axiom which succeeds
in picking out the consistent fixed points. We have stated KF without the
consistency axiom, following Halbach (2014). However, we can easily add the
consistency axiom back in by taking it as a member of Σ.
Definition 3.5.35. Let ProbKFC denote ProbKF with the additional axiom
∀x(SentP>,T(x)→ ¬(Tx ∧ T¬. x)). (Cons)
Lemma 3.5.36. Then IMM[f ] |= ∀x(SentP>,T(x) → ¬(Tx ∧ T¬. x)) if and only
if f is consistent.
Theorem 3.5.37. The following are equivalent:38
• Γ `ωProbKFC ϕ,
• For every probabilistic modal structure M with consistent fixed point f , we
have that for each w ∈W ,
IMM[w, f ] |= Γ =⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= ϕ.
We might also consider introspective frames now by using an axiom of in-
trospection expressed using the truth predicate Section 3.4.1.
Definition 3.5.38. Consider the axiom scheme (Intro):
TpP>(pϕq, prq)q→ P= (pP>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
∧ Tp¬P>(pϕq, prq)q→ P= (p¬P>(pϕq, prq)q, p1q)
Using Proposition 3.4.2, we obtain the following theorem as as a special case
of Theorem 3.5.6.
Theorem 3.5.39. Suppose L contains at least one empirical symbol. Then the
following are equivalent:
• Γ `ωProbKF∪{Intro} ϕ,
• For every weakly introspective probabilistic modal structure M with fixed
point f , we have that for each w ∈W ,
IMM[w, f ] |= Γ =⇒ IMM[w, f ] |= ϕ.
38And so is: For every w ∈W {Cons}c ,
IM
M
{Cons}
c
[w, f
{Cons}
c ] |= Γ =⇒ IM
M
{Cons}
c
[w, f
{Cons}
c ] |= ϕ.
102
3.6 Conclusions
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented a construction of a semantics for a language
that includes sentences that can talk about their own probabilities and have
given a corresponding axiomatic theory. The semantics is developed by apply-
ing a familiar construction of a semantics for type-free truth, namely Kripke’s
construction from Kripke (1975), to possible world style structures. In this se-
mantics some sentences are only assigned ranges of probability values instead
of a single value but this will only happen for “problematic” sentences. In most
cases, sentences one wants to work with will be grounded so they will then be
assigned a particular probability value and one can reason in a fairly natural
way. We provided an axiomatisation that allows one to reason about these se-
mantics in a clear way. One could also use this axiomatisation to show what
assumptions about probability would lead to inconsistencies.
We showed that if one expresses introspection principles by using a truth
predicate to do the job of quotation and disquotation these introspection prin-
ciples are consistent. Although we have only considered introspection principles
here, we believe the phenomenon is quite general. For evidence of this we can
see in Stern (2014a,b) that the strategy worked well in the case of necessity.
In future work we would like to investigate exactly how one should express
principles in order to avoid the paradoxical contradictions.
This construction does not yet have the ability to account for conditional
probabilities. Furthermore, it is not clear that it would be possible to add
conditional probabilities and give a good definition of (w, f) |=SKPM P>r(pϕq|pψq)
in the style of strong Kleene three valued scheme. However, in this thesis we are
not considering conditional probabilities (see Section 1.7). One might overcome
this limitation by instead using a supervaluational evaluation scheme, we turn
to that option in a short next chapter.
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Chapter 4
A Supervaluational Kripke
Construction and Imprecise
Probabilities
In the previous chapter we considered a Kripkean construction based on a strong
Kleene style evaluation scheme, as defined in Definition 3.2.3. In this chapter we
consider an alternative that is based on supervaluational logic. The particular
reason that this version is interesting is that it ends up bearing a nice connec-
tion to imprecise probabilities. Imprecise probabilities is a model of probability
which drops some particular assumptions of traditional probability, often by
modelling probability by sets of probability measures. It is a model that has
been suggested for many reasons, for example because numerically precise cre-
dences are psychologically unrealistic, imprecise evidence may best be responded
to by having imprecise credences, and they can represent incomparability in an
agent’s beliefs in a way that precise probabilities cannot. For an introduction
to imprecise probabilities Bradley (2015) can be consulted.
As we saw in Section 2.4, for many probabilistic modal structures there are
no classical valuations. We might alternatively describe this as saying there
are no stable states: whatever probability evaluation function is chosen, some
other probability evaluation function looks better from the original function’s
perspective, i.e. Θ(p) 6= p. It turns out that this is not the case in the imprecise
case. There are some imprecise probability assignments which do look best from
their own perspective, i.e. there are some stable states. This can therefore be
seen as an argument for imprecise probabilities that is very different from the
existing arguments.
Outline of the chapter
In Section 4.1.1 we will present the formal definition of the semantics, which is a
Kripke-style construction using ideas from supervaluational logic and imprecise
probabilities. Then in Section 4.1.2 we consider some examples which give the
idea of how this semantics works.
In Section 4.2 we apply these considerations to a different problem: how
to provide a semantics to a group of imprecise reasoners reasoning about one
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another. Here we are working with the operator language which contains op-
erators PA>r. To do this we will generalise the notion of a probabilistic modal
structure to an imprecise probabilistic modal structures. An interesting feature
of the semantics is that if an agent reasons about an imprecise agent then the
reasoner will also be imprecise.
In the final section, Section 4.3 we will discuss the issue of convexity. It
is often argued that imprecise probabilities should work with convex sets of
probabilities as these have a stronger behavioural motivation, but the semantics
that we have worked with ends up with non-convex probability sets as stable.
One could alter the semantics definition to obtain convex sets, but we will not
suggest doing that because that would mean we loose the property that the
resulting stable sets will have that every member of the credal state looks best
from some (possibly distinct) member of the credal state’s perspective. That is
a feature of our semantics that we think is very important, so we do not advice
altering the semantics to obtain convex sets.
4.1 The semantics and stable states
4.1.1 Developing the semantics
When we are working with supervaluational logic we can be more flexible with
the language. Now, instead of considering LP>,T as in Definition 1.6.10, which
worked with a binary predicate and a coding of rational numbers, we can work
with a language which has P as a function symbol and works with a background
theory of reals and arithmetic.
Setup 4 (for Chapter 4). Let L be some first-order language extending LPA,ROCF
with predicates N and R standing for the natural numbers and real numbers,
respectively. We will consider LP, which extends L by the addition of a function
symbol P.
See Definition 1.6.11 for the introduction to this language and a discussion
of it.
We here develop a construction which can be seen as a supervaluational
version of Kripke’s theory. In supervaluational logic one considers a number of
permissible interpretations of a language. In our case we have different worlds,
so we want to consider collections of permissible interpretations at each world.
We do this by considering sets of functions assigning an interpretation at each
world.
In the previous chapter we considered an evaluation function, which works
as the extension of T at each world, and used that to determine the extension
of P. We could therefore use collections of evaluation functions to provide a col-
lection of permissible interpretations of LP. However, in this chapter we are not
interested in coordinating P with T, we are just interested in the interpretation
of P, so we can rephrase it directly with sets of probabilities.1 This also allows
our discussion to fit closer with the existing literature on imprecise probabilities.
We already introduced prob-eval functions in Definition 2.4.1. This provides
an interpretation of P at each world. Formally p is some function assigning to
1This construction in terms of prob-evaluation functions is equivalent to that one would
define using collections of usual evaluation functions. See Section 4.A.
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each world a function from SentLP to R. If there are multiple agents, a prob-
evaluation function would be a collection of prob-evaluation functions, one for
each agent. And we would represent this as 〈pA〉.
We are interested in this chapter in the imprecise case, so we define imprecise
evaluations to be given by collections of precise ones.
Definition 4.1.1. An imprec-prob-eval function, P , is a collection of prob-
evaluation functions.
This provides a collection of permissible interpretations of P for each agent
at each world and coordinates these interpretations.
We can now give an operation, Θ, where, if P is the current imprec-prob-
eval function, Θ(P) gives the imprec-prob-eval function at the next stage. This
will be the imprec-prob-eval function that looks best from P ’s perspective.
Remember we defined ΘM for p in Definition 2.4.4 by:
ΘM(p)(w)(ϕ) = mw{v | (M,p)(w) |= ϕ}.
We can then use this to directly determine Θ for imprec-prob-eval functions.
Definition 4.1.2. Define
ΘM(P) = {ΘM(p) | p ∈ P}.
As usual, we will generally drop the explicit reference to M.
Just as in the Kripkean version, Θ is monotone so it has fixed points.
Proposition 4.1.3. Θ is monotone. I.e. if P ⊆ P ′ then Θ(P) ⊆ Θ(P ′).
Proof. Suppose P ⊆ P ′.
Θ(P) = {Θ(p) | p ∈ P}
⊆ {Θ(p) | p ∈ P ′}
= Θ(P ′)
Corollary 4.1.4. For every M, there is some P that is a fixed point of ΘM.
Definition 4.1.5. If P is a fixed point we call it a stable state.
We informally describe such stable states as the ones that look best from
their own perspectives. This is because we suggest that Θ(f) is the prob-eval
function that looks best from f ’s perspective. A suggestion for a justification
of this informal way of speaking is considered in Section 7.3.4 where what it
means to look best from one’s perspective is to minimize estimated inaccuracy,
where the estimation is taken according to the accessibility measure, but using
the current prob-eval function to interpret P at the different worlds.
So imprecise probabilities, as sets of probability functions, can provide stable
states, whereas single probability functions cannot.
We just need to check that the members of the stable states are in fact
probabilistic.
Proposition 4.1.6. If P is a stable state then each p ∈ P is probabilistic.
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Proof. Let p ∈ P and P be a stable state. Then there is some p′ ∈ P with
Θ(p′) = p, so
p(w)(ϕ) = Θ(p′)(w)(ϕ) = mw{v | (M,p′)(v) |= ϕ}.
So p(w) is given by a probabilistic measure over classical models, and p(w)
must therefore be probabilistic (see Proposition 1.2.4).
4.1.2 Examples
Let’s take a closer look at how these work.
We will write
P(w)(ϕ) := {p(w)(ϕ) | p ∈ P},
though there is more information in P than just the P(w)(ϕ), for example it
might only contain prob-eval functions where the probability of ψ at w plus the
probability of ϕ at w equals 1, but P(w)(ϕ) = P(w)(ψ) = [0, 1].
Consider the degrees of belief of an agent who is omniscient about non-
semantic state of affairs and is introspective. She is then represented in the
very simple trivial probabilistic modal structure, Momn:
w0 1
Example 4.1.7. Consider π with PA ` π ↔ ¬Ppπq > 1/2 in Momn.
Suppose p(w0)(π) 6> 1/2. Then (M,p)(w0) |= π. So
Θ(p)(w0)(π) = mw0{v | (M,p)(v) |= π}
= mw0{w0}
= 1
Suppose p(w0)(π) > 1/2. Then (M,p)(w0) |= ¬π. So
Θ(p)(w0)(π) = 0
So a stable state will have
P(w0)(π) = {0, 1}
This is stable because the probability value of 1 looks best from 0’s perspec-
tive, and 0 looks best from 1’s perspective.
It is important that we consider this as that the whole set gives the appro-
priate interpretation of probability. It could not be that there some particular
member of the set which is the correct interpretation but it is indeterminate
which. This is because each member of the set looks bad from its own perspec-
tive, but there’s a coherence about the whole set: every member is endorsed by
some (often different) member.2
Sometimes there are multiple stable states:
2This does then lead to the following challenge that was pointed out to me by Jack Spencer:
if the agents mental states really are the whole set of probabilities, then that is the sort of
thing that an introspective agent should be able to recognise. This will then mean that the
introspection conflict rearises. We would also then want to work with a language that can
refer to imprecise credal states. Further analysis of this is left to future research.
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Example 4.1.8. Suppose Handstand ↔ PpHandstandq > 1/2 is satisfied in
Momn.
3 This formalises a setup where if the agent has confidence in her abilities
she will be able to do the handstand, but if she doubts herself then she will not.
This is closely related to the truthteller τ ↔ Tpτq.
Suppose p(w0)(Handstand) 6> 1/2. Then (M,p)(w0) |= ¬PpHandstandq >
1/2, so (M,p)(w0) |= ¬Handstand. So
Θ(p)(w0)(Handstand) = mw0{v | (M,p)(v) |= Handstand}
= 0
Suppose p(w0)(Handstand) > 1/2. Then (M,p)(w0) |= Handstand. So
Θ(p)(w0)(Handstand) = 1
So, at least as far as Handstand goes, there are three stable states:
• P(w0)(Handstand) = 0
• P(w0)(Handstand) = 1
• P(w0)(Handstand) = {0, 1}
We can also now consider empirical self-reference as discussed in Caie (2013).
Example 4.1.9. Suppose we have a probabilistic modal structure with some
sentence FreeThrow as described in Fig. 4.1.
w00.9
FreeThrow↔
¬PpFreeThrowq > 1/2
w10.1
FreeThrow true
Figure 4.1: The M in Example 4.1.9
Suppose p(w0)(FreeThrow) 6> 1/2. Then (M,p)(w0) |= FreeThrow. So
Θ(p)(w0)(FreeThrow) = mw0{v | (M,p)(v) |= FreeThrow}
= mw0{w0, w1}
= 1
Suppose p(w0)(FreeThrow) > 1/2. Then (M,p)(w0) |= ¬FreeThrow. So
Θ(p)(w0)(FreeThrow) = mw0{v | (M,p)(v) |= FreeThrow}
= mw0{w1}
= 0.1
So, a stable evaluation will have: P(w0)(FreeThrow) = {0.1, 1}.
3Or at least where it is presupposed that for any prob-eval function, p, (M,p)(w0) |=
Handstand ⇐⇒ (M,p)(w0) |= PpHandstandq > 1/2. We might just work with the formal
sentence η where PA ` η ↔ Ppηq > 1/2, which would be immune to Egan and Elga (2005)’s
suggestion that equivalences between statements and the agent’s belief in them should not
be known by the agent and therefore not modelled as true in every world in the probabilistic
modal structure.
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We can also use these considerations and this semantics to analyse situations
without self-reference but where instead there is a group of imprecise agents rea-
soning about one another’s beliefs, and where the language is just the operator
language LP>r .
4.2 Semantics for embedded imprecise probabil-
ities
This semantics we have provided can be used and interesting, even in the oper-
ator case.
We will here talk about an agent’s belief state being modelled by a credal
committee, which consists of a set of probability functions.
Example 4.2.1. Consider the operator language LPOwen>r ,PAnn>r as set up in Defi-
nition 1.6.14, which will have sentences like:
POwen(¬PAnn>1/2(Heads)) = 1.
To determine the truth of this we need to determine:
pOwen(¬PAnn>1/2(Heads)) =?
Suppose Ann has pAnn(Heads) = {0.1, 0.9}, and Owen knows this.
When Owen considers the member of Ann’s credal committe that has degree
of belief 0 in Heads, he should have degree of belief 1 in ¬PAnn>1/2(Heads). When
he considers the other member of her credal committee, he should have 0. So,
perhaps, when he considers both members of her credal committee, he should
be represented as having the credal set where he has both credence 1 and 0. So
then
pOwen(¬PAnn>1/2(Heads)) = {0, 1}
is the appropriate state.
An interesting feature of this is that Owen becomes an imprecise reasoner
in virtue of reasoning about an imprecise agent.
In our probabilistic modal structures, as we have used them so far, all the
worlds have a precise interpretation of the non-semantic states of affairs, as
given by M, and all the accessibility measures, mAw, are precise finitely addi-
tive probability measures. In that case imprecision can only come in with the
semantic facts, so we wouldn’t be able to have a situation where “Ann has de-
grees of belief with pAnn(Heads) = [0, 1], and Owen knows this” because Ann
will always have a precise opinion about the chance of Heads. But we might
be interested in such a situations and this is indeed the kind of case that is
considered in the imprecise probability literature. We can build that possibility
in by allowing imprecise probabilistic modal structures. These are very closely
related to imprecise type-spaces, as considered in Ahn (2007).4
4One might also consider variants of probabilistic modal structures that allow the model
of the non-semantic language to be supervaluational and assign a set of permissible interpre-
tations. This would then allow one to model agent’s attitudes towards vague states of affairs.
We will not discuss that just to keep the chapter more focused.
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Definition 4.2.2. An imprecise probabilistic modal structure is given by:
• W a non-empty set,
• M which assigns to each world w a model of L, M(w),
• For each notion of probability A, an imprecise accessibility measure, mA,
which is a collection of finitely additive probability measures over W .
Let M be an imprecise probabilistic modal structure. If mA ∈ mA for each
A ∈ Agents, we define M〈mA〉 be the precise probabilistic modal structure which
has W and M as in M, but the accessibility measure given by mA for each agent
A.
Consider the interactive Ellsberg urn from Ahn (2007).
Example 4.2.3. Start with the Ellsberg setup (Ellsberg, 1961).
I have an urn that contains ninety marbles. Thirty marbles are yellow.
The remainder are blue or red in some unknown proportion.
With the additional following setup:
Now suppose that we have two subjects, [Rosie] and [Billy], and the
experimenter gives each an additional piece of information about
the drawn ball. [Rosie] will be told if the ball is [red] or not, while
[Billy] will be told if the ball is [blue] or not. (Ahn, 2007, names and
colours altered).
This situation can be represented by the imprecise probabilistic modal struc-
ture represented in Fig. 4.2.
Yellow
R:
1− x
B:
1− y Red
R
1
B:
y
Blue
R:
x
B:
1
x ∈ [0, 2/3]
y ∈ [0, 2/3]
Figure 4.2: The red (solid) information on this diagram captures Rosie’s acces-
sibility measure, blue (dashed) information captures Billy’s.
We can now present a probabilistic modal structure with the features of
Example 4.2.1.
Example 4.2.4. We want to find a probabilistic modal structure with the
features: Ann has degrees of belief with pAnn(Heads) = {0, 1}, and Owen knows
this.
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This doesn’t give us information about what degree of belief Owen assigns
to Heads, and how we fix that doesn’t matter for what we are considering, so
let’s suppose that he knows whether coin landed heads or not.
We can then represent this by the probabilistic modal structure where W =
{wHeads, wTails}, M is as expected,5 mAnn is the collection of measure functions
over {wHeads, wTails} with
mAnnw ({wHeads}) = mAnnwTails({wHeads}) ∈ {0, 1},
and mOwen is a singleton where its only member has the properties:
mOwenwHeads({wHeads}) = m
Owen
wTails
({wTails}) = 1.
We can represent this imprecise probabilistic modal structure as in Fig. 4.3
Heads
O:
1
A:
x
¬Heads O:
1
A:
1− x x ∈ {0, 1}
Figure 4.3: The red (solid) information on this diagram captures Ann’s acces-
sibility measure, the blue (dashed) information captures Owen’s.
This has just set up the model for Example 4.2.1, in Example 4.2.7 we
will analyse how to determine pOwen(¬PAnn>1/2(Heads)) formally. We do that by
means of Θ analogous to Definition 4.1.2 but which now takes imprec-prob-eval
functions to imprec-prob-eval functions.
The definition of Θ in Definition 4.1.2 was dependent on the probabilistic
modal structure by virtue of being dependent on the definition of (M,p)(w) |=M
ϕ and we haven’t yet defined
(M,p)(w) |=M ϕ
for M an imprecise probabilistic modal structure. We defined ΘM(P) to be
the collection of ΘM(p), using the precise version to directly get an imprecise
version, and we can do the same sort of thing here. We define ΘM by working
with ΘM〈mAg〉 on the precisifications of the probabilistic modal structure and
then collecting the results.
Definition 4.2.5. Let M be an imprecise probabilistic modal structure.
Define
ΘM(P) := {ΘM〈mA〉(p) | p ∈ P and for each A ∈ Agents, m
A ∈mA}
Where
ΘM〈mA〉(p)
A(w)(ϕ) = mw{v | (M,p)(v) |= ϕ}.
As always we will generally drop the explicit reference to M.
Proposition 4.2.6. Θ is monotone, so it has fixed points. Fixed points will be
called stable states.
5I.e. M(wHeads) |= Heads, M(wTails) |= ¬Heads.
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Example 4.2.7 (Example 4.2.1 formalised). Consider the probabilistic modal
structure from Example 4.2.4. Let P be any imprec-prob-eval function. Let
mOwen be the unique member of mOwen. Take any P .
We will first show that
ΘM(P)(w)Ann(Heads) = {0.1, 0.9}.
And then
ΘM(P)(w)Owen(¬PAnn>1/2(Heads)) = {0, 1}.
Consider m0.1 ∈mAnn with m0.1w ({wHeads}) = 0.1. Let Θ0.1 be a shorthand
for ΘM〈m0.1,mOwen〉 . Let p ∈ P .
Θ0.1(p)(w)
Ann(Heads) = m0.1w {v | (M,p)(v) |= Heads}
And (M,p)(v) |= Heads ⇐⇒ M(v) |= Heads, so:
= m0.1w {wHeads}
= 0.1
And therefore
(M,Θ0.1(p))(w) |= ¬PAnn>1/2(Heads)
for w both wHeads and wTails.
Consider m0.9 ∈mAnn with m0.9w ({wHeads}) = 0.9. Let Θ0.9 be a shorthand
for ΘM〈m0.9,mOwen〉 we can apply directly analogous reasoning. We get that
(M,Θ0.9(p))(w) |= PAnn>1/2(Heads)
for w both wHeads and wTails.
Now,
ΘM(P) = {Θ0.1(p) | p ∈ P} ∪ {Θ0.9(p) | p ∈ P}
So,
ΘM(P)(w)Ann(Heads) = {0.1, 0.9}.
Now
ΘM(ΘM(P)) = {ΘM〈mA〉(p
′) | p′ ∈ ΘM(P) and for each A ∈ Agents, mA ∈mA}
= {ΘM〈mA〉(Θ0.1(p)) | p ∈ P and for each A ∈ Agents, m
A ∈mA}
∪{ΘM〈mA〉(Θ0.9(p)) | p ∈ P and for each A ∈ Agents, m
A ∈mA}
= {Θ0.1(Θ0.1(p)) | p ∈ P} ∪ {Θ0.9(Θ0.1(p)) | p ∈ P}
∪{Θ0.1(Θ0.9(p)) | p ∈ P} ∪ {Θ0.9(Θ0.9(p)) | p ∈ P}
For x either 0.1 or 0.9, we have:
Θx(Θ0.1(p))(w)
Owen(¬PAnn>1/2Heads)
= mOwenw {v | (M,Θ0.1(p))(w) |= ¬PAnn>1/2(Heads)}
= mOwenw (W ) = 1
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and
Θx(Θ0.9(p))(w)
Owen(¬PAnn>1/2Heads)
= mOwenw {v | (M,Θ0.9(p))(w) |= ¬PAnn>1/2(Heads)}
= mOwenw (∅) = 0
Therefore
ΘM(ΘM(P))(w)Owen(¬PAnn>1/2(Heads)) = {0, 1}.
We can also observe that this is stable with respect to Owen’s beliefs about
¬PAnn>1/2(Heads). So stable evaluations P will have
P(wHeads)Owen(¬PAnn>1/2) = {0, 1}.
This is as our informal description worked. The additional complication over
the intuitive explanation is just to allow for generality.
4.3 Convexity?
It is sometimes argued that imprecise credal states should be convex in order
to be behaviouristically distinct because we can capture lower and upper prob-
abilities via buying and selling behaviour. This argument can be avoided if one
takes conditional bets, but we do not do this because of the issues suggested in
Section 1.7. However, there are other reasons we may not want to consider only
convex sets: for example, we might want to consider an agent to believe two
paramaters to be probabilistically independent, and this cannot be represented
by a convex credal committee.
If one did want to regain the convexity, one can always take the convex
closure of what has been done here. Alternatively one could generalise the work
on the strong Kleene Kripkean semantics more simply and just work with p(w,f)
and p(w,f) as in Definition 3.2.15. This would work as one might expect.
However, we will loose something by taking convex sets: it will no longer
be the case that every member of the credal state looks best from some (pos-
sibly different) member’s perspective. For example in the case of π in Momn
(Example 4.1.7) the only probability values for π that can look best from any
prob-eval function’s perspective are 0 and 1, and moreover they both have to be
in a stable state, so the stable state in that situation is not convex. If instead
we considered some convex set we would have that every member of the credal
state is in the convex closure of the credal states which look best from some
member’s perspective. But that is much less appealing. We therefore instead
suggest that one works with these non-convex sets.
Appendix 4.A Using evaluation functions
Consider evaluation functions as in Definition 3.2.2 which work as extensions of
the truth predicate. If p is maximally consistent, then it determines a classical
model of LP,T at each world, and each P will be probabilistic. So, given a set
of evaluation functions we have a set of interpretations of P and T that are
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nicely coordinated. When considering supervaluational versions of the Kripke
construction in the truth case, one usually works with a single evaluation func-
tion and determine a set from that, for example all the maximally consistent
evaluation functions extending the single one, and from that determine using
supervaluational logic which sentences will be super-true and use that as the
next single evaluation function. However that way of doing things imposes the
restriction that one can only consider sets of evaluation functions which are
generated by a single evaluation function. We do not wish to impose this re-
striction because that would impose a restriction on the sets of probabilities
that are admitted as the imprecise probabilities, for example it would require
that we have intervals assigned to each sentence, and perhaps lead us to results
about which sets are good that is more restrictive than is desired. We only focus
on maximally consistent evaluation functions because this leads us to probabil-
ity functions, so we are then working with sets of probability functions, which
allows this work to fit well with work on imprecise probabilities.
To provide a Kripke construction as in Chapter 3, we need to provide some
inductive definition giving a fixed point.
Definition 4.A.1. f is a maximally consistent evaluation function if for each
w, f(w) is a maximally consistent set of sentences (or the codes thereof).
An SV-evaluation, F , is a collection of maximally consistent evaluation func-
tions.
If the evaluation function f is maximally consistent, then it determines a
model of LP,T at each world where each P is probabilistic. This can be defined
as a classical model using M(w) to interpret the vocabulary from L, and defining
(w, f) |=M Ppϕq = r ⇐⇒ mw{v |#ϕ ∈ f(v)} = r, which corresponds to that
in Definition 3.2.3 for when f is maximally consistent.
Definition 4.A.2. Define Θ(f) by:
#ϕ ∈ Θ(f)(w) ⇐⇒ (w, f) |=M ϕ
For F an SV-evaluation, define
Θ(F ) := {Θ(f) | f ∈ F}.
This is monotone so fixed points exist. We should have
Conjecture 4.A.3. P is a fixed point iff there is a fixed point SV-evaluation
F such that p ∈ P iff there is f ∈ F such that
p(w)(ϕ) = mw{v | ϕ ∈ f(v)}.
Which would show these constructions are essentially the same.
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Chapter 5
The Revision Theory of
Probability
In the previous chapters we have developed semantics which drop certain tradi-
tional probability axioms and assumptions. In this chapter we will consider an
alternative theory of probability where we have that the standard probability
axioms are retained.
One influential theory for the liar paradox is the revision theory of truth. The
revision theory of truth was independently developed by Gupta and Herzberger
and the idea is to improve, stage-by-stage, some arbitrary model of the language.
Unlike for the Kripkean construction, such a construction will never terminate
but will instead result in a transfinite sequence of models. This lack of a “fixed
point” is the price to pay for remaining fully classical. In this chapter we see how
one can develop a revision construction for probability. Since the underlying
logic is fully classical our probability notion will satisfy the usual axioms of
probability (at least for finitely additive probability). We can therefore work
with a language with a probability function symbol (see Definition 1.6.11).
We shall present two different revision constructions for this language. In the
first construction we will develop Leitgeb’s work from Leitgeb (2008, 2012). This
construction cannot apply to general interpretations of probability but instead
fixes it to something that might be considered as semantic probability. The
second will be based on possible world structures and can be used to give a the-
ory for probabilities in the form of subjective probabilities or objective chances.
This is because it is based on background probabilistic modal structures.
One of our aims in developing our constructions is to provide nice limit
stages that can themselves be used as good models for probability and truth.
To achieve this we shall provide a strong criterion for what the limit models
should look like by giving a strong way of precisifying the claim:
If a property of interest of the interpretations is brought about by the
sequence beneath µ then it should be satisfied at the µth stage.
In Gupta and Belnap’s locus classicus on revision theories (Gupta and Belnap,
1993) the authors just consider the properties “ϕ is true” and “ϕ is false”, and
understand “brought about” according to what they call a stability condition.
Note that this notion of stability is not connected to that in Chapter 4. For
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Gupta and Belnap, if ϕ is true stably beneath µ, meaning that from some point
onwards, ϕ is always true, then ϕ should also be true at the stage µ; and similarly
for falsity. This is a weak way to make this criterion precise and they show that
even such a weak characterisations leads to an interesting construction. We
will instead present a strong limit stage criterion, the particular change being
that we consider more properties. For example we will also be interested in
properties like
The probability of ϕ is equal to the probability of ψ.
It is interesting to study strong proposals as well as weak proposals because from
strong proposals we can obtain nice models at the limit stages which may have
different kinds of properties to the models obtainable at the successor stages.
Outline of the chapter
In more detail what to come is as follows. Firstly in Section 5.1 we present
some definitions we will use throughout the chapter. The chapter properly
begins with Section 5.2 where we shall present our revision construction that
extends Leitgeb’s. This relies on the notion of relative frequencies to interpret
the probability notion at the successor stages. At limit stages we shall present a
criterion which is stronger than the one usually considered. We will be interested
in any properties of interpretations that act nicely at limit stages. For example,
a property described by
p(ϕ) 6 1/2
will act nicely at limits, whereas
p(ϕ) < 1/2
will not. If some such property is “brought about” by the previous stages, in the
sense of being nearly stable beneath µ (for µ a limit ordinal), then we ask that it
is satisfied at the stage µ. We shall motivate and present the construction and
in Example 5.2.9 we discuss some examples of how it works. In Section 5.2.2 we
shall show some properties of the construction. This includes the property that
at every state P is interpreted as a finitely additive probability function and that
at limit stages P and T satisfy the so-called Probabilistic Convention T. We then
present some alternatives in Section 5.2.3 which weaken the limit constraint,
before moving on to comments on this style of construction in Section 5.2.4. A
major feature of the construction is that it seems hard to use these constructed
interpretations for standard uses of probability such as to model an agent’s
beliefs.
In Section 5.3 we develop an alternative construction that can be used to
model subjective probabilities. This works by using an underlying structure
in the form of a probabilistic modal structure to give extra information about
how the probability notion should work. We discuss how the limit stage should
be defined in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. Then finally in Section 5.4 we present
some axiomatic theories for all these constructions. These have nothing like
the completeness that we obtained in Chapter 3. We obtain a nice theory
and nice properties if we just focus on limit stages. This is because of our fairly
restrictive definition for the limit stages, and it is contrary to traditional revision
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constructions. For example at a limit state we will have
¬ϕ ∈ T ⇐⇒ ϕ /∈ T.
We close the chapter with a short conclusions section.
5.1 Preliminaries
Setup 5 (for Chapter 5). Let L be some language extending LPA,ROCF containing
the predicates N and R. In this chapter we will be working with LP,T as presented
in Definition 1.6.11 which extends L with a function symbol P and a unary
predicate T.
We can use this more flexible language instead of LP>,T that was used in
Chapter 3 because our semantics will be based on classical logic and we will
assign single point valued probabilities to each sentence.
Note that in the specification of this language we required that L be count-
able in order to still use arithmetic for our coding. This assumption isn’t essen-
tial to anything that is done in this chapter.
Notation 5.1.1. Models of the language LP,T shall be denoted by M =
(M,T,p). Here, M is some background model of L, which we assume to in-
terpret the LPA,ROCF vocabulary as intended, for example interpreting N and R
by the set of (standard) natural and real numbers, respectively. T is a subset
of SentP,T which interprets the predicate T. p is a function from SentP,T to R
which provides the interpretation of the function symbol P.1
Revision sequences will be (transfinite) sequences of models of LP,T, the αth
model of which is denoted Mα = (M,Tα,pα).
Let JϕKM :=
{
1 M |= ϕ
0 otherwise
.
In this chapter we will often identify a sentence with its code, but this should
not lead to any confusion.
5.2 Revising probability using relative frequen-
cies and near stability
5.2.1 Motivating and defining the revision sequence
The final definition of the construction can be found in Definition 5.2.8 on
Page 127 but instead of jumping straight into giving the definitions we will
explain how it is motivated.
The idea of a revision construction is to start with some (classical) model of
LP,T and to improve on it. To do this we need to pick a sequence of extensions
of T and P, i.e. develop a sequence Mα of interpretations of T and P.
1Here we are identifying a sentence with its code. More carefully we have that T provides
the interpration for T by having n ∈ TM ⇐⇒ there is some ϕ ∈ T with n = #ϕ. Similarly
for p.
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Consider the liar sentence λ, which is a sentence where
λ↔ ¬Tpλq
is arithmetically derivable. At the zeroth stage suppose we have taken λ /∈ T0.
Then this zeroth model will in fact satisfy ¬Tpλq, i.e. it will satisfy λ. At
the next stage we therefore say λ is true, so put λ ∈ T1. By continuing this
reasoning we see that the liar sentence will continue to flip in and out of the
extension of the truth predicate:
¬Tpλq
λ
Tpλq
¬λ
¬Tpλq
λ
Tpλq
¬λ
¬Tpλq
λ
A formal characterisation of this reasoning is given by the clause:
ϕ ∈ Tn+1 ⇐⇒ Mn |= ϕ
To develop a revision sequence for probability we also need to interpret pn.
Leitgeb (2012) presents a model of LP,T which he uses to prove the consistency
of a set of principles including Probabilistic Convention T. To construct his
model he first develops an ω-length sequence of models of LP,T, which we can
take to be the finite stages of a revision construction, the final model he proposes
is something like a limit of the other models and can be seen as the ω-stage of a
revision construction. We shall use his proposal to tell us how to interpret the
finite stage probabilities and although our limit stage will differ in technical de-
tails it results in something very close to Leitgeb’s ω-stage definition. Leitgeb’s
finite stage construction says that we should interpret the nth probability of ϕ
as the relative frequency of ϕ being satisfied in the sequence of models leading
up to n, i.e.,
pn+1(ϕ) =
JϕKM0 + . . .+ JϕKMn
n+ 1
Including probability into the diagram of the revision sequence for the liar sen-
tence we then get:
¬Tpλq
λ
Tpλq
¬λ
Ppλq = 1
¬Tpλq
λ
Ppλq = 1/2
Tpλq
¬λ
Ppλq = 2/3
¬Tpλq
λ
Ppλq = 2/4
= 1/2
However our job is not yet done. Although each new model is an improve-
ment on the previous model, each of them is still in need of improvement. We
therefore should extend the revision sequence to the transfinite. This is also re-
quired, for example, to assign appropriate truth values to some unproblematic
quantified sentences like, e.g.
∀n ∈ N(Tnp0 = 0q).
Once the limit stages have been defined our job will still not be done because
that limit stage will itself be in need of improvement. We therefore will also
have to define transfinite successor stages and work our way all the way up the
ordinals. We first consider how the transfinite successor stages should be defined
as before considering the limit stage.
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The transfinite successor stages for truth are usually defined in the same
way as the finite successor stages, namely
ϕ ∈ Tα+1 ⇐⇒ Mα |= ϕ
Following this same idea we would want to define pα+1(ϕ) to be the relative
frequency of ϕ being satisfied in the sequence of models up to α + 1. However
there are now transfinitely-many such models so how should one define relative
frequency in this case? We shall define pα+1(ϕ) to be the relative frequency of
ϕ being satisfied in the finite sequence of models just before α+ 1.
For example,
pω+5(ϕ) =
JϕKMω + JϕKMω+1 + JϕKMω+2 + JϕKMω+3 + JϕKMω+4
5
For the liar sentence one would then obtain the following probabilities.
ω
λ
ω + 1
¬λ
Ppλq = 1
ω + 2
λ
Ppλq = 1/2
ω + 3
¬λ
Ppλq = 2/3
ω + 4
λ
Ppλq = 2/4
To give this definition in general one needs to choose the finite sequence of
models beneath an ordinal.
Definition 5.2.1. For a successor ordinal α+1 we let ζα+1 denote the greatest
limit ordinal beneath α+ 1, and kα+1 be the natural number such that α+ 1 =
ζα+1 + kα+1.
For example ζω+5 = ω and kω+5 = 5.
Proposition 5.2.2. ζα+n = ζα for n ∈ ω. And kα+n = kα + n.
We can define:
pα+1(ϕ) =
JϕKMζα + JϕKMζα+1 + . . .+ JϕKMζα+kα−1 + JϕKMα
kα+1
Now we can move on to approach the question of how to define the limit stages.
In Gupta’s first published presentation of his theory he says:
Intuitively what is wanted is a way of summing up the improvements
that are brought about by each successive application of τM [the
function fromMα toMα+12] That is, we want a way of going from
the improvements that are severally brought about by the various
applications of τM to the improvements that are collectively brought
about by those applications. (Gupta, 1982, p. 39)
We might characterise this intended limiting procedure as:
If a property of interest of the interpretations of T is “brought about”
by the sequence beneath µ then it should be satisfied at the µth stage.
2Observe that in our construction no such single function is available since the α + 1th
stage depends on a number of stages beneath α+ 1.
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This has to be filled-out by explaining which properties are of interest and what
counts as being “brought about by the sequence beneath µ”.
Gupta proposes that the properties which we should consider are those of
the form
ϕ is in the extension of T
and
ϕ is not in the extension of T.
He characterises what is “brought about by the sequence beneath µ” by using
the notion of stability : a stable property is one which at some point becomes
satisfied and remains satisfied in the later improvements (for a detailed definition
of stability see Definition 5.2.7).
This limit definition is then formalised by:
If ϕ is in the extension of T stably beneath µ, then ϕ ∈ Tµ, and
similarly for ϕ not being in the extension of T.
Here is an example of how this works: suppose T0 = ∅, then:
0
0 = 0
¬Tp0 = 0q
1
0 = 0
Tp0 = 0q
2
0 = 0
Tp0 = 0q
ω
0 = 0
Tp0 = 0q
ω + 1
0 = 0
Tp0 = 0q
From stage 1 onwards, 0 = 0 is in the extension of T, i.e. 0 = 0 ∈ Tn for n > 1,
so the stability requirement will therefore lead us to that 0 = 0 ∈ Tω.
We shall propose a stronger way to precisify the intended limiting procedure.
Firstly we can consider more properties of the interpretations. Secondly we shall
extend the definition of what is to be counted as a property being brought about.
We shall allow more properties to be considered than just the ones that
take the form ϕ ∈ T and ϕ /∈ T. We would ideally allow any properties to be
considered but are unable to do this.3 To see this consider the probability of
Tp0 = 0q starting with an initial model where p0(Tp0 = 0q) = 0 and T0 = ∅:
0
0 = 0
¬Tp0 = 0q
p0(Tp0 = 0q) = 0
1
0 = 0
Tp0 = 0q
p1(Tp0 = 0q) = 0
2
0 = 0
Tp0 = 0q
p2(Tp0 = 0q) = 1/2
3
0 = 0
Tp0 = 0q
p3(Tp0 = 0q) = 2/3
We can also graph these probability values as follows:
0 1 2 3 4 5
n
0.5
1
pnH.L
3Seamus Bradly motivated me to consider which properties can be worked with leading
me to this characterisation of the limit stages.
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For each ε ∈ R>0, 1 > p(Tp0 = 0q) > 1− ε is stable in the sequence beneath
ω, so it counts as being brought about by that sequence. If we consider each
of these properties as being applicable in the limiting procedure we would ask
each of them to be satisfied, i.e. for each ε > 0, 1 > pω(Tp0 = 0q) > 1 − ε.
However this cannot be satisfied because there is no value of pω(Tp0 = 0q)
which will satisfy this constraint for all ε. The difference is that {x | r < x < q}
is an open set, but {x | r 6 x 6 q} is closed. Closed sets are the ones which
contain their limit points, so one can only require nice limiting behaviour with
respect to closed sets. We transfer the notion of such closed sets directly to
requirements on the models. To do this we first need to put a topology on the
space of models.
Definition 5.2.3. Mod denotes the set of all models of LT,P. Remember these
all take the form (M,p,T).
Take as a subbase for the closed sets all sets of the form:
• for each M0 ∈ ModL, {(M,p,T) |M 6= M0},
• ϕ ∈ T and ϕ /∈ T,
i.e. {(M,p,T) | ϕ ∈ T} and {(M,p,T) | ϕ /∈ T},4
• p(ϕ) 6 r and p(ϕ) > r for r ∈ R,
i.e. {(M,p,T) | p(ϕ) 6 r} and {(M,p,T) | p(ϕ) > r}.
So using this subbase we can give an inductive definition of being closed:
C ⊆ Mod is closed if
• C is a member of the subbase for closed sets,
• C = A ∪B for some A,B closed,
• C =
⋂
i∈I Ai with each Ai closed.
For ϕ ∈ SentP,T we say ϕ is closed if [ϕ] = {M ∈ Mod | M |= ϕ} is closed.5
The topology is defined so that Mod is topologically equivalent to ModL ×
RSentP,T × {0, 1}SentP,T with the product topology (where ModL is endowed with
the discrete topology). Thus, any set which does not depend on T or p is closed.
Ignoring the part involving L, this is the sort of topology used in Christiano
et al. (ms).
The following states a useful way of checking whether a set of models is
closed or not.
Proposition 5.2.5. The following are equivalent:
4We will often identify the property, i.e. ϕ ∈ T, with the set {(M, p,T) | ϕ ∈ T}. We
therefore apply our notion of closedness to subsets, characterisations of features of the models
and sentences; but this should not cause any confusion.
5We conjecture:
Conjecture 5.2.4. [ϕ] is closed iff ϕ is equivalent to a sentence of the form
∀x1 . . . xn
∧
i∈I
∨
i∈J
ψi,j
where I and J are finite and ψi,j takes one of forms of the members of the subbase.
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1. C ⊆ Mod is closed
2. For every sequence (M, pn,Tn) and each (M, plim,Tlim) such that
(M, pn,Tn) −→ (M, plim,Tlim), i.e.
• for every ϕ pn(ϕ) −→ plim(ϕ)6
• for every ϕ there is some m ∈ N such that either
– for every n > m, ϕ ∈ Tn and ϕ ∈ Tlim, or
– for every n > m, ϕ /∈ Tn and ϕ /∈ Tlim.
If each (M,pn,Tn) ∈ C, then (M, plim,Tlim) ∈ C.
In its current form the theorem is only true when the language is countable.
If it is not countable, then the theorem would still hold with the proviso that C ⊆
Mod depend on the interpretation of probability and truth for only countably
many sentences. The details of this restriction and the proof of this result can
be found in Section 5.A.
Such closed properties will therefore be the ones that we can ask to be carried
over to the limits. So the strongest possible interpretation of “the properties to
be considered” is all the closed sets. This will lead to the limiting behaviour in
the features described in Example 5.2.9. First we give some examples of sets
which are closed and not.
Example 5.2.6. The following are closed:
• Any ϕ where ϕ ∈ SentL,
• p(ϕ) = 1/2,
• p(ϕ) = 1 ∨ p(ϕ) = 0,
• p(ϕ)− p(Tpϕq) 6 ε
• p(ϕ) = 1− p(ψ),
• p(ϕ) · p(ψ) > 1/2,
• p(ψ) = 0,
• If p(ϕ) > 0, then p(ψ) = 0 (because “if A then B” is “not-A or B”)
• If p(ψ) > 0, then p(ϕ ∧ ψ)
p(ψ)
= 1/2,
• p(ψ) + p(χ) = p(ψ ∨ χ),
• p is a finitely additive probability function,7
• Any ϕ which is in the propositional language containing the propositional
variables Tpψq for all ϕ ∈ SentP,T, E.g.
– Tp¬ϕq↔ ¬Tpϕq,
6I.e. for all ε ∈ R>0, there is some m ∈ N such that for all n > m, |pn(ϕ)− plim(ϕ)| < ε.
7I became aware of the fact that the property of being a finitely additive probability
function is closed in Christiano et al. (ms).
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– (Tpϕ1q ∧ . . . ∧ Tpϕnq)→ Tpψq,
• T is maximally consistent.
The following are not closed:
• p(ϕ) ∈ Q,
• 1/2 < p(ϕ),
• p(ϕ) 6= 1/2,
• ¬∀n∈NTn+1pγq, or equivalently ∃n∈N¬Tn+1pγq,
• p is an N-additive probability function,
• T is ω-consistent.
Proof. Most of these can either be seen directly or shown by using Proposi-
tion 5.2.5.
For example, consider p(ϕ) = 1 − p(ψ). This can be shown either by the
sequential characterisation or by reformulating it. Reformulated it would be:
{M | p(ϕ) = 1− p(ψ)}
=
⋂
r+q<1
r,q>0
({M | p(ϕ) > r} ∪ {M | p(ψ) > q})
∩
⋂
r+q>1
r,q>0
({M | p(ϕ) 6 r} ∪ {M | p(ψ) 6 q})
To show that being finitely additive is closed we use the criterion of being
sequentially closed. Take any sequence (Mn,pn,Tn) with pn(ψ) + pn(χ) =
pn(ψ ∨ χ). Suppose that for every ϕ, pn(ϕ) −→ plim(ϕ). Then:
pn(ψ ∨ χ) −→ plim(ψ ∨ χ)
pn(ψ ∨ χ) = pn(ψ) + pn(χ) −→ plim(ψ) + plim(χ)
So in fact plim(ψ ∨ χ) = plim(ψ) + plim(χ). Therefore (M,plim,Tlim) ∈ C.
One can easily observe that p(ϕ) > 0 and p(ϕ) = 1 are closed for any ϕ. So
Cfin add =
⋂
ϕ
{M | p(ϕ) > 0}
∩
⋂
ϕ is a logical tautology
{M | p(ϕ) = 1}
∩
⋂
ψ and χ are logically incompatible
{M | p(ψ) + p(χ) = p(ψ ∨ χ)}
is an intersection of closed sets, so must be closed.
Since both ϕ ∈ T and ϕ /∈ T are closed, and the propositional language over
these is constructed with just finite operations one can prove by induction that
all sentences with just say something about T are closed. Then one can show
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that T being maximally consistent is closed because it can be characterised
by:
Cmax con =
⋂
ϕ
{M | ¬ϕ ∈ T ⇐⇒ ϕ /∈ T}
∩
⋂
Γ`ψ
Γ is finite
{M | (for each ϕ ∈ Γ, ϕ ∈ T) =⇒ ψ ∈ T}
The second way we strengthen the limit clause is to give a more encompassing
characterisation of when C is “brought about by the sequence beneath µ”.
This will lead to fewer Mµ satisfying the limit constraint. The definition that
Belnap and Gupta focus on is that what it takes to be “brought about by the
sequence beneath µ” is that the property should be stable. They also mention
the possibility of considering the nearly stable properties but focus on the stable
ones because that definition “is simple and general, and because it reduces to
a minimum reliance on policies not absolutely dictated by the revision rule
itself”(Gupta and Belnap, 1993, p. 169). We instead focus on the near stability
constraint because it leads us to interesting limit-stage models, something that
is very interesting but is not usually considered in much detail when working
with revision theories. In their monograph Gupta and Belnap describe the
distinction between stability and near stability of an “element” d, such as T(ϕ),
to take value x,8 such as false, as follows
Stability simpliciter requires an element d to settle down to a
value x after some initial fluctuations, say up to β. . . . In contrast,
near stability allows fluctuations after β also, but these fluctuations
must be confined to finite regions just after limit ordinals. (Gupta
and Belnap, 1993, p. 169, their italics)
Formally the difference is described in the following definitions.
Definition 5.2.7. C ⊆ Mod is stable beneath µ in the sequence 〈Mα〉 if:
∃β < µ ∀α<µ>β Mα ∈ C
C ⊆ Mod is nearly stable beneath µ in the sequence 〈Mα〉 if:
∃β < µ ∀α<µ>β ∃Nα < ω ∀n
<ω
>Nα
Mα+n ∈ C
If [ϕ] is stable beneath µ we will say ϕ is stably satisfied beneath µ, and
similarly for near stability.
An example of the difference this makes to defining the limit stages can
be found in Converges along copies in Example 5.2.9. Taking the near
stability characterisation for the limit stages will also allow us to show a desirable
feature of the limit stages, namely that they satisfy Probabilistic Convention T
which says that the probability of a sentence is the same as the probability that
that sentence is true. Probabilistic Convention T was a motivator for Leitgeb’s
construction and we will discuss it in Section 5.2.2.
In conclusion, we suggest that the following definition gives a very strong
but always satisfiable interpretation of the idea that Mµ “sums up” the earlier
improvements and we will later show that it leads to nice properties.
8Using their notation.
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Whenever C ⊆ Mod is closed and is nearly stable beneath µ then
Mµ ∈ C.
In this criterion we have asked for as many properties as possible to be taken
over to limits. This is interesting because then one can determine what one can
consistently ask the limit stages to be like. Given properties and behaviour that
one likes, one can then consider possible weakening of the definition that still
achieve such behaviour.
Our definition of a revision sequence in full is therefore the following:
Definition 5.2.8. A revision sequence is a sequence of modelsMα = (M,Tα,pα)
such that
• ϕ ∈ Tα+1 ⇐⇒ Mα |= ϕ
• pα+1(ϕ) is the relative frequency of ϕ being satisfied in the (maximal)
finite sequence of models leading up to α+ 1. More carefully:
pα+1(ϕ) =
JϕKMζα+1 + JϕKMζα+1+1 + . . .+ JϕKMζα+1+kα+1−2 + JϕKMα
kα+1
where ζα+1 is a limit ordinal and kα+1 a natural number such that α+1 =
ζα+1 + kα+1.
• At a limit µMµ should satisfy:
If C ⊆ Mod is closed (see Definition 5.2.3) with C nearly stable
in the sequence 〈Mα〉α<µ, i.e.
∃β < µ ∀α<µ>β ∃Nα < ω ∀n
<ω
>Nα
Mα+n ∈ C
then Mµ ∈ C.
We call a sequenceMα a revision sequence using stability if “nearly stable”
in the above definition is replaced with “stable”.
It is easy to see that a revision sequence (simpliciter, which we might instead
write as “using near stability”) is a revision sequence using stability.
We will note in Theorem 5.2.11 that given any M, T0 and p0 there will be
such a revision sequence, however the revision sequence isn’t uniquely deter-
mined as there will in general be infinitely many Mµ to choose from at the
limit stages.
To get more of a sense of this construction, we will here present some exam-
ples of how this works, particularly to illustrate the limit condition.
Example 5.2.9. Here are some examples of how the limit stage defined in
Definition 5.2.8 works.9 The only features that use the near stability component
of the definition are Converges along copies and Non-convex.
Feature 5.2.9.1 (Fixes on a value). If the probability of ϕ ends up fixing
on some value r beneath µ, then pµ(ϕ) = r.
Example. pω(0 = 0). The probabilities beneath ω of 0 = 0 are:
9For the examples we shall suppose that T0 = ∅ and p0(ϕ) = 0 for all ϕ
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0 1 2 3 4 5
n
0.5
1
pnH.L
The earlier stages “bring about” the property that p(0 = 0) = 1 because it
is stable beneath ω. It is also closed, so the limit stage Mω will also have
to be in {M | p(0 = 0) = 1}, i.e. pω(0 = 0) = 1.
Feature 5.2.9.2 (Converges to a value). If the probability of ϕ converges
to r beneath µ, then pµ(ϕ) = r.
Example. pω(Tp0 = 0q). The probabilities beneath ω of Tp0 = 0q are:
0 1 2 3 4 5
n
0.5
1
pnH.L
These converge to 1, and our limit constraint will lead to pω(Tp0 = 0q) = 1.
This is because for each ε > 0 there is some N (take any N > 1/ε) such that
for all n > N pn(Tp0 = 0q) > 1− ε, so for each ε > 0, p(Tp0 = 0q) > 1− ε
is stable beneath ω, and this is a closed property, so Mω ∈ {M | p(Tp0 =
0q) > 1− ε} for each ε, i.e. pω(Tp0 = 0q) > 1− ε, and therefore it must be
that pω(Tp0 = 0q) = 1.
Feature 5.2.9.3 (In an interval). If the probability of ϕ ends up always
(roughly) being in some interval, then the limit probability will also be in
that interval.
Example. pω(δ) with δ such that
δ ↔ (Ppδq < 0.4 ∨ (0.4 6 Ppδq 6 0.6 ∧ Tpδq)).
Except for the first few values, the probability of δ beneath ω is always
between 0.4− ε and 0.6 + ε but does not converge to any value:
0 1 2 3 4 5
n
0.5
1
pnH.L
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Our limit constraint requires that 0.4 6 pω(δ) 6 0.6 for similar reasoning
as to in Converges to a value.
Feature 5.2.9.4 (Converges along copies). If the probability of ϕ con-
verges to r along each copy of ω beneath µ, then pµ(ϕ) = r.
Example. This feature is one where near stability plays a role. For every
limit stage α + ω the stability limit requirement is the same as the near
stability requirement, so the difference between stability and near stability
first arises at the limit stage ω · ω. Consider pω·ω(λ) with λ ↔ ¬Tpλq.
The probabilities beneath ω · ω of λ (with λ /∈ Tω·m and pω·m(λ) =
limn pω·(m−1)+n(λ) = 1/2) are:
0 1 2 3 Ω Ω×2 Ω×3+4
Α up to Ω2
0.5
1
pΑH.L
Along each copy of ω, the probability of λ converges to 1/2. Using the near
stability component of the limit definition we will get that pω·ω(λ) = 1/2.
This is because each property 1/2 − ε 6 p(λ) 6 1/2 + ε is nearly stable
beneath ω · ω. More carefully, 1/2− ε 6 pα+n(λ) 6 1/2 + ε holds whenever
n > 12ε .
Feature 5.2.9.5 (Relationships). If the probability of ϕ ends up always
being one minus the probability of ψ beneath µ, then pµ(ϕ) = 1− µ(ψ).
Example. Consider pω(¬δ) where δ is as in the example from In an
interval. The probabilities of ¬δ beneath ω are:
0 1 2 3 4 5
n
0.5
1
PnH.L
∆
Ø ∆
When compared to the probabilities of δ we see that for every stage beneath
ω, except for the first stage, pn(δ) = 1 − pn(¬δ), and p(δ) = 1 − p(¬δ) is
closed as mentioned in Example 5.2.6. We will therefore also have that
pω(¬δ) = 1− pω(δ).
Feature 5.2.9.6 (Non-convex).
If the probability of ϕ ends up always being either a or b beneath µ, then
pµ(ϕ) is either a or b.
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Example. Consider pω·ω(δ) where
10
δ ↔
(
(limstage ∧ ¬Tpδq)
∨ (¬limstage ∧ Tpδq)
)
The probabilities of this δ beneath ω · ω are:
0 1 2 3 Ω Ω×2 Ω×3+4
Α up to Ω2
0.5
1
pΑH.L
We therefore see that p(δ) = 0 ∨ p(δ) = 1 is stable beneath ω · ω, and this
is closed as mentioned in Example 5.2.6, so we will get that pω·ω(δ) = 0 or
pω·ω(δ) = 1.
We are left with one more thing to do before we can move to considering
properties of the construction: we should show that this construction is satisfi-
able, in particular that we can impose such limiting behaviour.
Lemma 5.2.10. Fix M0 ∈ ModL. Suppose for each i ∈ I,
Ci ⊆ {(M0,p,T) ∈ Mod | ∀ϕ ∈ SentP,T, 0 6 p(ϕ) 6 1},
and {Ci |i ∈ I} is a family of closed sets that has the finite intersection property,
i.e. if for each finite F ⊆ I,
⋂
i∈F Ci 6= ∅.
Then
⋂
i∈I Ci 6= ∅.
This says that for any M0, {(M0,p,T) ∈ Mod | ∀ϕ ∈ SentP,T, 0 6 p(ϕ) 6 1}
is compact with the topology given in Definition 5.2.3.
Proof. {(M0,p,T) ∈ Mod | ∀ϕ ∈ SentP,T, 0 6 p(ϕ) 6 1} is topologically equiv-
alent to [0, 1]SentP,T ×{0, 1}SentP,T with the product topology, which is compact
by Tychonoff’s theorem.11
Theorem 5.2.11. Consider any µ-length sequence of modelsMα = (M,Tα,pα).
Then there is some Mµ = (M,Tµ,pµ) such that whenever C is a closed
property that is nearly stable in 〈Mα〉α<µ then Mµ ∈ C.
Proof. Let
C := {C closed | C is nearly stable beneath µ in 〈Mα〉α<µ}
We will show that C has the finite intersection property and by Lemma 5.2.10
we will be able to deduce that ⋂
C 6= ∅,
10A concrete example of a formula “limstage” is ¬γ, where γ is a formula such that γ ↔
¬∀nTnpγq.
11Which says that the product of any collection of compact topological spaces is compact
with respect to the product topology.
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i.e. there is some Mµ ∈
⋂
C as required.
Let D be finite ⊆ C. Enumerate the members of D so that D = {C1, . . . , Cm}.
We know that for each i = 1, . . . ,m
∃βi < µ ∀α<µ>βi ∃N
i
α < ω ∀n<ω>Niα Mα+n ∈ Ci
Therefore for each α > max{βi | i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} and k > max{N iα | i ∈
{1, . . . ,m}}
Mα+k ∈ C1 ∩ . . . ∩ Cm
So we can see that
⋂
D = C1 ∩ . . . ∩ Cm 6= ∅. We have therefore shown that
C has the finite intersection property, as required.
This shows that there are revision sequences as described in Definition 5.2.8.
Corollary 5.2.12. For any M, T0 and p0 there is a sequence of Mα with
M0 = (M,p0,T0) that is a revision sequence in the sense of Definition 5.2.8.
5.2.2 Properties of the construction
The first result we will show is that in a revision sequence each pα is a finitely
additive probability and each Tα a maximally consistent set of sentences, even
at the limit stages.
Theorem 5.2.13. In any revision sequence using stability as in Definition 5.2.8,
for each α > 0, pα is a finitely additive probability and Tα a maximally consis-
tent set of sentences.
Proof. We work by induction on α. For the successor stages it is easy to
see that Tα is a maximally consistent set of sentences and pα is an additive
probability. For the limit stages we will show that the following criteria are
closed and stably true:
1. p is a finitely additive probability.
2. T is maximally consistent.
They are stable because of the induction hypothesis.12 They are closed as
shown in Example 5.2.6.
In the traditional revision construction, the limit stages aren’t maximally
consistent. An advantage of having the limit stages be nice in this way is that
they might themselves be considered as good candidates for an interpretation
of the language. Usually the limit stages aren’t taken to be suggested inter-
pretations but are just tools for summing up the previous stages. By focusing
on the limit stages themselves we can obtain some other desirable properties
that aren’t present at the other stages and they can therefore be seen to give
at least interesting interpretations. What is interesting in this construction is
that these properties of limit stages weren’t hard-coded into the construction
but are obtained from the more general requirement that we have given.
12In fact they are always satisfied from stage 1 on.
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Although the limit probabilities will be finitely additive probabilities, we
can show that they will not in general be nice with respect to the universal
quantifier. In particular the interpretation of P at limits will not be what we
call weak N-additivity, and similarly the limit truth will not be ω-consistent.13
Definition 5.2.14. We call T ⊆ SentP,T ω-consistent if whenever each of
ϕ(0) ∈ T, ϕ(1) ∈ T, ϕ(2) ∈ T . . .
then
¬∀n∈Nϕ(n) 6∈ T.
We call p : SentP,T → R weakly N-additive if whenever
p(ϕ(0)) = 1, p(ϕ(1)) = 1, p(ϕ(2)) = 1, . . .
then
p(¬∀n∈Nϕ(n)) 6= 1.
Weak N-additivity is a weak version of N-additivity, as introduced in Defi-
nition 1.2.3. It is implied by what Leitgeb called σ-additivity in Leitgeb (2008)
given the background assumption that p is finitely additive. The notion of weak
N-additivity given here could also be stated as {ϕ | p(ϕ) = 1} is ω-consistent.
Theorem 5.2.15. Let 〈Mα〉 be a revision sequence in the sense of Defini-
tion 5.2.8. At each limit µ, pµ will not be a weakly N-additive probability, and
each Tµ will not be ω-consistent.
14
This theorem and its proof can be seen as an extension of Leitgeb (2008) to
the transfinite.
Proof. We prove this theorem by means of two lemmas.
Lemma 5.2.15.1. For any sequence satisfying Definition 5.2.8,
Σ := {ϕ | ϕ is nearly stably satisfied in 〈Mα〉α<µ}
is ω-inconsistent.
In fact, for γ a sentence such that
γ ↔ ¬∀n ∈ N
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
TpTp. . .Tpγqqq
Σ contains:
• γ, and therefore ¬∀n ∈ N
n+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
TpTp. . .Tpγqqq
13We would like to instead call this N-consistency, but that would go against the tradition
of the name.
14Equivalently, there is a sentence ϕ such that:
Mµ |= ∀n∈NTpϕq(n/v) ∧ Tp¬∀x∈N ϕq
Mµ |= ∀n∈NPpϕq(n/v) = 1 ∧ Pp¬∀x∈N ϕq = 1
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• Tpγq
• TpTpγqq
• . . .
This is an immediate corollary of McGee (1985), a proof of which can be found
in Theorem 2.4.12 (though there we used P=1 instead of T), and the result
as an application to the revision theory can already be found in Gupta and
Belnap (1993).
Proof. For all α, Mα is an N-model, therefore each Mα+1 satisfies:
• Tpϕ→ ψq→ (Tpϕq→ Tpψq)
• Tp¬ϕq→ ¬Tpϕq
• ∀n∈NTpϕq(n/x)→ Tp∀x∈Nϕq
Therefore by the theorem in McGee (1985), which is again presented in The-
orem 2.4.12, Mα+1 |= γ. So by the definition of the extension of truth
in a revision sequence we have that for any n ∈ N, Mα+n+1 |= Tnpγq.
Since this worked with arbitrary α, we have that for any α and m > n,
Mα+m |= Tnpγq.
Lemma 5.2.15.2. Suppose ϕ is nearly stably satisfied in 〈Mα〉α<µ and the
sequence satisfies the near stability criterion for all the closed properties. Then
ϕ ∈ Tµ and pµ(ϕ) = 1.
Proof. Suppose ϕ is nearly stably satisfied in 〈Mα〉α<µ. Observe that when-
ever ϕ is nearly stably satisfied then Tpϕq is also nearly stably satisfied
beneath µ therefore, since Tpϕq is closed, ϕ ∈ Tµ. Similarly for each ε > 0,
1 > Ppϕq > 1−ε is a closed and is nearly stably satisfied beneath µ, therefore
for each ε > 0, 1 > pµ(ϕ) > 1− ε, i.e. pµ(ϕ) = 1.
Putting these lemmas together gets us
• For each n ∈ N, pµ(Tn+1pγq) = 1
• pµ(¬∀n∈NTn+1pγq) = 1.
• For each n ∈ N, Tn+1pγq ∈ Tµ
• ¬∀n ∈ N Tn+1pγq ∈ Tµ.
As required.
If we instead considered revision sequences using stability, i.e. to weaken the
requirement to the stability criterion instead of the near stability criterion (still
for all closed properties), one would be able to show all these results for the
stages α+ ω but not necessarily for the other limit stages.
The last property of this construction we will discuss involves a property
was very important for Leitgeb (2008, 2012), namely Probabilistic Convention
T, which says that the probability of Tpϕq is the same as the probability of ϕ.
Definition 5.2.16. p : SentP,T → R satisfies Probabilistic Convention T if for
all ϕ
p(ϕ) = p(Tpϕq)
Probabilistic Convention T is satisfied by a modelM of LP,T ifM |= PpTpϕqq =
Ppϕq for all ϕ.
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This is interesting to Leitgeb because he argues that although we cannot
assign the same truth value to Tpϕq and ϕ, it is consistent and interesting that
we can assign the same probabilities.
Theorem 5.2.17. Probabilistic Convention T is satisfied at limit stages of re-
vision sequences (in the sense of Definition 5.2.8), and at stages α + ω for the
revision sequence using stability.
Proof. Observe that for ε > 0, |p(ϕ) − p(Tpϕq)| 6 ε is closed. We will show
that it is nearly stably satisfied and therefore |pµ(ϕ)− pµ(Tpϕq)| 6 ε for each
ε > 0. I.e. pµ(ϕ) = pµ(Tpϕq).
Each |p(ϕ)− p(Tpϕq)| 6 ε is nearly stable because:
pα+n(ϕ)− pα+n(Tpϕq)
=
JϕKMζα+n + JϕKMζα+n+1 + JϕKMζα+n+2 + . . .+ JϕKMα+n−1
kα+n
−
JTpϕqKMζα+n + JTpϕqKMζα+n+1 + . . .+ JTpϕqKMα+n−1
kα+n
=
JϕKMζα+n + JϕKMζα+n+1 + JϕKMζα+n+2 + . . .+ JϕKMα+n−1
kα+n
−
JTpϕqKMζα+n + JϕKMζα+n + JϕKMζα+n+1 + . . .+ JϕKMα+n−2
kα+n
=
JϕKMα+n−1 − JTpϕqKMζα+n
kα+n
so |pα+n(ϕ)− pα+n(Tpϕq)| 6
1
kα + n
−→ 0 as n −→ ω
We finally mention that at each limit stage there are infinitely-many choices.
Theorem 5.2.18. Let 〈Mα〉α<µ be any µ-length initial sequence of a revision
sequence in the sense of Definition 5.2.8. There are infinitely many Mµ which
extend 〈Mα〉α<µ in accordance with Definition 5.2.8.
The proof for this result can be found in Section 5.B
5.2.3 Weakening of the definition of the limit stages
In Definition 5.2.8 we presented a construction with a strong limiting criterion.
However one might wish to consider possible weakenings of this definition. One
reason to do this is that one disagrees with some of the behaviour which the
definition leads to, alternatively one may wish to satisfy properties which are
inconsistent with such a strong limiting behaviour.15 We shall therefore here
present some options for how one might weaken the limit rule.
Gupta and Belnap (1993) gives a revision theory not only for the notion
of truth but for general definitions, so we can attempt to directly apply their
procedure to our definition of interest. This would lead us to the stability
constraint:
15We will see an example of this in Section 5.3.
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If the probability of ϕ is stably r beneath µ then pµ(ϕ) = r.
This would obtain the limiting behaviour in Fixes on a value but not even
that in Converges to a value, in fact almost no sentences will have their
probabilities stably fix on some value. We therefore think that this is not a
sufficient constraint on the limit probabilities.
To obtain the limiting behaviour in Converges to a value one can instead
impose the constraint:
If pα(ϕ) −→ r as α −→ µ, then pµ(ϕ) = r
This would also achieve the behaviour in Fixes on a value. However it
wouldn’t capture any of the other behaviours so we think this is also too weak.
This also isn’t phrased as a formalisation of informal limit requirement:
If a property of interest of the interpretations is “brought about” by
the sequence beneath µ then it should be satisfied at the µth stage.
If we were to try to obtain this convergence behaviour as a formalisation of this
informal limit requirement we would obtain:
If r 6 p(ϕ) 6 q is stable beneath µ, then r 6 pµ(ϕ) 6 q
But this would not only obtain the behaviour of Fixes on a value and Con-
verges to a value but also that of In an interval. This constraint is then
equivalent to:
lim infα<µ pα(ϕ) 6 pµ(ϕ) 6 lim supα<µ pα(ϕ)
This would achieve, as special cases, the behaviours in Fixes on a value and
Converges to a value. One could also add to this the constraint: pµ is a
probability function. We can show that one can add the requirement that pµ be
probabilistic by using the Hahn-Banach Extension Theorem to show that there
always is such an pµ.
16 We will discuss this sort of approach in much more
depth in Section 5.3.3. This kind of a proposal is a more direct generalisation
of Leitgeb’s construction from Leitgeb (2012). We believe that this proposal is
an interesting one, it carries a significant amount of the intention of the original
suggestion of stability but focuses only on the behaviour of single sentences,
however we think that the behaviour in Converges along copies is desirable,
so to also obtain this we instead consider near stability
Modifying stability to near stability also gives us the behaviour in Con-
verges along copies. This is then:
lim inf
α<µ
lim inf
n<ω
pα+n(ϕ) 6 pµ(ϕ) 6 lim sup
α<µ
lim sup
n<ω
pα+n(ϕ)
Which is equivalent to:
If r 6 p(ϕ) 6 q is nearly stable beneath µ, then r 6 pµ(ϕ) 6 q
16For example see Aliprantis and Border (1999, 5.53), this can be used since lim supα<µ xα
is a convex function on Rµ.
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This can also be combined with the constraint that pµ be probabilistic, again by
an application of the Hahn-Banach Extension Theorem. Choosing a pµ which is
given by a linear functional bounded above by lim supα<µ lim supn<ω xα+n will
imply that Probabilistic Convention T holds at limit stages.17 This is a good
proposal. Although it is weaker than the definition of revision sequence we gave
in Definition 5.2.8 it still leads to most of the properties we have considered.
The behaviour in Relationships is where we see the effect of considering the
relationships between different sentences. This would not be obtained if we were
only interested in properties of the form r 6 p(ϕ) 6 q but is obtained because we
allow the specification of a revision sequence to consider, for example, how the
probability of ϕ relates to the probability of ¬ϕ. It is this feature that allows us
to derive that the limit interpretations of P will be probabilistic and the limit
interpretations of T will be a maximally consistent set of sentences. This is
also what results in differences to the truth limit step, and moreover these are
differences that are interesting but have not previously been suggested. This
is a limit definition that I think should be further studied just in regard to its
consequences for truth. The criterion seems to follow from the motivation for the
usual stability clauses, namely that the limit stages should sum up properties of
truth and probability that have been agreed on in the revision sequence leading
up to that limit ordinal.
Finally, consider the behaviour in Non-convex. It is debatable whether
this behaviour is desirable. If the probabilities of ϕ flip between 0 and 1 then
we might think that an appropriate way of summing this up would be to take
the probability of ϕ to be 1/2. If we just focus on the probability component
then we can avoid this behaviour by imposing the constraint that C be convex.
More generally then we would need to say what it means to be a convex subset
of Mod and impose the limit constraint only using sets which are closed and
convex. We will not further consider this option in this thesis.
Although such weakenings of the limiting behaviour are interesting, there
are some more fundamental worries that we have with this construction. These
worries will also apply to the weakenings because the main problem they point
to is the style of successor stage definition that we have used.
5.2.4 Interpretation of probability in this construction
This construction does not allow for non-trivial probabilities of contingent mat-
ters. For example consider the question of whether a coin lands heads. A
sentence saying that the coin does land heads is a simple example of somewhere
where we might want to assign a non-trivial probability, typically we would want
to assign p(Heads) = 1/2. However this won’t be possible in a revision sequence
as we have defined it. This is because a proposition like Heads is part of the base
language, i.e. doesn’t involve reference to truth or probability, and it is therefore
determined by the base model M. If M |= Heads then in any revision sequence,
pα(Heads) = 1 for each α > 0, and if M |= ¬Heads then pα(Heads) = 0 for
all α > 0. This shows that we can’t apply these constructions to traditional
uses of probabilities. The problem is that the only information we consider to
determine the probability is given by the revision sequence itself, which has a
background model fixed.
17Because lim supn<ω(pα+n(Tpϕq)− pα+n(ϕ)) = 0.
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A related challenge is that this cannot be used to model more than one
probability notion, for example to model a group of agents and their degrees of
belief about one another’s beliefs. This is because it is not clear how this should
be extended to allow for different probability functions. The problem is that
the probability functions are in a large part fixed by the base model.
We should therefore see the p that are defined in such a revision sequence
as some sort of semantic probabilities, but they don’t give us a theory of, for
example, degrees of belief or chance.
5.2.5 Other features of the construction
Another consequence of the definitions given is that for any ϕ and any limit
ordinal µ, either pµ+1(ϕ) = 1 or pµ+1(ϕ) = 0. It should be possible to give
an alternative definition which does not have this feature while retaining the
spirit of this style of revision construction, namely probabilities characterising
how often something is satisfied in the revision sequence. This should be further
studied.
The proof of existence of the limit stages that we gave relied on Tychonoff’s
theorem, which is equivalent to the axiom of choice. We therefore have not
given a constructive method for picking some limit stage. In Theorem 5.2.18 we
showed that there are many options to choose from when picking a limit stage.
Moreover, at least in the way that we have presented it, such a non-constructive
choice has to be made at each limit ordinal. In this sense the construction
cannot be “carried out”. One can instead see this in a different way: not as
a construction of a revision sequence but instead as a condition for when a
sequence is a revision sequence. Then we don’t have to make a choice at the
limits. Even with that idea, it is still interesting that there are many legitimate
revision sequences, and one should still think about how they may vary.
5.3 Probabilities over possible world structures
5.3.1 Setup and successor definition
We shall now develop an alternative theory where we add some extra structure
to our underlying models. This will be able to represent many different notions
of probability, such as objective chances and the degrees of beliefs of agents,
because we model some aspects of probability in our base models. The under-
lying structure will be used to give the successor definitions of probability, so
it may be the case that 0 < pµ+1(ϕ) < 1, avoiding our aforementioned worry.
Our comment on the non-constructive nature of the revision definition will still
apply to the revision sequences presented in this section.
Imagine two agents who have degrees of belief about something uncertain,
such as whether a coin which is to be tossed will land heads or tails. They are
both uncertain about this feature of the world, and they are uncertain about
each other’s uncertainty. Moreover, we are interested in frameworks which have
some aspects of self-reference, so there are sentences such as
Alice’s degree of belief in π is not great than or equal to 1/2. (π)
In this section we will provide a revision theory that can work in such situations
and can model such agents’ degrees of belief.
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To do this we will use the structures that we have been using throughout
this thesis, namely probabilistic modal structures, as defined in Definition 2.1.1.
These consist of a set of worlds, W , accessibility measures mAw, and a valuation
M(w) that assigns to each w a model of the language without probability or
truth. We shall here assume that these interpret the arithmetic vocabulary by
the standard model of arithmetic and the vocabulary of the reals by the standard
reals. In the alternative definition of a revision sequence that we give in this
section, the probabilities of successor stages aren’t given by relative frequencies,
but instead we use this possible worlds framework to give meanings to P. The
advantage of this construction is that it can deal with multiple interacting prob-
ability notions and it can give non-trivial probabilities to contingent vocabulary.
This is because each revision sequence can now use the contingent vocabulary
allowed in the language L and the revision sequence can refer to different models
assigning different interpretations to this contingent vocabulary.
It can also easily be modified to result in a revision construction for modali-
ties, like necessity or knowledge, by using an underlying Kripke structure instead
of the probabilistic modal structures that we shall use.
For clarity of presentation we shall focus on structures with a single agent,
or probability notion, but the definitions easily extend to multiple probability
notions.
To give a revision sequence we need to define pα(w) and Tα(w) for all
ordinals α and worlds w. The interpretation of truth at a world has nothing to
do with the other worlds, so we still define:
ϕ ∈ Tα+1(w) ⇐⇒ Mα(w) |= ϕ
where Mα(w) = (M(w),pα(w),Tα(w)). We can easily give the definition of
the successor steps by directly using the probabilistic modal structure, namely:
pα+1(w)(ϕ) = mw{v |Mα(v) |= ϕ}
This definition is very similar to those found in, for example, Halbach et al.
(2003) where they gave a similar definition for the case of necessity.
For example this will result in a revision sequence as in Fig. 5.1.
We now have to explain how to give the limit stages.
One could take some alternative way of defining limit truth, for example as
in the standard revision sequences, and then define a limit probability derivative
on that, by letting
pµ(w)(ϕ) = mw{v | ϕ ∈ Tµ(v)}
Such a construction will allow a nice connection between the interpretation of
truth and probability at the limit stage but just focusing on probability it has
some odd consequences. For example, it might be the case that pω(w)(λ) = 0
even though for each n < ω, pn(w)(λ) = 1/2.
18
To ensure that such situations do not arise, we will instead focus on limit
stage proposals that work in the spirit of the limit stage that we defined for
Section 5.2.
18 For example:
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P(pPpHq = 3/4q) = 3/4
TpTpHqq
¬H
0
1
1/4
3/4
Figure 5.1: Example of a revision sequence with a probabilistic modal structure
5.3.2 Limit stages “sum up” previous stages
We might therefore instead propose an alternative limit definition for probability
by directly applying our limit stage construction from Definition 5.2.8.
If C ⊆ Mod is closed with C nearly stable in the sequence 〈Mα(w)〉α<µ,
then Mµ(w) ∈ C.
This definition is still possible since the proof in Theorem 5.2.11 will still
apply. Similarly, Theorem 5.2.13 will still hold so the limit probabilities will be
finitely additive probability functions.
For certain matters this may seem too weak: Given the additional struc-
ture there are additional properties of the sequence of previous interpretations
that might be “brought about by the previous stages” but not yet required to
be satisfied at the limit stage. Such properties will relate to the relations be-
tween truth and probabilities at the different worlds. For example consider the
situation described in Fig. 5.2 with λ ∈ T0(wCircle) and λ /∈ T0(wCross).
Consider pω(w)(λ). Beneath ω, pn(w)(λ) how it acts is described in Fig. 5.3.
Tpλq
¬λ
¬Tpλq
λ
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
¬Tpλq
λ
Ppλq = 1/2
Tpλq
¬λ
Ppλq = 1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
Tpλq
¬λ
Ppλq = 1/2
¬Tpλq
λ
Ppλq = 1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
¬Tpλq
Ppλq = 0
¬Tpλq
Ppλq = 0
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
This example relies on taking Tµ to be the collection of sentences that are nearly stably true
beneath µ, though this undesirable feature shouldn’t rely on this definition of limit-truth.
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wCircle 1 wCross 1
Figure 5.2: The probabilistic modal structure showing that some properties
aren’t taken to limits.
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Figure 5.3: Revising probability showing that some properties aren’t taken to
limits.
So a property of the probabilities which is brought about by the sequence
beneath ω is that the probability of λ in wCircle is one minus the probability of
λ in wCross, i.e. p(wCircle)(λ) = 1− p(wCross)(λ). We might therefore ask that
this is also satisfied at the limit stage.
To take account of this we can extend the limit constraint. To do this,
though, we first need to extend the notion of being closed from Definition 5.2.3.
This definition will have that Mod is topologically equivalent to Mod, which is
in turn equivalent to ModWL × RSentP,T×W × {0, 1}
SentP,T×W .
Definition 5.3.1. Let Mod be all functions assigning to each w ∈ W some
member of Mod. So for M ∈Mod, M(w) = (M(w),p(w),T(w)) ∈ Mod.
We say that C ⊆ Mod is closed iff it is closed in the product topology on
Mod. This can be defined by: C ⊆Mod is closed if
• There is some C a closed subset of Mod, C = {M |M(w) ∈ C}.19
• C = A ∪B for some A,B closed,
• C =
⋂
i∈I Ai with each Ai closed.
We can then extend the limit stage definition by:
If C ⊆Mod is closed with C nearly stable in the sequence 〈Mα〉α<µ,
then Mµ ∈ C.
We then result in the following definition of a revision sequence:
19This could equivalently be defined by: C takes the form:
– M(w0) 6= M0,
– ϕ ∈ T(w), or ϕ /∈ T(w), or
– r 6 p(w)(ϕ), or r > p(w)(ϕ),
where, as before, these describe sets, e.g. ϕ ∈ T(w) describes the set {M ∈ Mod |ϕ ∈ T(w)}.
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Definition 5.3.2. A revision sequence over a probabilistic modal structure M
is a sequence of models Mα ∈ Mod, Mα(w) = (M(w),pα(w),Tα(w)) such
that
• ϕ ∈ Tα+1(w) ⇐⇒ Mα(w) |= ϕ
• pα+1(w)(ϕ) = mw{v |Mα(v) |= ϕ}
• At a limit µ, Mµ should satisfy:
If C ⊆Mod is closed (see Definition 5.3.1) with C nearly stable
in the sequence 〈Mα〉α<µ, i.e.
∃β < µ ∀α<µ>β ∃Nα < ω ∀n
<ω
>Nα
Mα+n ∈ C
then Mµ ∈ C.
This will be satisfiable because the proof in Theorem 5.2.11 will still apply.
Moreover, we will still have all the results Theorems 5.2.13, 5.2.15 and 5.2.18
as the proofs with go through in this more general setting.20 However, we will
not have Theorem 5.2.17, i.e. some of the revision sequences will fail to satisfy
Probabilistic Convention T. For someone who is worried about this, we can
weaken the constraint so as to have Probabilistic Contention T satisfied. A
result of that modification, though, is that one won’t have that the limit stages
must be probabilistic and maximally consistent automatically following from
the definition, they instead will have to be built in. It is this option which we
study in the next section.
5.3.3 Limit stages summing up – a weaker proposal using
Banach limits so we can get Probabilistic Conven-
tion T.
In the previous section we considered a strengthening of the criterion:
If C ⊆ Mod is closed with C nearly stable in the sequence 〈Mα(w)〉α<µ,
then Mµ(w) ∈ C.
This leads to a failure of Probabilistic Convention T. In fact the criterion,
even un-strengthened, leads to failures of Probabilistic Convention T, i.e. for
some ϕ pµ(w)(ϕ) 6= pµ(w)(Tpϕq). Theorem 5.2.17 fails in this framework
because now |p(w)(ϕ) − p(w)(Tpϕq)| 6 ε is not (nearly) stable beneath limits
in 〈Mα(w)〉α<µ because our definition of the successor stages has changed. We
can see that in fact we get bad failures of Probabilistic Convention T.
Example 5.3.3. For example consider Momn containing one world w0, and
observe that after stage 2, pn(w0)(λ) = 1 − pn(w0)(Tpλq) as can be seen in
Fig. 5.4.
Moreover p(w0)(λ) = 1 − p(w0)(Tpλq) is a closed property that is sta-
ble in this 〈Mn(w0))〉n<ω and therefore our constraint would require that
pω(w0)(λ) = 1−pω(w0)(Tpλq). This will also be the case at any limit ordinal,
showing that this criterion requires bad failures of Probabilistic Convention T.
20For the proof of Theorem 5.2.15, one needs to redefine Σ as {ϕ |
ϕ is uniformly nearly stably satisfied in 〈Mα〉}, where we say ϕ is uniformly nearly
stably satisfied if {M | for all w, M(w) |= ϕ} is nearly stable.
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Figure 5.4: Revising the probability of the liar in Momn.
If one is interested in keeping Probabilistic Convention T, there is a way of
weakening our constraint that would allow for Probabilistic Convention T to be
satisfiable. This would be to instead just focus on single sentences and impose
the constraint that
lim infα<µ pα(w)(ϕ) 6 pµ(w)(ϕ) 6 lim supα<µ pα(w)(ϕ)
or equivalently:
If r 6 p(ϕ) 6 q is stable in 〈Mα(w)〉α<µ, then it should be satisfied
at µ.
Imposing this constraint will lead to the behaviour in Fixes on a value,
Converges to a value and In an interval. Modifying it to understand it
with near stability will also lead to Converges along copies.
We will be able to show that we can always find limit stages which:
• Have pµ probabilistic,
• Satisfy Probabilistic Convention T, i.e. pµ(ϕ) = pµ(Tpϕq),
• Satisfy the limit constraint:
If r 6 p(ϕ) 6 q is nearly stable in 〈Mα(w)〉α<µ, then it should
be satisfied at µ.
We do this by choosing limit stages by means of so called Banach limits. We
will take:
pµ(w)(ϕ) = BanLimµ
(
〈pα(w)(ϕ)〉α<µ
)
where BanLimµ is some functional which is linear, positive, normalised, finitely
shift-invariant and satisfies near stability. This could be proposed as an appro-
priate generalisation of the notion of a Banach limit to the transfinite.
Theorem 5.3.4. For every limit ordinal µ we can find some BanLimµ defined
on the space of bounded µ-length sequences of real numbers which is:
• linear, i.e.
BanLimµ
(
〈rxα + qyα〉α<µ
)
= r·BanLimµ
(
〈xα〉α<µ
)
+q·BanLimµ
(
〈yα〉α<µ
)
• positive, i.e. if each xα > 0 then BanLimµ
(
〈xα〉α<µ
)
> 0
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• normalized, i.e. BanLimµ (1) = 1
• (finitely) shift-invariant, i.e.
BanLimµ
(
〈xα〉α<µ
)
= BanLimµ
(
〈xα+1〉α<µ
)
• satisfies near stability, i.e.
lim inf
α<µ
lim inf
n<ω
xα+n 6 BanLimµ
(
〈xα〉α<µ
)
6 lim sup
α<µ
lim sup
n<ω
xα+n
The linear positive, normalised components of the definition of a Banach
limit will get us that pµ is probabilistic, the shift-invariance will get us Proba-
bilistic Convention T, and the near stability component will get us the restricted
version of the near stability limit requirement where we only consider properties
of the form r 6 p(ϕ) 6 q. So this theorem will show us that we can choose limit
stages with the desired properties.
To show the existence of such a Banach limit we generalise one of the usual
proofs of the existence of Banach limits. When we considered revision sequences
as defined in Definition 5.2.8, we obtained Probabilistic Convention T at limit
stages. In the proof of this, Theorem 5.2.17, we only used the near stability
requirement for properties of the form |p(ϕ) − p(Tpϕq)| 6 ε, or, equivalently
−ε 6 Ppϕq − PpTpϕqq 6 ε, and to see that each of these is nearly stable
we use the fact that the successor stages are defined as relative frequencies
and that JϕKMα = JTpϕqKMα+1 . When we consider the weakening of revision
sequences which only uses the near stability requirement for properties of the
form r 6 p(ϕ) 6 q, one can see pµ(ϕ) as a function of 〈JϕKMα〉α<µ. In that
context Probabilistic Convention T expressed a finitely shift-invariant property.
So obtaining limit probabilities using the near stability criterion for properties
of the form r 6 p(ϕ) 6 q was very close to showing the existence of a Banach
limit. To formalise that we will mimic the definition of such a revision sequence.
Proof. Let lµ denote the space of bounded µ-length sequences of real numbers.
Define f : lµ → R by21
f
(
〈xα〉α<µ
)
= lim sup
µ′<µ
lim sup
n<ω
Avµ′+n
(
〈xβ〉β<µ′+n
)
where
Avµ′+n
(
〈xβ〉β<µ′+n
)
:=
xµ′ + . . .+ xµ′+n−1
n
f is a sub-linear functional since lim sup and Avα are sub-linear functionals,
and therefore the composition of them is also a sub-linear functional.
Therefore by the Hahn-Banach extension theorem22 there is some BanLimµ
a linear functional defined on lµ which is dominated by f . One can check
21We use this more complicated definition of f instead of the more obvious definition as
lim supα<µ Avα
(〈
xβ
〉
β<α
)
which would be a direct generalisation of the proof for BanLimω
since the latter definition is only shift invariant at ordinals α+ ω.
22For example, see Aliprantis and Border (1999, 5.53).
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that this BanLimµ has the required properties. For example to show that it is
finitely shift-invariant:∣∣∣Avα+n (〈xβ − xβ+1〉β<α+n)∣∣∣
=
(xζα − xζα+1) + . . .+ (xα+n − xα+n+1)
kα+n
=
xζα − xα+n+1
kα+n
−→ 0 as n −→ ω since xα is bounded
So
BanLimµ(〈xα〉α<µ)− BanLimµ(〈xα+1〉α<µ) = BanLimµ(〈xα − xα+1〉α<µ)
6 f
(
〈xα − xα+1〉α<µ
)
= 0
as required.
We have now presented two different options for how to define limit prob-
abilities using the limiting behaviour of the sequence. The first suggestion,
in Section 5.3.2, was a criterion which forces strong limiting clause given the
behaviour of probability in the preceding sequence. This was given by:
If C ⊆Mod is closed with C nearly stable in the sequence 〈Mα〉α<µ,
then Mµ ∈ C.
Our second suggestion weakened the limiting behaviour. For some closed prop-
erties which are stably satisfied beneath µ were not asked to be satisfied at
the limit stages. For example p(Tpλq) = 1 − p(λ) might be stably satisfied
beneath µ, but if we want the limit stages to satisfy Probabilistic Convention T
we will require that this is not satisfied at the limit stages as we instead want
p(Tpλq) = p(λ) to be satisfied. So we dropped some of the limiting behaviour
and only focused on properties of the form r 6 p(ϕ) 6 q and instead imposed
an alternative additional constraint: that the limit probabilities satisfy Prob-
abilistic Convention T and be probabilistic. We showed that it is possible to
require such limiting behaviour by generalising the notion of a Banach limit to
arbitrary length sequences. It would be interesting to see what further limiting
behaviour is consistent with Probabilistic Convention T.
I find Probabilistic Convention T a nice feature, but not enough to take this
alternative approach to the limit stages, unless of course one has specific reasons
to be interested in Probabilistic Convention T. The definition which I find the
most attractive is the one presented in Section 5.3.2 given by considering the
nearly stable closed properties. A particularly nice feature of this definition is
that the criterion is just a single constraint (unlike the version to get Proba-
bilistic Convention T where one has to explicitly require an extra feature) and
has many desirable consequences, for example that the limit stages are finitely
additive probabilities and finitely consistent extensions of truth.
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5.4 Theories for these constructions
5.4.1 In the general case
It is useful to give theories explaining properties of these revision sequences.
This is something that is considered when one works with revision theories for
truth, and we do the same here for revision theories of probability. In Leitgeb
(2012) Leitgeb gives some axiomatic theories which directly apply to our notions
of a revision sequence.
Theorem 5.4.1. In any revision sequence in the sense of Definition 5.2.8,
the theorems of the axiomatic theory PT1 from Leitgeb (2012) are nearly stably
satisfied in any sequence up to any limit ordinal I.e. if PT1 ` ϕ then
∃β < µ ∀α<µ>β ∃N < ω ∀n
<ω
>N Mα+n |= ϕ
PT1 is:
• Base theory:
– PALP,T , Peano Arithmetic with the induction axioms extended to the
full language of LP,T,23
– The theory of real closed fields, ROCF.
• Axioms and rules for truth:
– The commutation axioms for T with respect to ¬,∧,∨,∀,∃,
– All T-biconditionals for atomic sentences which do not involve T or
P,
–
ϕ
Tpϕq
and Tpϕq
ϕ
.
• Axioms and rules for each probability function symbol P: 24
– ∀ϕ(0 6 Ppϕq 6 1),
– ∀ϕ(ProvPALP,T pϕq→ Ppϕq = 1),
– ∀ϕ∀ψ(ProvPALP,T p¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)q→ Ppϕq+ Ppψq = Ppϕ ∨ ψq),
– ∀ϕ(Pp∀v ∈ N(ϕ(v))q = limn−→∞ Ppϕ(1) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕ(n)q),25
–
ϕ
Ppϕq > 1− 1/n ,
– Ppϕq = 1
ϕ
.
• Approximation to Probabilistic Convention T
23Quantification in the theory of Peano Arithmetic is understood as quantification restricted
by the natural number predicate N .
24 “∀ϕ” is understood as ∀x(SentP,T(x)→ . . .). Quantification into p.q can be made precise
using standard arithmetic means. For further details of a way to do this see Halbach (2011).
We are following Leitgeb (2012) in using this notation. For example, ∀ϕ(0 6 Ppϕq 6 1)
is shorthand for ∀x(SentP,T(x) → (0 6 Px 6 1) and ∀ϕ(|PpTpϕqq− Ppϕq| < 1/n) would
appropriately be formulated by: ∀x(cClTermLPA (x)→ |PT. x− Px
◦| < 1/n)
25lim can be made precise using a usual ε− δ definition of convergence.
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– ∀ϕ(|PpTpϕqq− Ppϕq| < 1/n)
If we just focus on limit stages we can get a stronger theory being satisfied.
Theorem 5.4.2. In any revision sequence in the sense of Definition 5.2.826,
the theorems of the axiomatic theory PT′2 is satisfied at every limit ordinal.
PT′2 is:
• Base theory as before.
• Axioms and rules for truth:
– The commutation axioms for T with respect to ¬,∧,∨,27
– All T-biconditionals for atomic sentences which do not involve T or
P
– ∀ϕ(ProvPT1pϕq→ Tpϕq).
• Axioms for P: 28
– ∀ϕ(0 6 Ppϕq 6 1),
– ∀ϕ(ProvPT1pϕq→ Ppϕq = 1),
– ∀ϕ∀ψ(ProvPT1p¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)q→ Ppϕq+ Ppψq = Ppϕ ∨ ψq),
– ∀ϕ∀a, b ∈ R(ProvPT1pr 6 Ppϕq 6 qq→ r 6 Ppϕq 6 q).
• Probabilistic Convention T:
– ∀ϕ(PpTpϕqq = Ppϕq).
• A version of Miller’s Principle:
– ∀ϕ(PpPpϕq = 1q > 0→ P(pTpϕqq | pPpϕq = 1q)) = 1.
This extends Leitgeb’s PT2 by also including axioms and rules for truth. If
near stability is replaced with stability, PT2 will be satisfied at limit ordinals of
the form α+ ω.
For the probabilistic modal structure construction we can make the following
modifications:
Theorem 5.4.3. Fix any probabilistic modal structure. In a revision sequence
using as successor rules:
ϕ ∈ Tα+1(w) ⇐⇒ Mα(w) |= ϕ
pα+1(w)(ϕ) = mw{v |Mα(v) |= ϕ}
the theorems of the axiomatic theory PTPMS1 are uniformly nearly stably satisfied
in any sequence up to any limit ordinal. I.e. if PT1 ` ϕ then
∃β < µ ∀α<µ>β ∃N < ω ∀n
<ω
>N ∀w ∈W Mα+n(w) |= ϕ
PTPMS1 modifies PT1 by:
26The proofs only rely on having the near stability constraint for properties of the form
r 6 Ppϕq 6 q and that the pµ is a finitely additive probability, and Tµ is a maximally
consistent set of sentences.
27but not for ∀ or ∃
28 “∀ϕ” is really understood as quantification over natural numbers that are codes of sen-
tences of LP,T. Quantification into p.q can be made precise using standard arithmetic means.
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• Base theory as in PT1,
• Axioms and rules for truth as in PT1,
• Axioms and rules for each probability function symbol P: 29 Modifies those
from PT1 by now using the alternative rules
–
ϕ
Ppϕq = 1
– If the fixed probabilistic modal structure is such that for all w there
is some v with mAv {w} > 0, then we also have:
Ppϕq = 1
ϕ
• Modified version of Probabilistic Convention T
– ∀ϕ∀a ∈ R(TpPpϕq = rq↔ PpTpϕqq = r)
Here we have replaced the axiom ∀ϕ(|PpTpϕqq− Ppϕq| < 1/n) by ∀ϕ∀a ∈
R(TpPpϕq = rq↔ PpTpϕqq = r). This is in some sense stronger and in another
sense weaker. It is stronger because the approximate equality is replaced by an
exact equality, but weaker because we also need Ppϕq to appear inside of a truth
predicate instead of just being able to state Ppϕq = PpTpϕqq.
We can also consider the theory at the limit stages, which has some nice
features:
Theorem 5.4.4. If we take a revision sequence based on a probabilistic modal
structure with the successor stages
ϕ ∈ Tα+1(w) ⇐⇒ Mα(w) |= ϕ
pα+1(w)(ϕ) = mw{v |Mα(v) |= ϕ}
and limit stages such that:
If T(ϕ) = 1 is nearly stable in 〈Mα(w)〉α<µ then ϕ ∈ Tµ(w)
If r 6 p(ϕ) 6 q is nearly stable in 〈Mα(w)〉α<µ then r 6 pµ(w)(ϕ) 6
q
And Tµ(w) is a maximally consistent set of sentences and pµ(w) a finitely
additive probability30 then:
The axiomatic theory PT′PMS2 is satisfied at all limit ordinals, where PT
′PMS
2
modifies PT′2 by replacing ProvPT1 with ProvPTPMS1 and also dropping Probabilistic
Convention T (unless the limit was designed to satisfy that, for example as given
by BanLim) and the version of Miller’s Principle.
If near stability is replaced with stability, PT′PMS2 will be satisfied at limit
ordinals α+ ω.
We can also add extra axioms in the probabilistic modal structure case
depending on the structure on which the construction is based. For example
principles for introspection or trust. We discuss these in Section 5.4.2.
29 “∀ϕ” is understood as ∀x(SentP,T(x)→ . . .). Quantification into p.q can be made precise
using standard arithmetic means. For further details of a way to do this see Halbach (2014).
30Such as the notions of revision sequences discussed in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3.
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These theories we have given are sound but carry no completeness property.
However, they provide a start to reasoning about the constructions syntactically.
Since we have been working on giving nice limit stages we see that the theory of
the limit stages, as is given in PT′2 and PT
′PMS
2 , are in fact interesting theories.
This is different to the usual revision sequence where the limit stages are not
intended as interpretations for the truth predicate but are instead tools, for
example they don’t have ϕ 6∈ Tµ ⇐⇒ ¬ϕ ∈ Tµ. This alternative focus
might lead to very interesting models arising from these constructions which
was ignored in the usual constructions where the limit condition is designed to
be fairly weak.
5.4.2 Further conditions we could impose
The importance of the construction based on the probabilistic modal structures
is that it allows us to consider different probabilistic modal structures which will
have implications for the interactions between the probabilities. By considering
particular probabilistic modal structures we can add extra axioms.
Introspection
An important class of probabilistic modal structures are the introspective ones.
Strongly introspective frames are the ones where:31
mw{v |mv = mw} = 1
In this construction we should modify the expression of introspection in an
analogous way to as we did in Section 3.4.1.
Proposition 5.4.5. If M is weakly introspective,32 and Mα+1 is given by
ϕ ∈ Tα+1(w) ⇐⇒ Mα |= ϕ
pα+1(w)(ϕ) = mw{v |Mα(v) |= ϕ},
we will have:33
Mα(w) |= TpPpϕq > rq→ PpPpϕq > rq = 1
Mα(w) |= Tp¬Ppϕq > rq→ Pp¬Ppϕq > rq = 1
for all α > 1, and therefore this has probability 1 in the limit probability.
31In the σ-additive case these are called Harsanyi type spaces. For applications of these
spaces, this assumption is often taken for granted.
32At least for agent A. This is a slight weakening of the condition mw{v |mv = mw} = 1.
33Also note that the negative form is much stronger than the version in the Kripkean
construction, Section 3.4.1, because in this theory we have Tp¬ϕq ↔ ¬Tpϕq and Pp¬ϕq =
1 − Ppϕq. Also because of the ability to switch the order of T and P one could equivalently
write these with PpTpϕqq > r or ¬PpTpϕqq > r as antecedents.
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Proof. We will only present the proof for the positive version.
Mα+2(w) |= TpPpϕq > rq
⇐⇒ Mα+1(w) |= Ppϕq > r
⇐⇒ mw{u |Mα(u) |= ϕ} > r
=⇒ mw{v |mv{u |Mα(u) |= ϕ} > r} = 1 M weakly introspective
=⇒ mw{v |Mα+1(v) |= Ppϕq > r} = 1
⇐⇒ Mα+2(w) |= PpPpϕq > rq = 1
The addition of the truth predicate in the expression of introspection pre-
vents the contradiction from arising. We can give an explanation for this as
described in Fig. 5.5.
ϕ?
Tpϕq?
Ppϕq =? TpPpϕq > rq→ PpPpϕq > rq?
ϕ?
ϕ?
Ppϕq =? Ppϕq > r → PpPpϕq > rq?
Figure 5.5: Why introspection formulated this way is consistent
What this is pointing out is that the answer to whether the introspection
version using T is satisfied at Mα+2(w) depends only on the question of at which
u ∈ W , Mα(u) |= ϕ and then the successor definition and the underlying M
do the rest of the work. However, the version not using T depends both on
the question of at which u ∈ W , Mα(u) |= ϕ and where Mα+1(u) |= ϕ. How
these answers relate depends on what ϕ is. But for example if ϕ = Tpψq, then
the answer to whether Mα(u) |= ϕ will be the opposite answer to whether
Mα+1(u) |= ϕ. So these answers need not cohere, and the point where they are
put together in the conditional then might have strange features. In particular
then it does not just depend on the structure of M (and, of course, the successor
definition).
We shall now move to considering the requirement of deference and shall see
the same thing happening.
Reformulating deference
We showed in Section 1.7 that a deference principle
PA(pϕq | pPBpϕq > 1/2q) > 1/2
PA(pϕq | p¬PBpϕq > 1/2q) 6> 1/2
is problematic in a framework where there are self-referential probabilities.
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But using our considerations as for introspection we can find an alternative
version of these principles which is consistent by using the truth predicate.
Proposition 5.4.6. The following are consistent:
• P is probabilistic over a base theory of arithmetic, or more generally PTPMS1
holds
• Trust formulated with a T predicate:
– ∀ϕ∀a ∈ R(PA(pPBpϕq > aq) > 0→ PA(pTpϕqq |pPBpϕq > aq) > a)
– ∀ϕ∀a ∈ R(PA(p¬PBpϕq > aq) > 0 → ¬PA(pTpϕqq | p¬PBpϕq >
aq) > a)
– And similarly for =, >,<,6 and also intervals like a < PBpϕq 6 b.
Proof. One can show that in a frame where mAw{v |mBv = mAw} = 1, we have
for n > 1
Mα(w) |= PApTpϕqq = r → PApPBpϕq = rq = 1
and the deference principles we require are consequences of this.
In fact, deference formulated with a truth predicate, in the setting where we
formulate P as a function symbol is satisfied in exactly the frames where the
operator variants without T are satisfied. Though I am currently unaware of
the frame condition for deference, this would be a result analogous to Proposi-
tion 2.3.2.
As for the case of introspection, the explination for why this does not lead
to contradiction can be summed up in Fig. 5.6:
ϕ?
Tpϕq?
PBpϕq =? PA(pTpϕqq | pPBpϕq > rq) =?
ϕ?
ϕ?
PBpϕq =?
PA(pϕq | pPBpϕq > rq) =?
Figure 5.6: Why deference formulated this way is consistent
5.5 Conclusion
We have presented a number of possibilities for how to define a revision sequence
to also account for probability. We were interested in giving a limit criterion
which leads to nice limit stages, so we presented a criterion which gives as
much as possible in the limit stages in the sense that we consider as many
properties of the extensions of T and P as possible. We gave two different
ways that the successor probabilities can be determined, the first was to take
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relative frequencies over the previous stages, the second is to use additional
structure in the background. Both of these constructions are interesting in
their own right. The former style of revision sequence has that the feature that
the probability notion now tells us useful extra information about truth and
other logical facts. For example in those sequence one will always have that
pµ(λ) = 1/2. The second style of revision sequence, however, can apply to our
everyday use of probabilities as one can allow for varying interpretations of the
probability notion. Though we have not come to definite conclusions in this
chapter we have demonstrated that there are lots of possibilities for revision
theories of truth and probability and we hope that these may lead to valuable
insights into the concept of probability as it applies in expressively rich settings.
In this chapter we have presented a new limit stage definition that is different
from traditional revision sequences. We have been able to propose such a limit
stage because the notion that we are trying to determine is probability, which
takes values in the real numbers. In the revision theory we are interested in
what is brought about by the stages beneath some limit stage. Since for truth
there are only two truth values, the only features that can be brought about is
to end up being equal to one of these truth values. Now that we instead have
the real numbers to provide values, we might instead have that the probability
of a sentence converges to some value and then use this information to let the
limit probability be the limit of these values. This motivated us to consider
generalising the notion of the limit stage. We were then naturally lead to fur-
ther generalisations by considering even more properties, for example also those
stating relationships between different sentences. The same advantages may be
had with something like fuzzy truth which would also have a domain of R, but
the application to probability is interesting because of the usefulness of proba-
bility. We can also take insights from this construction and focus just on how
truth is revised. In our revision sequences, equivalences of liars were respected
at limits, which is an interesting property that hasn’t previously been studied.
Appendix 5.A Definition of closed
Here we will prove the result from Proposition 5.2.5. However, we will state
it in the more general way where the language may be uncountable, typically
because it would then have constants for all real numbers. Then one would need
to work with an alternative syntax coding, but the details of this won’t matter
for our purposes.
Proposition 5.A.1. Suppose C ⊆ Mod depends on only countably many sen-
tences, i.e. There is some countable collection of sentences {ϕn}n∈N such that
if for all n, p(ϕn) = p
′(ϕn) and ϕn ∈ T ↔ ϕn ∈ T′, then (M, p,T) ∈ C ⇐⇒
(M, p′,T′) ∈ C.
Then the following are equivalent:
1. C ⊆ Mod is closed
2. For every sequence (M,pn,Tn) and each (M,plim,Tlim) such that (M,pn,Tn) −→
(M,plim,Tlim), i.e.
• for every ϕ pn(ϕ) −→ plim(ϕ)34
34I.e. for all ε ∈ R>0, there is some m ∈ N such that for all n > m, |pn(ϕ)− plim(ϕ)| < ε.
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• for every ϕ there is some m ∈ N such that either
– for every n > m, ϕ ∈ Tn and ϕ ∈ Tlim, or
– for every n > m, ϕ /∈ Tn and ϕ /∈ Tlim.
If each (M,pn,Tn) ∈ C, then (M,plim,Tlim) ∈ C.
Proof. For Item 1 =⇒ Item 2 work by induction on the definition of being
closed, observing that all members of the subbase have this property, and the
inductive definition steps respect the property.
For Item 2 =⇒ Item 1: Suppose C only depends on {ϕn} and Item 2 is
satisfied. Define
Mod {ϕn}:=
⋂
{M ∈ Mod | ∀ψ /∈ {ϕn}, ψ /∈ T and p(ψ) = 0}
and endow it with the subspace topology. Observe that this is topologically
equivalent to ModL × R{ϕn} × {0, 1}{ϕn} with the product topology (where
ModL has the discrete topology). So it is first countable and therefore sequen-
tial. By the assumption that Item 2 is satisfied we have that C is sequentially
closed in Mod {ϕn} and therefore that it is closed in the topology on Mod {ϕn}.
Since Mod {ϕn} is a closed subset of Mod we have that C is closed in Mod
too.
Appendix 5.B Proof that there are infinitely many
choices at limit stages
In this section we include the proof of Theorem 5.2.18.
Lemma 5.B.1. Let 〈(M,Tα,pα)〉α<µ = 〈Mα〉α<µ be any µ-length sequence of
members of Mod. Suppose A is a closed set that is nearly cofinal beneath µ in
〈Mα〉α<µ i.e. such that Mod \ A is not nearly stable beneath µ. Then we can
find some (M,Tµ,pµ) =Mµ ∈ A such that:
Whenever C is a closed property that is nearly stable in 〈Mα〉α<µ then
Mµ ∈ C.
This is just a slight generalisation of Theorem 5.2.11. It can be proved by
choosing some α > max{βi | i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} and k > max{N iα | i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}
whereMα+k ∈ A since therefore this is in A∩C1∩ . . .∩Cn, and so A∩
⋂
C 6= ∅.
Proof. Let
C := {C closed | C is nearly stable beneath µ in 〈Mα〉α<µ}
We will show that C ∪ {A} has the finite intersection property. We will then
be able to deduce that ⋂
(C ∪ {A}) 6= ∅
which suffices to prove the theorem since taking some Mµ ∈
⋂
(C ∪ {A}) will
be as required. Note that this suffices because {(M′,T,p) ∈ Mod |M′ = M} is
closed.
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Let D be finite ⊆ C ∪ {A}. Enumerate the members of D so that D ∪ {A} =
{C1, . . . , Cm, A}.35
We know that for each i = 1, . . . , n
∃βi < µ ∀α<µ>βi ∃N
i
α < ω ∀n<ω>Niα Mα+n ∈ Ci
Therefore for each α > max{βi | i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} and k > max{N iα | i ∈
{1, . . . ,m}}
Mα+k ∈ C1 ∩ . . . ∩ Cm
Mod \A is not nearly stable beneath µ in 〈Mα〉α<µ, so:
∀β < µ ∃α<µ>β ∀Nα < ω ∃n
<ω
>Nα
Mα+n ∈ A
Therefore there is some α with µ > α > max{βi | i ∈ {1, . . . n}} and n with
ω > n > max{N iα | i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} which is such that Mα+n ∈ A. By the
previous observation this will also be a member of C1 ∩ . . . ∩ Cm.
So we can see that
⋂
(D ∪ {A}) =
⋂
{C1, . . . , Cm, A} 6= ∅, so
⋂
D 6= ∅.
We have therefore shown that C ∪ {A} has the finite intersection property, as
required.
Lemma 5.B.2. Let 〈Mα〉α<µ be any µ-length initial sequence of a revision
sequence in the sense of Definition 5.2.8. Consider δ ↔ (Ppδq 6 0.4 ∨ (0.4 <
Ppδq < 0.6 ∧ Tpδq)), as in In an interval from Example 5.2.9. We see that
for every M and m < M
0.4 + 0.2 · m
M
6 Ppδq 6 0.4 + 0.2 · m+ 1
M
has its complement not nearly stable beneath µ.
Proof. We prove this by a series of lemmas.
Lemma 5.B.3. For every ϕ, µ and n:
pµ+n+1(ϕ) = pµ+n(ϕ) +
JϕKMµ+n − pµ+n(ϕ)
n+ 1
So, if JϕKMµ+n = 1 then pµ+n+1(ϕ) > pµ+n(ϕ), otherwise pµ+n+1(ϕ) 6
pµ+n(ϕ)
Proof. Simple manipulation:
pµ+n+1(ϕ) =
JϕKMµ + . . .+ JϕKMµ+n−1 + JϕKMµ+n
n+ 1
=
n · JϕKMµ+...+JϕKMµ+n−1n + JϕKMµ+n
n+ 1
=
n · pµ+n(ϕ) + JϕKMµ+n
n+ 1
=
(n+ 1)pµ+n(ϕ)− pµ+n(ϕ) + JϕKMµ+n
n+ 1
= pµ+n(ϕ) +
JϕKMµ+n − pµ+n(ϕ)
n+ 1
35We shall show that
⋂
(D ∪ {A}) 6= ∅ so we do not have to deal with the separate cases
where A ∈ D and A /∈ D.
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Lemma 5.B.4. For each M and N < ω we can pick ω > k > N where for
every n > k, |pα+n(δ)− pα+n+1(δ)| 6 0.2M
Proof. |pα+n(δ)− pα+n+1(δ)| 6 max{| 1−pµ+n(δ)n+1 |, |−
pµ+n(δ)
n+1 |} 6
1
n+1 .
By picking k > max{5M,N}, we have |pα+n(δ)− pα+n+1(δ)| 6 15M+1 6
0.2
M ,
as required.
Lemma 5.B.5. For each α < µ and N < ω we can pick ω > n > N where
pα+n 6 0.4 and ω > n′ > N where pα+n > 0.6.
Proof. Suppose JδKMα+N = 1. Then pα+N (δ) < 0.6 by the definition of
δ. So the probability of δ will keep increasing until we reach an n where
pα+n(δ) > 0.6. For each k with pα+N+k(δ) < 0.6, pα+N+k(δ) =
Npα+N (δ)+k
N+k .
This can be proved by induction on k: Base case k = 0 is clear. For k+ 1, if
pα+N+k+1(δ) < 0.6 then:
pα+N+k+1+1(δ) = pα+N+k+1(δ) +
1− pα+N+k+1(δ)
N + k + 1
=
Npα+N (δ) + k
N + k
+
1− Npα+N (δ)+kN+k
N + k + 1
=
(N + k + 1)(Npα+N (δ) + k) + (N + k)− (Npα+N (δ) + k)
(N + k)(N + k + 1)
=
(N + k)(Npα+N (δ) + k) + (N + k)
(N + k)(N + k + 1)
=
Npα+N (δ) + k + 1
N + k + 1
Now Npα+N (δ)+2NN+2N >
2N
3N > 0.6, so there will be some k 6 2N with pα+N+k(δ) >
0.6.
Now suppose JδKMα+N = 0. We apply analogous reasoning to show that
while pα+N+k(δ) > 0.4, pα+N+k(δ) =
Npα+N (δ)
N+k , and see that
Npα+N (δ)
N+2N 6
N
3N 6 0.4.
If JδKMα+N = 1 we have found our k > N where pα+N+k 6 0.4 so we
can take n = N + k, then use the second argument with N ′ = N + k to find
0 < k′ 6 2N ′ where pα+N ′+k′ > 0.6, so can take n = N ′+k′. If JδKMα+N = 0
we do the process the other way around, first finding one with high enough
probability then one with low enough.
Corollary 5.B.6. For any α < µ and N , and M we can pick n > N so that
0.4 + 0.2 · m
M
6 pα+n(δ) 6 0.4 + 0.2 ·
m+ 1
M
Proof. Choose k where for each n > k, |pα+n(δ) − pα+n+1(δ)| 6 0.2M using
Lemma 5.B.4 Choose k′ > k with pα+k(δ) 6 0.4 using Lemma 5.B.536 and
k′′ > k with pα+k′′ > 0.6 again using Lemma 5.B.5.
36The previous lemmas were stated for µ and this one for arbitrary α, so if α is a successor
ordinal apply Lemma 5.B.5 to find n > N+kα such that pζα+n(δ) 6 0.4 and take k
′ = n−kα.
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pα+k′(δ) 6 0.4 and pα+k′′(δ) > 0.6 and the probability values move from 0.4
to 0.6 in small enough jumps (because k′ > k), the probability values must
lie within each 1/M-sized interval between 0.4 and 0.6. More carefully we can
argue as follows:
Prove by induction on n0 that for all n0 > k′, if there is no n with k′ 6 n 6 n0
such that 0.4 + 0.2 · mM 6 pα+n(δ) 6 0.4 + 0.2 ·
m+1
M then for every n with
k′ 6 n 6 n0, pα+n(δ) 6 0.4 + 0.2 · mM .
For n0 = k
′ the result is clear.
Suppose there is no n such that k′ 6 n 6 n0 + 1 and 0.4 + 0.2 · mM 6
pα+n(δ) 6 0.4 + 0.2 · m+1M . Then by the induction hypothesis for every
n with pα+n0(δ) 6 0.4 + 0.2 · mM , so since |pα+n0(δ) − pα+n0+1(δ)| 6
0.2
M ,
pα+n0+1(δ) 6 pα+n0(δ)+
0.2
M 6 0.4+0.2 ·
m+1
M . Since we assumed that n0 +1
does not have the property that 0.4 + 0.2 · mM 6 pα+n(δ) 6 0.4 + 0.2 ·
m+1
M ,
it must be that pα+n0(δ) < 0.4 + 0.2 · mM .
Now since we know that there is a k′′ where pα+k′ > 0.6, we have for each
m < M this k′ is such that pα+k′ > 0.4 + 0.2 · mM . And therefore there is
an n with k′ 6 n 6 k′′ such that 0.4 + 0.2 · mM 6 pα+n(δ) 6 0.4 + 0.2 ·
m+1
M
by using the contrapositive of what we just proved by induction. This is as
required.
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Part II
Rationality Requirements

Chapter 6
Introduction
In this second part of the thesis we will turn to a different, but related, question:
What rationality requirements are there on agents in such expressively
rich frameworks?
and, relatedly:
To what degree should an agent believe a sentence that says something
about her own degrees of belief?
In Part I we developed semantics for frameworks that involve such self-
referential sentences, but in this part we consider how traditional arguments
for rational requirements on agents, such as probabilism, apply when such self-
referential sentences are around. In this we are therefore focusing on the partic-
ular interpretation of probability as subjective probability, or degrees of belief
of an agent.
6.1 The question to answer
There has been a large body of work trying to develop justifications for particular
rationality constraints on agents, particularly focused on justifying probabilism.
There are two main influential styles of argument: an argument from accuracy,
initially presented in Joyce (1998), and a so-called Dutch book argument, origi-
nating from Ramsey (1931). The argument from accuracy says an agent should
have credences that are as accurate as possible. The Dutch book argument says
that agents should have credences which, if they bet in accordance with these
credences, will not lead them to a guaranteed loss of money. It is not yet clear
that the semantics that we have proposed can model agents who are doing best
from an accuracy or Dutch book point of view. This is the question that we
turn to in this part of the thesis.
Michael Caie has recently argued (Caie, 2013) that accuracy and Dutch book
criteria need to be modified if there are self-referential probabilities, and that
appropriately modified they in fact lead to the requirement that a rational agent
must have degrees of belief which are not probabilistic and which are also not
representable in any of the semantics we have proposed in Part I. If it turned
out that Caie’s suggested modifications of the criteria were correct, then this
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would be a blow to our proposed semantics. Perhaps the appropriate response
in that case would be to admit that our semantics are unable to model rational
agents, so the notion of probability embedded in these semantics could not be
interpreted as subjective probability.
Caie’s suggested modification of the accuracy criterion is that we should
consider the inaccuracy of the act of coming to occupy a credal state c, analysing
this in a decision-theoretic manner. To do this we only care about the inaccuracy
of a credal state at the world which would be actual if the agent had those
credences. In cases where we have sentences where having some attitude towards
them can affect their truth value, it turns out that this then differs from the
traditional accuracy criterion.
In Chapter 7 we will consider Caie’s suggested modification and we will
show a number of undesirable consequences of it. These will give us more mo-
tivation to consider rejecting his modification and instead consider something
analogous to the usual accuracy criterion. This leaves open the possibility that
accuracy considerations do in fact support the semantics we provided in Part I,
and in Section 7.3.2 we will show that one way of understanding the accuracy
criterion does in fact lead to the semantics developed. In doing this we will
still need some additional generalisations and considerations in formulating the
accuracy criterion because the semantics we developed, at least in Chapters 3
and 4, dropped certain assumptions implicit in the traditional accuracy crite-
rion by dropping classical logic and the assumption that credences assign single
real numbers to each sentence. We will briefly consider how one might apply
these considerations in such a setting in Section 7.3.4. This connects to work
by J. Robert G. Williams (2012b; 2014) on non-classical probabilities. In the
semantics developed in those chapters we were able to find fixed points, which
in Chapter 4 we called stable states. It will turn out that for the way we suggest
to formulate the rational constraints in Section 7.3.4, these will be exactly the
credences that are immodest, or look the best from their own perspective, so
these are desirable credal states.
In Chapter 8 we will consider the Dutch book argument and will work with
the assumption that an agent in such a situation does bet in accordance with
her credences, and under that assumption try to develop a Dutch book criterion
which is applicable in a wide range of circumstances. In developing this criterion
we are expanding a suggestion from Caie (2013). We will show that the proposal
that we finally settle on is in fact a version of the modified accuracy criterion
that we considered in Chapter 7. It therefore inherits a number of undesirable
characteristics. This will therefore lend more weight to our proposal to in fact
reject this criterion by rejecting the assumption that an agent bet with her
credences.
One problem before we can even get started with considering these argu-
ments is what the worlds at stake are. Both the accuracy and Dutch book
arguments, at least as traditionally formulated, refer to the notion of a collec-
tion of possible worlds. The accuracy criterion can be formulated as: A credal
state is irrational if there is some alternative credal state which is more accurate
whatever the world is like. The Dutch book criterion can be formulated as: A
credal state is irrational if there is a bet that the agent would be willing to ac-
cept but will lead her to a loss whatever the world is like. Caie already suggests
that we should not consider any way the world would be like, but only those
that are consistent with her having the considered credences. But there is also a
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more fundamental worry: what could the world be like? Surely that’s governed
by a semantics, so we would need to determine a semantics before we can even
discuss these arguments. However, in the very simple case that Caie considers,
such an analysis of a potential semantics is not a prerequisite for discussing
the arguments. In Caie’s analysis he assumes that agents assign point-valued
degrees of belief to each sentence and that the background semantics is classi-
cal. In the cases that he considers, the agent’s beliefs in empirical matters are
irrelevant, so we can also consider the agents as omniscient. Furthermore he
considers the agent to be introspective. In the possible worlds framework we
can see that he is considering the trivial probabilistic modal structure Momn.
So he considers situations where if the agent’s (A’s) credences are c, then c is
the correct interpretation of PA in the object language, and the agent is her-
self aware of this. So for his considerations we do not need a more developed
semantics.
However, when the assumptions of introspection and omniscience are dropped
then we need to do something else. For example we will then consider the agents
as modelled by other probabilistic modal structures and determine what their
degrees of belief should be like. This will then be closely related to the revision
semantics considered in Chapter 5 and will be discussed in Section 7.3.3. In
Section 7.3.4 we will also consider dropping the assumption that an agent have
point-valued probabilities and that the background logic is classical.
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In this part of the thesis we will work with LP, for L any language extending
LPA,ROCF, which formalises the probability notion as a function symbol. How-
ever, these details of the language will not be important for our discussion. For
example in Theorem 7.1.11 we will consider a more expressive language.
We will be judging an agent’s credal state by looking at a specific “agendas”,
or collections of sentences that we are interested in.
Definition 6.2.1. An agenda, A, is some collection of sentences. I.e. A ⊆
SentP.
We will typically fix an agenda and judge the agent’s rationality just by
considering her credences in the sentences in that agenda. This is ideally used
as a tool to give us some sentences to focus on.1 Unless otherwise stated, an
agenda will be assumed to be finite.
We will use ϕ as a metavariable for arbitrary sentences, and δ for a metavari-
able for sentences of the form:
δ ↔ ‘ the agent’s credences, c, are ∈ R ’
Note, here the quote marks are scare-quotes. One would replace that part of
the sentence with some sentence in the formal language describing the fact that
1We would want a result to show that this focusing on agendas is not important in the
following sense:
Desired Theorem 6.2.2. If an agent is rational judged with respect to agenda A, then she
is rational when judged with respect to agenda A′ ⊆ A.
In fact all the rationality criteria which we consider do satisfy this theorem.
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her credences satisfy the relevant constraint. E.g. Ppϕ0q > 1/2. Throughout
this section we will often just state a biconditional to characterise the sentence.
We will be assuming that this biconditional is derivable in PA.2 δ is the sort of
sentence we would obtain by the diagonal lemma, so it might be e.g.
δ ↔ ¬Ppδq > 1/2
though this special case of δ is called π. Or,
δ ↔ (Ppδq 6 0.5 ∨ (Ppδq 6 0.55 ∧ Pp¬δq > 0.2)).
An agent’s credences is a function assigning to each sentence (in A) a real
number.
Definition 6.2.3. The agent’s possible credence functions are given by CredsSentP .
These are all functions from SentP to [0, 1].
Her possible credence functions, restricted to an agenda A, are given by
CredsA, which consists of all functions from A to [0, 1].
Here we are making the assumption that an agent always assigns credences
in the unit interval3. That is an assumption we will consider dropping in Sec-
tion 7.2.3. It will turn out that this assumption is substantial if we accept
Caie’s suggested modification of the accuracy considerations as it will then not
be justified by accuracy considerations.
As discussed in the introduction, we are here assuming that if the agent’s
credences are c then c is the correct interpretation of P and the agent is herself
aware of this.4We will also only consider agendas where a choice of an agent’s
credences (in sentences in the agenda) determine all truths of sentences in that
agenda. These will be called self-ref agendas.
Definition 6.2.4. A ⊆ SentP is a self-ref agenda if:
For all c, c′ ∈ CredsSentP , and Mc,Mc′ ∈ Mod
PA,ROCF
LP , such that for any
ϕ ∈ A,
Mc |= Ppϕq = r ⇐⇒ r = c(ϕ)
and Mc′ |= Ppϕq = r ⇐⇒ r = c′(ϕ)
we have:
∀ϕ ∈ A, (c(ϕ) = c′(ϕ)) =⇒ ∀ϕ ∈ A, (JϕKMc = JϕKMc′ )
There are two important features of a self-ref agenda. The first is that they
don’t contain any sentences whose truth is determined by empirical matters,
2We could take it to be in some other sense necessary by altering ModPA,ROCFLP
to some other
set of models which satisfies the biconditional. That then may help us to model situations
like Alice’s promotion by just imposing that all considered situations, or worlds, satisfy the
relevant biconditional Promotion↔ ¬PAlicepPromotionq > 1/2.
3= [0, 1] = {r ∈ R | 0 6 r 6 1}.
4This is basically assuming that the probabilistic modal structure representing her is in-
trospective. Due to the challenges with introspection and probabilism these are the cases in
which we’ll have a problem. However, in this thesis we have been focusing on not simply re-
jecting assumptions like introspection but to see how to deal with them in the self-referential
framework, and this methodology we will continue with here.
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the truth of all sentences can only depend on the interpretation of P. Secondly
they have a fullness component: if a sentence is in the agenda and it refers to
the probability of some other sentences, then these other sentences must also
be in the agenda.
In Chapters 7 and 8 we will only consider self-ref agendas. We are therefore
uninterested in the agent’s uncertainty about anything whose truth isn’t depen-
dent on her own credences, e.g. we are not interested in her degree of belief in
Heads.
For example the following are self-ref agendas
Example 6.2.5. • Consider π ↔ ¬Ppπq > 1/2. {π} is itself a self-ref
agenda, and so is {π,¬π}, and also {π,¬π,> ∨ π, π ∧ π,⊥}. However,
{π,Heads} is not.
• Let δ ↔ (Ppδq < 1/2 ∨ Pp¬δq > 1/2)). Then a self-ref agenda including δ
would also need to include ¬δ. In fact {δ,¬δ} is a self-ref agenda.
• Let δ ↔ Ppδ′q = 1 and δ′ ↔ Ppδq > 0. Then {δ, δ′} is a self-ref agenda.
• Let δ ↔ PpPpδq > 1/2q = 1. Then a self-ref agenda including δ would also
need to include Ppδq > 1/2. In fact {δ,Ppδq > 1/2} is a self-ref agenda.
An agent’s credences are judged with respect to something. It is quite com-
mon in talking about rational requirements to use the term “world” to refer to
the matters which make sentences true and false. And it is such worlds with re-
spect to which the agent’s credences are judged. In Part I of this thesis we were
using “worlds”, or “w” to refer to objects in our probabilistic modal structures.
In this part of the thesis we will use sans-serif “ w” to give truth values of the
relevant sentences in A. This is essentially some model, M, restricted just to
A.
Definition 6.2.6. Let A be any agenda. For M ∈ ModLP , define M A be a
function from A to {0, 1} by
MA (ϕ) := JϕKM =
{
1 M |= ϕ
0 otherwise
.
Define:
WorldsA := {MA | M ∈ ModPA,ROCFLP }.
We use w as a metavariable for a member of WorldsA.
Definition 6.2.7. IfA is a self-ref agenda where WorldsA has just two members,
one where δ is true, and one where δ is false, we may also use the notation wδ
and w¬δ to refer to these. In that case we say that A is a δ-agenda.
Equivalently, A is a δ-agenda iff it is a self-ref agenda and for every ϕ ∈ A
PA `
((δ → ϕ) ∨ (δ → ¬ϕ))
∧ ((¬δ → ϕ) ∨ (¬δ → ¬ϕ))
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For example all the examples of self-ref agendas involving π above were π-
agendas. For any δ, if {δ,¬δ} is a self-ref agenda then it is also a δ-agenda. But
for δ ↔ PpPpδq > 1/2q = 1, there are no δ-agendas.5
Note that all δ-agendas are self-ref agendas by definition.
As mentioned in the introduction, Caie’s proposal is that one should not
judge an agent’s credal state with respect to all worlds, but only those that are
consistent with the agent having the considered credences. In the case of self-ref
agendas, a choice of credal state determines the truths of sentences and so the
world at stake. We therefore define wc to refer to this the world that would be
actual if the agent had the credences c.
Definition 6.2.8. Let A be a self-ref agenda. Suppose c ∈ CredsA. Define
wc =Mc A, where Mc ∈ ModPA,ROCFLP is such that for any ϕ ∈ A,
6
Mc |= Ppϕq = r ⇐⇒ r = c(ϕ)
If A is a δ-agenda, we have some R ⊆ CredsA such that
δ ↔ ‘ c ∈ R ’.
This could be done by defining R = {c | wc = wδ}.
For a δ-agenda we can represent this situation diagrammatically.
Example 6.2.9. The situation for π (where π ↔ ¬Ppπq > 1/2) with A =
{π,¬π} can be represented as in Fig. 6.1. The agent’s credence can be repre-
sented by some point in the square [0, 1]2. If the agent’s credence is represented
by a point in the shaded region then π. Otherwise π is false.
Note that this image is 2-dimensional because A just contains two sentences.
Generally δ-agendas may contain arbitrarily many sentences then the corre-
sponding “diagram” would be an n-dimensional one.
5 A self-ref agenda must involve Ppδq > 1/2. Consider M,M′ ∈ ModPA,ROCFLP given by the
two interpretations of P, c and c′ respectively:
c(Ppδq > 1/2) = 1, c(δ) = 1,
c′(Ppδq > 1/2) = 1, c′(δ) = 0.
And observe that
M |= δ since M |= PpPpδq > 1/2q = 1
M |= Ppδq > 1/2
M′ |= δ since M′ |= PpPpδq > 1/2q = 1
M′ |= ¬Ppδq > 1/2
So
PA 6` (δ → Ppδq > 1/2) ∨ (δ → ¬Ppδq > 1/2)
6Note that the choice of Mc doesn’t matter because we have assumed that A is a self-ref
agenda.
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c(¬π)
c(π)
w¬π
wπ
10
1
0
Figure 6.1: A diagram representing the agent’s possible credences in π and ¬π
(restricted to those in [0, 1]2). The shaded area is the region where if the agent’s
credences are in that region then π is true.
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Chapter 7
Accuracy
The accuracy argument assumes that the epistemic goal of an agent is to max-
imise the accuracy of their credences. This style of rational constraint was
proposed in Joyce (1998).
Rationality Criterion 1 (Usual Accuracy Criterion). An agent is irrational
if she has a credal state b which is dominated in accuracy.
I.e. b ∈ CredsA is irrational if there is some c ∈ CredsA such that for all
w ∈WorldsA,
I(c,w) < I(b,w).
There are in fact different variations of this criterion, but these won’t in fact
affect us much. A good overview can be found in Pettigrew (ms).
This requirement refers to some inaccuracy measure, or I.
Definition 7.0.10. An inaccuracy measure, I, is some function
I :
⋃
A is a
finite agenda
(CredsA ×WorldsA)→ [0,∞].
Since we only work with finite agendas here, we do not need to assume that
I is defined on infinite agendas. A common choice of an inaccuracy measure is
the Brier score:
Definition 7.0.11. For A = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} the Brier score (BS) is such that:
BS(c,w) :=
n∑
i=1
1
n
· (c(ϕi)− w(ϕi))2
A wide class of inaccuracy measures in fact lead to the same rationality
requirement according to Usual Accuracy Criterion: that an agent should be
probabilistic.
7.1 Caie’s decision-theoretic understanding
7.1.1 The criterion
Caie (2013) argued that when one works with frameworks that have sentences
whose truth depends on the probability they are assigned, one should only
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consider the accuracy of an agent’s credences at worlds where the agent has
those credences. This would be the natural way of understanding the criterion
in a decision theoretic manner and considering the utility of the act of coming
to occupy some credal state.
Rationality Criterion 2 (Minimize Self-Inaccuracy). Let A be a self-ref agenda.
An agent should minimize
SelfInaccI(c) := I(c,wc)
When I is clear from context we will drop the reference to it.
For A a δ-agenda, with δ ↔ ‘ c ∈ R ’ this is:
SelfInaccI(c) =
{
I(c,wδ) c ∈ R
I(c,w¬δ) c /∈ R
Consider the following example as discussed in Caie (2013).
Example 7.1.1. Consider π ↔ ¬Ppπq > 1/2 and A = {π,¬π}. As before we
can represent π diagrammatically. But we can also include in this diagram some
additional information about how the accuracy is measured.
If we consider some c in the grey region, then if the agent has those credences
then wπ would be actual, i.e. wc = wπ. For such points we should consider
I(c,wπ). If I is truth-directed this can be considered as some (generalised)
notion of distance from that point to wπ. And similarly if we pick some point in
the unshaded region to be the agent’s credences, then the inaccuracy is measured
from that point to w¬π.
For inaccuracy measured by the Brier score, the minimum such distance is
obtained at the point 〈1/2, 1〉, i.e. credences where c(π) = 1/2 and c(¬π) = 1.
c(¬π)
c(π)
w¬π
wπ
10
1
0
Figure 7.1: Measuring the accuracy for π
As Caie discusses, this criterion leads to the rejection of probabilism, at least
when the Brier score is used, since it leads to a rational requirement to have
credences c(π) = 1/2 and c(¬π) = 1, a credal state that is not probabilistic.
We will now present some results which allow us to generally determine
when a credal state is rationally required according to this criterion. This will
allow us to then show that the criterion is very flexible and some undesirable
consequences of this flexibility.
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7.1.2 When b minimizes SelfInacc
Definition 7.1.2. Fix A a self-ref agenda. Let b ∈ CredsA and w ∈ WorldsA.
Define
MoreAccIb (w) := {c ∈ CredsA | I(c,w) < SelfInacc(b)}
wMoreAccIb (w) := {c ∈ CredsA | I(c,w) 6 SelfInacc(b)}
and for r ∈ R define:
MoreAccIr (w) := {c ∈ CredsA | I(c,w) < r}
wMoreAccIr (w) := {c ∈ CredsA | I(c,w) 6 r}
When I is clear from context we will drop the reference to it.
Later we will consider Is which satisfy Extensionality, and in such a case
we can also use the versions with r without first picking A.
For an example of MoreAccBSb (w) consider Fig. 7.2.
MoreAccBSb (w¬δ)
MoreAccBSb (wδ)
b
c(¬δ)
c(δ)
w¬δ
wδ
10
1
0
Figure 7.2: An example of MoreAccBSb (w)
wMoreAccBSb (w) would also include the edge.
The following is a trivial observation:
Proposition 7.1.3. Let A be a self-ref agenda.
SelfInacc(c) > SelfInacc(b) ⇐⇒ c /∈ MoreAccb(wc)
SelfInacc(c) > SelfInacc(b) ⇐⇒ c /∈ wMoreAccb(wc)
Which immediately implies:
Proposition 7.1.4. Let A be a self-ref agenda.
SelfInacc is minimised (possibly non-uniquely) at b iff
for all c ∈ CredsA, c /∈ MoreAccb(wc)
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SelfInacc is minimised uniquely at b iff
for all c ∈ CredsA \ {b}, c /∈ wMoreAccb(wc)
In the case where A is a δ-agenda we have a further characterisation of when
a credal state minimizes SelfInacc:
Proposition 7.1.5. Let A be a δ-agenda, and let R = {c ∈ CredsA |wc = wδ}.1
SelfInacc is minimised (possibly non-uniquely) at b iff
R ∩MoreAccb(wδ) = ∅
and R ⊇ MoreAccb(w¬δ).
SelfInacc is minimised uniquely at b iff
R ∩ wMoreAccb(wδ) ⊆ {b}
and R ⊇ wMoreAccb(w¬δ) \ {b}
To get an idea of why this is, fix the Brier score and consider the example
in Fig. 7.2. In this diagram the point labelled b minimizes SelfInacc uniquely.
This is because: for there to be a point in R that has smaller SelfInacc than b, it
would have to lie in region labelled MoreAccb(wδ), and one not in R would have
to be in MoreAccb(w¬δ). The points which have the same SelfInacc as b would
either lie on the dotted edge of MoreAccb(wδ) and be in R or lie on the dotted
edge of MoreAccb(w¬δ) and lie outside R. The general proof of the result just
states this argument in a more general way.
Proof. By Proposition 7.1.4, b minimizes SelfInacc (possibly non-uniquely) iff
for all c ∈ CredsA,
c ∈ R and c /∈ MoreAccb(wδ)
or c /∈ R and c /∈ MoreAccb(w¬δ)
This holds iff
R ∩MoreAccb(wδ) = ∅
and R ⊇ MoreAccb(w¬δ).
Also by Proposition 7.1.4, b minimizes SelfInacc uniquely iff
for all c ∈ CredsA with c 6= b,
c ∈ R and c /∈ wMoreAccb(wδ)
or c /∈ R and c /∈ wMoreAccb(w¬δ)
This holds iff
R ∩ wMoreAccb(wδ) ⊆ {b}
and R ⊇ wMoreAccb(w¬δ) \ {b}
As a direct consequence of this we have the following:
1So we have δ ↔ ‘ c ∈ R ’.
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Proposition 7.1.6. If SelfInacc is minimised (possibly non-uniquely) at b, then
MoreAccb(wδ) ∩MoreAccb(w¬δ) = ∅
If SelfInacc is minimized uniquely at b then
wMoreAccb(wδ) ∩ wMoreAccb(w¬δ) ⊆ {b}
We will also show that if we impose an extra constraint on I we can get
something like a converse of this result. That will allow us to show that the
Minimize Self-Inaccuracy is in fact a very flexible criterion.
7.1.3 The flexibility
For this result, we need to make some minimal assumptions on the inaccuracy
measure I.
Definition 7.1.7. I satisfies Extensionality iff:
Suppose A = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} and A′ = {ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ′n} are self-ref agendas. Sup-
pose c ∈ CredsA and c′ ∈ CredsA′ are such that
for all i, c(ϕi) = c
′(ϕ′i)
And w and w′ are such that
for all i, w(ϕi) = w
′(ϕ′i)
Then
I(c,w) = I(c′,w′).
This says that I does not depend on the particular sentence, it only depends
on the multiset:2
{〈c(ϕ),w(ϕ)〉 | ϕ ∈ A}.
Proposition 7.1.8. If I satisfies Extensionality then there is some d :
⋃
n(Rn×
{0, 1}n)→ R such that for c ∈ CredsA,w ∈WorldsA,3
I(c,w) = dI(〈c(ϕ1), . . . , c(ϕn)〉, 〈w(ϕ1), . . . ,w(ϕn)〉).
It might, however, fail to satisfy Normality, which says that the inaccuracy
score is a function of |c(ϕ) − w(ϕ)|, because an inaccuracy function satisfying
Extensionality may still care about closeness to truth more than it cares about
closeness to falsity. However most natural functions satisfying Extensionality
will also satisfy Normality.
Once we have assumed that I satisfies Extensionality we can consider the
inaccuracy of a credal state just by considering it as a point in R2 and forgetting
which agenda it is associated with.
2Which is unordered but may contain repetitions.
3In fact it also cannot depend on the ordering simply because we assumed that A was
unordered.
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Definition 7.1.9. Suppose I satisfies Extensionality. Suppose x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈
Rn. Consider a δ-agenda A = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}.4
Then we can let
I(x,wposn )
be equal to I(c,wδ) where c(ϕi) = xi. Similarly
I(x,wnegn )
be equal to I(c,w¬δ) for such c.
Proposition 7.1.10. Suppose I satisfies Extensionality. For any δ-agenda,
A = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn},
I(c,wδ) = I(xc,wposn )
I(c,w¬δ) = I(xc,wnegn )
for xc := 〈c(ϕ1), . . . , c(ϕn)〉.
If we assume that enough regions are definable in the language and Exten-
sionality is satisfied we will be able to show:
For any x ∈ Rn that is “I-close enough” to either wposn or wnegn , there
is some δ and a δ-agenda A such that the agent should have credences
c(ϕi) = xi according to Minimize Self-Inaccuracy.
What we will mean by I-close enough to wposn is that there is nothing that
is closer to both wposn and w
neg
n than x is to w
pos
n .
As an example of this “I-close enough” we present the examples for BS,
AbsValDist and `∞ in Fig. 7.3. We include the examples for AbsValDist and
`∞ as these will be inaccuracy scores corresponding to the Dutch book criteria
considered in Chapter 8, see Section 8.5.
For the shaded region in the diagrams in that figure we can find some sen-
tence where the inaccuracy is minimized at that point.
This theorem has a very strong assumption, namely that many regions are
definable. This will not be satisfied in LP, but will in some expanded language.5
In the case where I is continuous we can in fact find regions definable in LP>r
(Theorem 7.A.1).
Theorem 7.1.11. Suppose I satisfies Extensionality and for the R ⊆ Rn re-
quired in the proof, there is some δR and a δR-agenda AR such that δR ↔
‘ 〈c(ϕ)〉ϕ∈AR ∈ R ’
Define
DistClosestWorld(x) := min{I(x,wposn ), I(x,wnegn )}.
Then for n > 2:
MoreAccDistClosestWorld(x)(w
pos
n ) ∩MoreAccDistClosestWorld(x)(wnegn ) = ∅
4One could take {π,¬π, π ∨ π, π ∨ (π ∨ π), . . . ,
n−2︷ ︸︸ ︷
π ∨ (π ∨ (. . . (π ∨ (π ∨π) . . .))}.
5Though this will involve some alterations to the framework as the language is then un-
countable so we cannot code sentences up in arithmetic but will instead have to use some
alternative syntax theory.
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Brier:
c(¬δ)
c(δ) 10
1
0
AbsValDist:
c(¬δ)
c(δ) 10
1
0
`∞:
c(¬δ)
c(δ) 10
1
0
Figure 7.3: For any point in the shaded region, there is some sentence such that
the agent is rationally required to have those credences. In this example we are
dropping the assumption that credences lie in [0, 1].
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iff there is some δ-agenda {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}6 such that SelfInacc is minimized (pos-
sibly non-uniquely) at b(ϕi) = xi.
And
wMoreAccDistClosestWorld(x)(w
pos
n ) ∩ wMoreAccDistClosestWorld(x)(wnegn ) ⊆ {x}
iff there is some δ-agenda {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} such that SelfInacc is minimized uniquely
at b(ϕi) = xi.
Proof. The right-to-left of these “iff” follow directly from Proposition 7.1.6, so
we just need to show the left-to-right direction. We first consider the unique
minimization.
Suppose
wMoreAccDistClosestWorld(x)(w
pos
n ) ∩ wMoreAccDistClosestWorld(x)(wnegn ) ⊆ {x}.
If I(x,wposn ) 6 I(x,wnegn ), we can let
R := {x} ∪ (Rn \ wMoreAccDistClosestWorld(x)(wposn )).
If I(x,wposn ) > I(x,wnegn ), we can let
R := wMoreAccDistClosestWorld(x)(w
neg
n ) \ {x}.
Using Proposition 7.1.5 we can see that x will then uniquely minimize SelfInacc.
This is displayed in Fig. 7.4.
x
c(¬δ)
c(δ)
wnegn
wposn
10
1
0
x
c(¬δ)
c(δ)
wnegn
wposn
10
1
0
Figure 7.4: Defining R so x uniquely minimizes SelfInacc.
Suppose
MoreAccDistClosestWorld(x)(w
pos
n ) ∩MoreAccDistClosestWorld(x)(wnegn ) = ∅.
If I(x,wposn ) 6 I(x,wnegn ), we can let R := Rn \MoreAccDistClosestWorld(x)(wposn ).
If I(x,wposn ) > I(x,wnegn ), we can let R := MoreAccDistClosestWorld(x)(wnegn ).
We then obtain possibly non-unique minimization at x using Proposition 7.1.5.
For a case where we have non-unique minimization see Fig. 7.5
6One could take {δ,¬δ, δ ∨ δ, δ ∨ (δ ∨ δ), . . . ,
n−2︷ ︸︸ ︷
δ ∨ (δ ∨ (. . . (δ ∨ (δ ∨δ) . . .))}.
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x
c(¬δ)
c(δ)
wnegn
wposn
10
1
0
Figure 7.5: Defining R so x non-uniquely minimizes SelfInacc.
Without further assumptions on I, this theorem is still quite limited because
it might be that there is no x which is close enough to either of wposn or w
neg
n .
Example 7.1.12. Let I(c,w) := 2 for all c and w. Here SelfInacc(c) = 2 for
any c and δ.
Note that the theorem did not assume TruthDirectedness of I.
7.2 Consequences of the flexibility
In this section we put forward some consequences of the flexibility of this ratio-
nal requirement. We will later suggest that this gives us more reason to reject
the rational requirement proposed. To be able to pick particular examples of the
consequences of this criterion we will assume some additional things about the
inaccuracy measure. However similar results will hold under weaker assump-
tions; for results using other assumptions Proposition 7.1.5 and Theorem 7.A.1
can be used.
Definition 7.2.1. An inaccuracy measure I satisfies TruthDirectedness iff for
all c, b ∈ CredsA:
• For all ϕ ∈ A, either:
– w(ϕ) 6 c(ϕ) 6 b(ϕ), or
– w(ϕ) > c(ϕ) > b(ϕ)
and
• For some ϕ ∈ A, either:
– w(ϕ) 6 c(ϕ) < b(ϕ), or
– w(ϕ) > c(ϕ) > b(ϕ)
Then
I(c,w) < I(b,w).
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It is only when I satisfies TruthDirectedness7 that we can consider it as
closeness to w.
In order to be able to pick concrete examples we will impose a further con-
straint on I. This is Normality.
Definition 7.2.2. I satisfies Normality iff whenever A = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} and
A′ = {ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ′n} are self-ref agendas and c ∈ CredsA, c′ ∈ CredsA′ , w ∈
WorldsA and w
′ ∈WorldsA′ are such that
for all i, |c(ϕi)− w(ϕi)| = |c′(ϕ′i)− w′(ϕ′i)|,
then
I(c,w) = I(c′,w′).
I.e. I is a function of the multiset
{|c(ϕ)− w(ϕ)| | ϕ ∈ A}.
Also note that Normality implies Extensionality.
7.2.1 Rejecting probabilism
Example 7.2.3 (Caie, unpublished result). Consider A := {π,¬π} where π ↔
¬Ppπq > 1/2.
Suppose I satisfies Normality and TruthDirectedness. Then b with b(π) =
1/2, b(¬π) = 1 minimizes SelfInacc.
See Fig. 7.6
c(¬π)
c(π)
w¬δ
wδ
10
1
0
b
Figure 7.6: Rejection of probabilism
This generalises Example 7.1.1 to work for a class of inaccuracy scores instead
of just the Brier score. The argument for it, though, is exactly the same.
7Or at least its weaker form:
• For all ϕ ∈ A, either:
– w(ϕ) 6 c(ϕ) 6 b(ϕ), or
– w(ϕ) > c(ϕ) > b(ϕ)
Then
I(c,w) 6 I(b,w).
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7.2.2 Failure of introspection
Consider an example very closely related to π. Instead of considering π ↔
¬Ppπq > 1/2, consider
δ ↔ Ppδq 6 1/2.
This will show that Minimize Self-Inaccuracy is inconsistent with a principle
saying that introspection is rationally permissible.
Example 7.2.4. Consider A := {δ,¬δ} where δ ↔ ¬Ppδq > 1/2.
Suppose I satisfies Normality and TruthDirectedness. Then b with b(δ) =
1/2, b(¬δ) = 0 minimizes SelfInacc.
See Fig. 7.7 This is a credal state where b(δ) 6> 1/2, but b(¬Ppδq > 1/2) =
c(¬δ)
c(δ)
w¬δ
wδ
10
1
0
b
Figure 7.7: Rejection of introspection
b(¬δ) = 0. So if an agent is rational according to Minimize Self-Inaccuracy with
a self-ref agenda containing δ, then she must very badly fail the principle:
for all ϕ ∈ A, c(ϕ) 6> 1/2 =⇒ c(¬Ppδq > 1/2) = 1.
One can also show a similar result for the related positive introspection
principle (now with 6).
Example 7.2.5. Consider A := {δ} where δ ↔ Ppδq 6 1/2.
Suppose I satisfies Normality and TruthDirectedness. Then b with b(δ) = 1/2
minimizes SelfInacc. As shown in Fig. 7.8. This is a credal state where b(δ) 6 1/2,
w¬δ wδ
10
c(δ)
b
Figure 7.8: Another rejection of introspection
but b(Ppδq 6 1/2) = b(δ) = 1/2. So if an agent is rational according to Minimize
Self-Inaccuracy with a self-ref agenda containing δ, then she cannot satisfy
for all ϕ ∈ A, c(ϕ) 6 1/2 =⇒ c(Ppδq 6 1/2) = 1.
177
7. Accuracy
This is a very interesting feature of this criterion. In Caie (2013), Caie
supported two arguments for the possibility of rational probabilistic incoherence.
The first was due to the inconsistency of probabilism with introspection, the
second is due to Minimize Self-Inaccuracy. This result shows that although
both might be reasons to reject probabilism, by dropping probabilism one has
not removed inconsistencies between the desirable principles of introspection
and Minimize Self-Inaccuracy.
7.2.3 Negative credences
So far we have generally been making the assumption that we only consider
credences in the unit interval. It turns out that this was in fact an assumption
that cannot be justified by Minimize Self-Inaccuracy, because if that assumption
is dropped then sometimes negative credences minimize SelfInacc.
Example 7.2.6. For this example drop the assumption that an agent’s cre-
dences take values in the unit interval.
Consider A := {δ} where
δ ↔ −1/4 < Ppδq < 1/2.
Fix I some inaccuracy measure satisfying Normality and TruthDirectedness.
Then b with b(δ) = −1/4 minimizes SelfInacc.
See Fig. 7.9
w¬δ wδ
10
c(δ)
b
Figure 7.9: May require negative credences
Sometimes this assumption of having credence values in the unit interval is
dropped, but this is generally only when one considers altering the numerical
proxies of 0 and 1 for falsity and truth. What is interesting in this case is that
we still keep the numerical representation of 0 for falsity and 1 for truth, and
the distance measure is still as usual but we end up with credences outside of
the unit interval.
Having a negative credence in such cases does seem odd, and one can rectify
this, as we have done, by just building in the assumption that all credence
functions assign numbers from the unit interval to sentences. However, this
is now an assumption that cannot be justified by the accuracy considerations.
So if one wishes to keep the rational requirement of minimizing SelfInacc, one
should either have an alternative argument for that assumption and then build
it in, or should admit that sometimes an agent must have negative credences.
7.2.4 Failure of simple logical omniscience
Again consider π ↔ ¬Ppπq > 1/2. But we now consider a different agenda.
Let A := {π, π ∨ >}. π ↔ (π ∨ >) is a logical tautology. Moreover, it is
a simple one which we would expect a rational agent to be able to recognise.
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However we will show that Minimize Self-Inaccuracy requires that the agent has
a different credence in π to π ∨>. This is a very bad failure of the agent being
probabilistic. It is a principle which is assumed in many cases. This means
that the assumption that probabilities are assigned to propositions (or sets of
possible worlds) is now an assumption that makes a difference. Of course one
can build in that assumption, and only consider that c should minimize SelfInacc
with respect to other members of CredsA that satisfy logical omniscience in an
analogous way to assuming that credences take values in the unit intervals. But
this is a bad feature of the proposed accuracy criterion that this cannot be
justified by accuracy considerations.
Example 7.2.7. Consider A := {π, π ∨ >} where π ↔ ¬Ppπq > 1/2.8
Fix I some inaccuracy measure satisfying Normality and TruthDirectedness.
Then b with b(π) = 1/2, b(π ∨ >) = 0 minimizes SelfInacc.
See Fig. 7.10:
c(π ∨ >)
c(π)
wπ
w¬π
10
1
0
b
Figure 7.10: Rejection of logical omniscience
7.2.5 Dependence on the inaccuracy measure
By using Proposition 7.1.5 one can show that the rational requirement from
Minimize Self-Inaccuracy is dependent on the inaccuracy measure that is chosen.
For example, we consider the case of the Brier score vs the logarithmic score.
This result was also presented in Campbell-Moore (2015b).
Theorem 7.2.8. Consider:
δ ↔ (Ppδq 6 0.5 ∨ (Ppδq 6 0.6 ∧ Pp¬δq > 0.2)).
Then
• b = 〈0, 0.5〉 uniquely minimizes SelfInaccAbsValDist
• b′ = 〈0.6, 0.2〉 uniquely minimizes SelfInaccBS
• b′ = 〈0.6, 0.2〉 uniquely minimizes SelfInaccLS.
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MoreAccb(w) MoreAccb′(w)
BS:
c(¬δ)
c(δ) 10
1
0
b
b′
c(¬δ)
c(δ) 10
1
0
b
b′
AbsValDist:
c(¬δ)
c(δ) 10
1
0
b
b′
c(¬δ)
c(δ) 10
1
0
b
b′
Figure 7.11: AbsValDist and BS lead to different rationality requirements
Proof. We will use Proposition 7.1.5 and for that purpose show the relevant
balls in Fig. 7.11 for AbsValDist and BS.
Since all these inaccuracy measures are truth-directed and normal we can see
that b and b′ are the credal states that compete for being most accurate, and
by calculating the values for these two credal states we can also see the result.
This is how one can show the result for LS.
This is not specific to these inaccuracy measure. We can find similar exam-
ples for most pairs of inaccuracy measures, at least when the measures aren’t
just scalings of one another at regions close to wpos2 and w
neg
2 . So even restricting
to proper scoring rules doesn’t lead to a determined class of rationally required
credences.
Theorem 7.2.9. Let I0 and I1 be inaccuracy measures satisfying Extension-
ality. And assume the language can define all relevant regions required in the
proof.
If there are some q0, q1 ∈ R such that all the following hold:
• q0 is I0-close-enough and q1 is I1-close enough, meaning that none of balls
around wpos2 intersect any of the balls around w
neg
2 . I.e. for all i, j ∈ {0, 1},
MoreAccIiqi (w
pos
2 ) ∩MoreAcc
Ij
qj (w
neg
2 ) = ∅.
• And the balls aren’t scalings of one another at these close enough distances
to one of the w. I.e. for some w ∈ {wneg2 ,w
pos
2 }
MoreAccI0q0 (w) 6⊆ MoreAcc
I1
q1 (w)
MoreAccI1q1 (w) 6⊆ MoreAcc
I0
q0 (w)
8This result was observed by Benja Fallenstein (personal communication).
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then there is some R ⊆ R2, δ with δ ↔ ‘ 〈c(δ), c(¬δ)〉 ∈ R ’ and A = {δ,¬δ},
with some b0 and b1 ∈ CredsA such that:
• SelfInaccI0 is minimized at b0 and not at b1, and
• SelfInaccI1 is minimized at b1 and not at b0
So showing that the rational requirements of the criterion Minimize Self-Inaccuracy
based on these two different inaccuracy measures are different.
Proof. Suppose we have such q0, q1. Without loss of generality suppose w =
wpos2 . Then pick some
〈x0, y0〉 ∈ MoreAccI0q0 (w) \MoreAcc
I1
q1 (w)
〈x1, y1〉 ∈ MoreAccI1q1 (w) \MoreAcc
I0
q0 (w)
Now let
R := R2 \ (MoreAccI0〈x0,y0〉(w
pos
2 ) ∪MoreAcc
I1
〈x1,y1〉(w
pos
2 ))
and δ ↔ ‘ 〈c(δ), c(¬δ)〉 ∈ R ’. Now:
To show the facts about where SelfInacc is minimized we need to show:
1. SelfInaccI0 is minimized at 〈x0, y0〉,
2. SelfInaccI0 is not minimized at 〈x1, y1〉,
3. SelfInaccI1 is minimized at 〈x1, y1〉,
4. SelfInaccI1 is not minimized at 〈x0, y0〉,
Which we can do by using Proposition 7.1.5 so checking:
1. • R ∩MoreAccI0〈x0,y0〉(w
pos
2 ) = ∅, and
• R ⊇ MoreAccI0〈x0,y0〉(w
neg
2 ),
2. • R ∩MoreAccI0〈x1,y1〉(w
pos
2 ) 6= ∅
3. • R ∩MoreAccI1〈x1,y1〉(w
pos
2 ) = ∅, and
• R ⊇ MoreAccI1〈x1,y1〉(w
neg
2 ),
4. • R ∩MoreAccI1〈x0,y0〉(w
pos
2 ) 6= ∅.
These hold because of our choice of 〈x0, y0〉 such that SelfInacc(〈x0, y0〉) 6 q0
and 〈x1, y1〉 such that SelfInacc(〈x1, y1〉) 6 q1 and the assumptions about q0
and q1.
If one wishes to keep Minimize Self-Inaccuracy, one therefore needs to explain
what rational constraints accuracy-dominance considerations lead to, and due
to this dependence on the inaccuracy measure this is not as easy as it is for the
usual accuracy constraint case.
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There are at least four options.9 Firstly, one could give arguments for one
particular inaccuracy measure and argue that accuracy-dominance considera-
tions require one to minimize inaccuracy with respect to that inaccuracy mea-
sure. Secondly, one could take a subjectivist approach and argue that for each
agent and context there is some particular measure of inaccuracy which is appro-
priate. Thirdly, one could take a supervaluationist approach and argue that the
notion of inaccuracy is vague and that any inaccuracy measure satisfying certain
conditions is an appropriate precisification of it; to satisfy accuracy dominance
considerations one would then have to minimise inaccuracy with respect to at
least one appropriate inaccuracy measure. Lastly one could take an epistemicist
approach and argue that although there is some particular inaccuracy measure
which one should be minimising inaccuracy with respect to, we do not know
which it is.10
This dependence on the inaccuracy measure has a further consequence.
We will show in Section 8.5 that the Dutch book criterion proposed, Mini-
mize Average-Unit-Guaranteed-Loss, is the same as Minimize Self-Inaccuracy
with the inaccuracy measure AbsValDist (and that Minimize Maximum-Unit-
Guaranteed-Loss is the same with the inaccuracy measure given by `∞). This re-
sult therefore shows that the Minimize Self-Inaccuracy criterion leads the agent
to hold credences such that if she bets in accordance with those credences she
does not minimize her possible overall guaranteed loss. I.e. that this accuracy
criterion conflicts with the Dutch book criterion. In fact we will support neither
this form of the accuracy or Dutch book criterion, but it is important to note
that one cannot support both.
7.3 Accuracy criterion reconsidered
7.3.1 For introspective agents and self-ref agendas– the
options
The results we have presented in Section 7.2 show that the rationality constraint
proposed in Minimize Self-Inaccuracy, which says to minimize I(c,wc), leads to
rational agents having very unwieldy credence functions. This might therefore
give one a reason to reconsider the traditional accuracy criterion and suggest
that it is in fact the correct way to apply accuracy considerations even when
propositions like π are considered. One would still have to say how and why the
traditional criterion does appropriately apply in such situations so our results
haven’t shown that this is the correct approach, just that the approach seems
more tenable than it seemed before.
Responding to Greaves (2013), where Greaves considers cases that are re-
lated to π and other δ,11 Konek and Levinstein (ms) and Carr (ms) suggest we
9This problem is very closely related to a problem for the traditional accuracy argument,
the Bronfman objection, which is due to the fact that there is no credence function that
dominates on every measure. This is discussed in (Pettigrew, 2011, section 6.2.2). Furthermore
the ways of dealing with the two problems are similar and these options presented here parallel
the options presented in Pettigrew’s article.
10The disadvantage of this version of accuracy considerations is that an agent does not have
the resources to know whether she satisfies the rational requirement or not.
11Greaves considers situations where the chance of something is related to its credence. So
the version of Promotion in Greaves’ paper has ch(Promotion) = 1− c(Promotion).
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should distinguish:
1. The inaccuracy of the act of coming to occupy c, which is given by
SelfInacc(c) = I(c,wc).
2. The inaccuracy of holding the state c from b’s perspective, which is given
by Estb(I(c, ·)).
The two options for how to understand this estimation are:12
(a) Expb(I(c, ·)) =
∑
w∈WorldsA b(w) · I(c,w)
(b) I(c,wb).
Let’s work through the example with π to see what these different possibil-
ities would recommend.
Example 7.3.1. Suppose b(π) = 1/3, b(π) = 2/3 currently. The most accurate
credal state from b’s perspective is:13
1. c1(π) = 1/2, c1(¬π) = 1.
2. (a) c2a(π) = 1/3, c2a(¬π) = 2/3.
(b) c2b(π) = 1, c2b(¬π) = 0.
b(¬π)
b(π) 10
1
0
c1
c2b
c2a
b
Figure 7.12: Alternative accuracy criteria
The accuracy criterion which we have been considering is to minimize the
inaccuracy of the act of coming to occupy c. This is option 1.
Konek and Levinstein (ms) have argued that accuracy considerations should
motivate us to try to minimize the inaccuracy of holding the state, not the
inaccuracy of the act of coming to occupy the credal state.14 This is because
that has the correct direction of fit: the credences are trying to fit to the world
instead of trying to force the world to fit to the credences. They argue as follows:
12Konek and Levinstein (ms) only considers the option which is analogous to 2b as an
analysis of Estb(I(c, ·)).
13For I satisfying Normality, TruthDirectedness, StrictProprietry.
14In fact they fix on option analogous to 2b, which we will also do, but the discussion of 2b
vs 2a is an independent discussion.
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And credal states, as we have stressed, are better or worse (more
or less valuable) to the extent to which they conform to the world
by encoding an accurate picture of it.. . . But recall that credal states
are not valuable in virtue of causally influencing the world so as to
make themselves accurate. (Konek and Levinstein, ms, p. 19, their
emphesis)
I agree with Konek and Levinstein that we should in fact consider a tradi-
tional accuracy criterion, which would be given by measuring estimated inaccu-
racy, namely either 2b or 2a. For further discussion of why that is an appropriate
response, their paper should be consulted. Our results in Section 7.2 lend extra
weight to rejecting inaccuracy as understood by 1.
Typically when dealing with the accuracy argument, Estb(I(c, ·)) would be
understood to be given by15
Estb(I(c, ·)) = Expb(I(c, ·)) =
∑
w∈WorldsA
b∗(w) · I(c,w).
This is the option in 2a.
Assuming that I satisfies a number of conditions, particularly StrictPro-
prietry, we have that Expb(I(c, ·)) is minimized at b iff b is probabilistic. So
this would not lead us to any rational constraint different to those in the usual
accuracy arguments: an agent should just be probabilistic.
Usually higher order probabilities are not considered in accuracy arguments.
When we do consider higher order probabilities this criterion doesn’t seem to
be the right thing to apply. In this criterion there is no information about what
the internal P refers to; it could just as well be someone else’s degrees of belief,
or objective chance, or even some random non-probabilistic function. Consider
the following example:
Example 7.3.2. Sophie is certain that the coin that has just been tossed has
landed tails.
b(Heads) = 0
b(¬Heads) = 1
She also has higher order beliefs. Let’s suppose that she is perfectly intro-
spective, which should mean that we get:
b(PSophiepHeadsq = 0) = 1,
b(PSophiep¬Headsq = 1) = 1.
But suppose Sophie’s credences are not like that, but are instead such that:
b(PSophiepHeadsq = 1) = 1
b(PSophiep¬Headsq = 1) = 1
So Sophie’s higher order beliefs do not cohere with her lower order ones even
for non-problematic sentences like Heads. Even worse, Sophie is certain that
PSophie is non-probabilistic.16
15Following Pettigrew (ms) we take b∗ to be some probabilistic function defined on B (A),
the smallest Boolean algebra extending A.
16But note that b is itself probabilistic.
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However, Sophie’s beliefs, b, minimizes
Expb(I(c, ·)) =
∑
w∈WorldsA
b∗(w) · I(c,w),
by virtue of I satisfying StrictProprietry and b being probabilistic.17 Her beliefs
are therefore stable.
We don’t want to count Sophie as rational. We tried to assume that she was
perfectly introspective but this was unable to play a role in the minimization of
expected inaccuracy.
If we have supposed that an agent is introspective and we are considering
self-ref agendas, she will be certain about which w is actual. And then the
only thing that should matter is the distance to that wb. This is embedded
in the constraint 2b: the agent should determine the estimated inaccuracy by
considering the inaccuracy of a credal state at the world the agent knows to be
actual. This is different from looking at self-accuracy because the agent uses
her current credences to determine what is actual instead of considering what
would be actual if she were to adopt the credences she is considering.
In 2a the interpretation of P is left to vary, and b is instead just used to
measure the possible varying interpretations of P. In 2b we use the credence
state that she currently has, b, to interpret P, the symbol in our language as we
are only considering the inaccuracy to wb.
In Konek and Levinstein (ms), the authors in fact assume that the estima-
tions are calculated in a way analogous to 2b instead of 2a. Following Greaves
(2013), they formulate a principle called Deference to Chance which says that
in some cases an agent shouldn’t determine Estb(I(c, ·)) by calculating the ex-
pectation.
DEFERENCE TO CHANCE If an agent with credences c and
evidence E is such that:∑
w
b(w) · I(c,w) = x
but she is also certain that the chance function ch is such that:∑
w
ch(w) · I(c,w) = y, with x 6= y
in which case she violates the Principal Principle, then nonetheless:
Estb(I(c, ·)) = y
That is, she ought to line up her own best estimate of c’s inaccuracy
with what she knows c’s objective expected inaccuracy to be. (Konek
and Levinstein, ms, p. 10, notation slightly altered).
So if she knows additional facts about how the world is set up, she must calculate
the estimated inaccuracy using these.
Our 2b is given in a similar spirit to the principle Deference to Chance:
Since she is introspective she has additional facts about how the world is set
17At least for the agenda {Heads,¬Heads,PSophiepHeadsq,PSophiep¬Headsq}
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up. In fact, she will know which world is actual. She should therefore only care
about inaccuracy in that world. So we calculate her estimated inaccuracy only
by considering that world, i.e.
Estb(I(c, ·)) = I(c,wb).
If we want to consider agents who aren’t perfectly introspective or who are
uncertain about facts in the world but still want to apply a criterion analogous
to 2b, we will have to modify the definition of 2b to apply to non self-ref agendas.
7.3.2 How to measure inaccuracy in the general case –
Deferring to the probabilistic modal structure
In Chapter 7 we assumed that agents that we considered were introspective
and we restricted our attention to self-ref agendas, essentially assuming that
the agent was omniscient in the relevant regards. In this chapter we will drop
these assumptions. In Chapter 6 we already suggested that this is essentially
assuming that the agent can be modelled by the trivial probabilistic modal
structure Momn.
w0 1
In this chapter we will still assume that the agent is modelled by some prob-
abilistic modal structure but will not assume that it is Momn. We are not using
these accuracy considerations to argue for the fact that the agent is appropri-
ately modellable by such structures or which structure appropriately models an
agent; that is something we are going to take as given. We can see this as a gen-
eralisation of the assumptions embedded in the previous considerations of these
rationality criteria where we said the agent was introspective and omniscient
so modellable by Momn. In future work we would like to consider dropping the
assumption that we start off with a probabilistic modal structure.
We are therefore considering the question of:
If an agent is appropriately represented as being at world w of a prob-
abilistic modal structure M, what should her degrees of belief be like?
This is very connected to the question in Part I where we started with an M
modelling a situation and were trying to determine truth values of sentences.
Here we start with some M and try to determine the rationally required cre-
dences.
In Section 7.3 we proposed that if an agent is currently in credal state b, she
should wish to be in the credal state which minimizes Estb(I(c, ·)). For the case
where we assume the agent is introspective and the agenda is a self-ref agenda,
we proposed to define this as
I(c,wb).
We will here provide a generalisation of this definition, where I(c,wb) is the
special case for Momn.
In the general case we will ask the agent to defer to the meta-accessibility
relation to calculate the estimated inaccuracy, using her current credences to
interpret P at each world.
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Self-ref agendas do not allow for any contingent sentences and we now want
to drop this restriction on agendas. The other, fullness component of the self-ref
agenda is still needed. For example if Ppϕq > r is in the agenda A, then we also
need that ϕ is. This is because in those cases it makes sense to just focus on
such an agenda as it is self-contained in the appropriate way. We call agendas
that have this feature full agendas.
Definition 7.3.3. We say that A is a full agenda if: for any M ∈ ModPA,ROCFL
and p,p′ : SentP → R,
∀ϕ ∈ A, (p(ϕ) = p′(ϕ)) =⇒ ∀ϕ ∈ A, (JϕK(M,p) = JϕK(M,p))
What this says is that the truth values of all sentences in the agenda should
depend on: firstly a choice of base model (this is the difference to the self-ref
agendas) and secondly a choice of probability values for the sentences also in the
agenda. This only rules out that it depends on the probability value assigned
to a sentence not in the agenda.18
Since we want to allow the agent to have different degrees of belief at dif-
ferent worlds, to sum up how an alternative credal state looks from her current
perspective we need to start off with her possible attitude in each world, as
given by a prob-eval function, except restricted to an agenda.
Definition 7.3.4. An A-prob-eval function, c, is some collection of members
of CredsA, one for each w ∈ W . So c(w) : A → [0, 1]. We might also use the
metavariable b.
In the special case of self-ref agendas, we measured the inaccuracy of a credal
function to wb, because for self-ref agendas, truths were determined by a choice
of credences. For full agendas we also need information about how to interpret
the base language, so instead of measuring the inaccuracy to wb, we measure
it to w(M,b)(v), which will be a member of WorldsA. This will be given by the
truth values when M(v) interprets the vocabulary from L and b(v) interprets
P. These are then the true, ideal, or omniscient credences if the agent’s degrees
of belief, restricted to A, are given by b.
Definition 7.3.5. w(M,b)(v) is a function from A to {0, 1} with
w(M,b)(v)(ϕ) := JϕKM(M(v),b(v)) =
{
1 M(M(v),b(v)) |= ϕ
0 otherwise
Where M(M(v),b(v)) ∈ ModPA,ROCFLP which, restricted to L is just M(v), and
which has
M(M(v),b(v)) |= Ppϕq = r ⇐⇒ b(v)(ϕ) = r
For full agendas, the flexibility in the choice of M(M(v),b(v)) does not alter
w(M,b)(v).
We can now define the estimated inaccuracy from b’s perspective.
18We would like to say: the agenda contains any sentences which it refers to the proba-
bility of, however Ppϕq > r ∨ Ppϕq < r itself forms full agenda because this sentence is true
regardless of the probability value assigned to ϕ.
187
7. Accuracy
Definition 7.3.6. LetA be a full agenda and b anA-prob-eval function. Define
the inaccuracy of a credal state, c ∈ CredsA, from b-at-w’s perspective, by:19
Estb,w(I(c, ·)) :=
∑
v∈W
mw{v} · I(c,w(M,b)(v)).
We can also measure the estimated inaccuracy of a whole A-prob-eval function,
c, from b’s perspective, by:
Estb(I(c, ·)) :=
∑
w∈W
Estb,w(I(c(w), ·))
=
∑
w∈W
∑
v∈W
mw{v} · I(c(v),w(M,b)(v)).
Of course, all this is assuming W is finite. If W is infinite, the analogous
definitions can be made, they just become more complicated.
7.3.3 Connections to the revision theory
We have now suggested a proposal for how to measure inaccuracy. This was
given by:
Estb(I(c, ·)) :=
∑
w∈W
∑
v∈W
mw{v} · I(c(v),w(M,b)(v))
Definition 7.3.7. I is an additive and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy
measure, if there is some s : [0, 1]× {0, 1} → [0,∞] such that:
• s(x, i) is a continuous function of x,
• s is strictly proper, i.e. for all r ∈ [0, 1],
r · s(x, 1) + (1− r) · s(x, 0)
is minimized uniquely (as a function of x) at r.
• I(c,w) =
∑
ϕ∈A s(c(ϕ),w(ϕ)).
This is an assumption that is usual when working with inaccuracy measures
for the accuracy argument. There has been a body of work developing justi-
fications for working with such rules (see, e.g., Joyce, 1998, 2009; Leitgeb and
Pettigrew, 2010; Pettigrew, ms). Notably AbsValDist is not strictly proper, so
we are ruling this out as a legitimate inaccuracy measure.
Proposition 7.3.8. Suppose A is a (finite) full agenda, and I is an additive
and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure. Then (due to the strict
proprietry),
Estb,w(I(c, ·)) :=
∑
v∈W
mw{v} · I(c,w(M,b)(v))
19=
∑
w∈WorldsA mw{v | w(M,b)(v) = w} · I(c,w)
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is minimized uniquely at
c =
∑
v∈W
mw{v} · w(M,b)(v),
i.e. for each ϕ ∈ A,
c(ϕ) = mw{v | w(M,b)(v)(ϕ) = 1}.
Therefore,
Estb(I(c, ·))
is minimized uniquely at c with for each w ∈W , ϕ ∈ A,
c(w)(ϕ) = mw{v | w(M,b)(v)(ϕ) = 1}.
We have seen this characterisation before: we saw it in the definition of the
revision sequence:
pα+1(w)(ϕ) := mw{v | (M,pα)(v) |= ϕ}
The difference is just in the use of the agenda. This is hopefully also what we
would obtain by applying the inaccuracy considerations to the (infinite) agenda
SentP. The complication the agenda brings in should be studied, but we will
not do that here.
So in fact, the successor definition of probability in the revision sequence can
be seen to be the appropriate way to minimize inaccuracy: suppose the agent
is currently in some epistemic state. To minimize her estimated inaccuracy she
would like to be in a (generally) different state. The step from the first state to
the second is a revision of her credal state. Once she has moved her credences
she will again like to move, which is another revision step. The revision theory
of probability characterises these steps in minimizing estimated accuracy.
This is very different to the traditional setup because if we have made these
assumptions then there is no credal state which minimizes its own estimated
inaccuracy, or looks best from its own perspective. I.e. there are no stable states.
However, to obtain stable states, or fixed points, one can instead consider non-
classical evaluation schemes and probability functions which do not always as-
sign single real numbers to each proposition.
7.3.4 Non-classical accuracy criteria and connections to
Kripkean semantics
In Chapters 3 and 4 we considered semantics that were based on non-classical
evaluations schemes so that by revising one’s probabilities one obtains a fixed
point. This resulted in a final semantics where one can interpret the proba-
bilities as being assigned by a range instead of a single point, or by a set of
probability values. The other way in which the Kripkean semantics requires al-
terations to the rationality requirements is their reliance on non-classical logic.
We therefore have to alter the measuring-inaccuracy framework to account for
these alterations.
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Connections to Chapter 3
There has been work on applying the rational constraints of Dutch book and ac-
curacy considerations to non-classical semantics (Williams, 2014, 2012b,a; Paris,
2001). In the accuracy considerations we had that w : A → {0, 1} where w(ϕ)
is the numerical representation of the truth value of ϕ in w. Williams (2012b)
shows that also in the general, non-classical setting, accuracy considerations
require one to pick some credal state in the convex hull of the ws, even when
these assign numerical representations of the truth values according to some
non-classical evaluation schema and also when the truth value representations
are not in {0, 1} but are some other real numbers. These do require one to assign
some particular number as the numerical representation of the truth value, and
from these one obtains credal states that assign a single number as a degree of
belief to each sentence. These credal states may not be (classically) probabilis-
tic, but they are instead non-classical probabilities. We will slightly generalise
this framework to obtain something like the ranges we considered in Chapter 3.
We will first mention how the agenda can play a role working with evaluation
functions instead of prob-eval functions, but the role is similar.
Proposition 7.3.9. If A is a full agenda, then for any M20 and evaluation
functions f, f ′,21
∀ϕ ∈ A, ∀w ∈W, #ϕ ∈ f(w) ⇐⇒ #ϕ ∈ f ′(w)
=⇒ ∀ϕ ∈ A, ∀w ∈W, (w, f) |=SKPM ϕ ⇐⇒ (w, f ′) |=SKPM ϕ
So for a full agenda, just having the information about the evaluation of
sentences in the agenda is enough to characterise Θ.
Definition 7.3.10. An A-evaluation function, g, assigns to each w ∈ W some
subset of A.
We will use Θ as a function from A-evaluation functions to A-evaluation
functions using the obvious modification of the definition from Definition 3.2.5.22
In the Kripkean semantics based on three-valued Strong Kleene evaluation
scheme, so where we assumed f was consistent, we considered credal states as
assigning intervals of real numbers to each sentences. These were given by
p(v,f)(ϕ) := sup{α | IMM[w, f ] |= P>(pϕq, pαq)}
= mw{v | (v, f) |=SKPM ϕ}
p(v,f) := inf{α | IMM[w, f ] |= P< (pϕq, pαq)}
= mw{v | (v, f) 6|=SKPM ¬ϕ}
These values can in fact be justified by accuracy considerations. For this frame-
work to work it is important here that we fix three-valued strong Kleene eval-
uation scheme and assume that f is consistent.23 We are then working with
20With each M(w) ∈ ModPA,ROCFL .
21Which implies, ∀ϕ ∈ A, ∀w ∈W, #ϕ ∈ Θ(f) ⇐⇒ #ϕ ∈ Θ(f ′)
22I.e. Let Θ(g)(w) := {ϕ ∈ A | #ϕ ∈ Θ(f)(w)} for some evaluation function f , where
#ϕ ∈ f(w) ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ g(w).
23 An analysis of how this restriction could be dropped would be very interesting but is
left to future research. See Janda (2016) for some results on applying accuracy arguments
in Belnap’s 4-valued logic setting, which is the setting we’d be in by considering the Kripke
construction allowing for non-consistent evaluation functions.
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three different truth values and we will consider two different weightings: a
lowerweighting and an upperweighting.
truth value characterised by given weight
lowerweighting upperweighting
ϕ true (v, f) |=SKPM ϕ 1 1
ϕ neither
(v, f) 6|=SKPM ϕ 0 1
and (v, f) 6|=SKPM ¬ϕ
ϕ false (v, f) |=SKPM ¬ϕ 0 0
These two different weightings characterise the extremities of natural weightings
that can be assigned to the truth value neither.
Definition 7.3.11. Fix a full agenda A. For ϕ ∈ A, and an A-evaluation
function g, let:
w(v,g)(ϕ) :=

1 (v, g) |=SKPM ϕ
0 (v, g) 6|=SKPM ϕ and (v, g) 6|=SKPM ¬ϕ
0 (v, g) |=SKPM ¬ϕ
w(v,g)(ϕ) :=

1 (v, g) |=SKPM ϕ
1 (v, g) 6|=SKPM ϕ and (v, g) 6|=SKPM ¬ϕ
0 (v, g) |=SKPM ¬ϕ
These are the truth value assignments corresponding to the upper and lower
weightings.
Proposition 7.3.12. Let I be some additive and continuous strictly proper
inaccuracy measure. Let A be a full agenda, and g an A-evaluation function,
then:
• p(w,Θ(g)) uniquely minimizes∑
v∈W
mw{v}I(c,w(v,g))
with respect to c.
• p(w,Θ(g)) uniquely minimizes∑
v∈W
mw{v}I(c,w(v,g))
with respect to c.
And as in the discussion of Section 7.3.3, this may be seen as the appropriate
way to measure the estimated inaccuracy of a credal state.
Proposition 7.3.13. Suppose A is a full agenda taking the form {ϕ1,¬ϕ1, . . . , ϕn,¬ϕn}.
If I is normal and g1 and g2 are consistent, then:
I(p(v,g2),w(v,g1)) = I(p(v,g2),w(v,g1))
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Proof. If g1 and g2 are consistent,
p(v,g2)(ϕ) = 1− p(v,g2)(¬ϕ)
w(v,g1)(ϕ) = 1− w(v,g1)(¬ϕ)
p(v,g2)(¬ϕ) = 1− p(v,g2)(ϕ)
w(v,g1)(¬ϕ) = 1− w(v,g1)(ϕ).
So we have equalities between the relevant multisets.
{|p(v,g2)(ϕi)− w(v,g1)(ϕi)| | i = 1, . . . , n}
∪ {|p(v,g2)(¬ϕi)− w(v,g1)(¬ϕi)| | i = 1, . . . , n}
= {|p(v,g2)(¬ϕi)− w(v,g1)(¬ϕi)| | i = 1, . . . , n}
∪ {|p(v,g2)(ϕi)− w(v,g1)(ϕi)| | i = 1, . . . , n}
So if I is normal we have our result.
Definition 7.3.14. For A a full agenda, I satisfying normality and g, g′ con-
sistent A-evaluation functions, define:
Estg(I(g′, ·)) :=
∑
w∈W
∑
v∈W
mw{v} · I(p(v,g),w(v,g′))
Proposition 7.3.15. For A a finite, full agenda, g a consistent A-evaluation
function and I an inaccuracy measure satisfying StrictProprietry and Normal-
ity, we have:
Θ(g) = arg min
g′ consistent
(Estg(I(g′, ·)))
It is common in the traditional accuracy criterion to only be deemed irra-
tional if the dominating credal state is immodest.24 In this case, the dominating
credal state may not be immodest (since it would advise moving to Θ(Θ(f))),
however after a sequence of such moves one will reach a fixed point, which is a
credal state that is immodest and looks best from its own perspective.
Proposition 7.3.16. Suppose A a finite, full agenda, g is a consistent A-
evaluation function and I an inaccuracy measure satisfying StrictProprietry
and Normality.
g uniquely minimizes Estg(I(g′, ·)) with respect to g′ if and only if g is some
fixed point evaluation function restricted to A.
This is different from the revision sequence where we ended up with a never
ending sequence of moves trying to minimise estimated inaccuracy.
Idea for a connection to Chapter 4
In Chapter 4 we considered a variant of probability where we can assign a
set of probabilities to be the interpretation of P. We therefore interpret P
using imprecise probabilities. There has recently been work in trying to apply
accuracy considerations to imprecise probabilities, and particularly to try to
24See Pettigrew (ms) for a discussion.
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find an appropriate inaccuracy measure for them (see Seidenfeld et al., 2012;
Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler, ta; Schoenfield, 2015). It has turned out that one
cannot find an inaccuracy measure that assigns single real numbers and which
satisfies StrictProprietry.
Here, we suggest an alternative way of measuring the inaccuracy where we let
the inaccuracy be a set of numbers, namely the set of inaccuracy of the members
of the credal set. This works point-wise and collects the results. Suppose C is a
collection of members of CredsA. Define:
I(C,w) := {I(c,w) | c ∈ C}
To try and apply this to our framework we have not just imprecise probabil-
ities, but imprec-prob-eval functions which also account for the different worlds
in the probabilistic modal structure. We define A-imprec-prob-eval functions in
an analogous way to A-prob-eval functions in Definition 7.3.4.
We might hope to define estimated inaccuracy in a similar manner, by:
EstB(I(C, ·)) := {Estb(I(c, ·))) | b ∈ B, c ∈ C}
We would then hope that the way to minimize this matches the semantics. It
is not immediately clear what it means to minimize a set of numbers. But we
can see the following connection.
Suppose A is a finite full agenda. Then Θ as defined in Chapter 4 can also be
conceived of as a function from A-imprec-prob-eval functions to A-imprec-prob-
eval functions. Suppose I is an inaccuracy measure satisfying StrictProprietry.
Then for B an A-imprec-prob-eval function we have:
Θ(B) =
{
arg min
c
(Estb(I(c, ·)))
∣∣∣∣ b ∈ B}
So this should somehow be able to be construed as the result of minimizing
estimated inaccuracy, where inaccuracy is measured by a set of real numbers.
The details of exactly how this works are yet to be worked out. We would then
have that the stable states are exactly those that minimize estimated inaccuracy
from their own perspective.
We can now see the feature that we mentioned in Chapter 4: At a fixed
point (where B = Θ(B)), for every b ∈ B there is some c ∈ B such that c looks
best from b’s perspective, i.e. it minimizes Estb(I(c′, ·)) with respect to c′.
In conclusion, by modifying the measuring inaccuracy framework in different
ways we obtain the result that the different semantics that we have developed
can each be seen as closely relating to minimising estimated inaccuracy. Though
certain details still need to be worked out, this is a very interesting connection.
Appendix 7.A Minimize Self-Inaccuracy’s flexi-
bility to get definable regions with-
out Normality
In this thesis we have been working in formal languages which generally aren’t
able to express all regions, so the result in Theorem 7.1.11 doesn’t apply to
the languages we’ve been considering. In the following result we make further
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assumptions on SelfInacc in order to derive a result that will apply in these
restricted languages.
Theorem 7.A.1. Let n > 2. x is here a metavariable for some member of Rn.
Suppose:
• I satisfies Extensionality,
• I is a continuous function wrt the Euclidean topology, e on R,
• I is bounded: For each w ∈WorldsA, I(c,w) does not go to 0 as c(ϕ) goes
to infinity for some ϕ ∈ A. I.e.:
– There is some q0 > 0 and q1 > 0 such that for all w ∈ WorldsA,
wMoreAccq1(w) ⊆ [−q0, q0]
n.
• There is no x with both I(x,wposn ) = 0 and I(x,wnegn ) = 0.
Then there is some r > 0 such that for all x with I(x,wposn ) 6 r or I(x,wnegn ) 6
r, there is a region R ⊆ Rn and a sentence δ of LP>r with
δ ↔ “c ∈ R”
such that SelfInacc is minimised uniquely at x.
If, in addition, I satisfies:
• I(wposn ,wposn ) = I(wnegn ,wnegn ) = 0
Then there is some r′ > 0 such that for all x with e(x,wposn ) 6 r
′ or e(x,wnegn ) 6
r′, there is a region R ⊆ Rn and a sentence δ of LP>r with
δ ↔ “c ∈ R”
such that SelfInacc(c) is minimised uniquely at x.
Proof. Fix some n > 2 We first define the rectangular approximation of the
ball around wnegn . For i1, . . . in ∈ Z, m ∈ N let Ii1,...inm = ([i1/2m, i1+1/2m]× . . .×
[in/2m, in+1/2m]). Let
RectClBmr (w) :=
⋃
i1,...,in such that
wMoreAccr(w)∩I
i1,...,in
m 6=∅
Ii1,...,inm
Observe that ⋂
m∈N
RectClBmr (w) = wMoreAccr(w)
since I is continuous.25
For m′ > m and r′ > r,
RectClBmr (w
neg
n ) ⊇ RectClB
m′
r′ (w
neg
n )
25Suppose x ∈
⋂
m∈N RectClB
m
r (w). Then for each m ∈ N there is some I
i,j
m 3 x with some
xm ∈ wMoreAccr(w) and xm ∈ I
i,j
m . So e(x,xm) 6
√
1
mn
. Since wMoreAccr(w) is closed it
must therefore be that x ∈ wMoreAccr(w).
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without Normality
and
wMoreAccr(w
pos
n ) ⊇ wMoreAccr′(wposn ).
By the assumption that I is bounded we have that there are q0, q1 > 0 with
wMoreAccq1(w
neg
n )∩wMoreAccq1(w
pos
n ) ⊆ [−q0, q0]n, and therefore for all r 6 q1,
RectClBmr (w
neg
n ) ∩ wMoreAccr(wposn ) ⊆ [−q0 − 2, q0 + 2]n
We also have:⋂
r6q1
m∈N,m>0
RectClBmr (w
neg
n )∩wMoreAccr(wposn ) = wMoreAcc0(wnegn )∩wMoreAcc0(wposn ) = ∅.
And since I is continuous, each of these sets is closed.
[−q0− 2, q0 + 2]n is compact, so by the finite intersection property of compact
sets, there is some q > q1,M ∈ N such that
RectClBMq (w
neg
n ) ∩ wMoreAccq(wposn ) = ∅
Now take any x with I(x,wposn ) < q. So x ∈ wMoreAccq(wposn ).
Take
R := RectClBMq (w
neg
n ) ∪ {x}.
Define a sentence δ with a δ-agenda δ ↔ “c ∈ R”. This can be done by using
the diagonal lemma with the formula:
∨
wMoreAccr(w)∩I
i1,...,in
m 6=∅
|ij ·m|<q0 for j=1,. . . ,n
 ∧
j=1,...,n
(ij/m 6 P(
j︷ ︸︸ ︷
v∨. (v∨. (. . . (v∨. (v ∨. v) . . .))) 6 ij+1/m)

∨
∧
k=1,...,n
P(
j︷ ︸︸ ︷
v∨. (v∨. (. . . (v∨. (v ∨. v) . . .))) = xk
Observe SelfInacc(x) 6 q. So
wMoreAccSelfInacc(x)(w) ⊆ wMoreAccq(w) ⊆ RectClB
M
q (w)
for w ∈ {wposn ,wnegn }. Therefore
R ∩ wMoreAccSelfInacc(x)(wposn )
⊆ ({x} ∩ wMoreAccSelfInacc(q)(wposn )) ∪ (RectClB
M
q (w
neg
n ) ∩ wMoreAccSelfInacc(q)(wposn ))
⊆ {x}
and
R ⊇ RectClBMq (wnegn ) ⊇ wMoreAccx(wnegn )
So by Proposition 7.1.5, x minimizes SelfInacc.
Now take any x with I(x,wnegn ) < q. Then we can take R := RectClB
M
q (w
neg
n )\
{x} and apply analogous reasoning.
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One might have hoped that such accuracy considerations could lead to sup-
port for some generalized probabilism, in the sense of Williams (2014), or some
other nice constraints on the rationally required credal states. But I think this
shows that this is not possible since for any x sufficiently I-close to wposn we can
pick a sentence where x will minimize SelfInacc(c).
Corollary 7.A.2. If I satisfies the above then we can always find some δ where
SelfInacc(c) is minimized by some non-probabilistic x.
Proof. Using the above theorem we can find an N with the required properties.
Since I is truth directed we can therefore pick some x non-probabilistic with
I(x,wposn ) < 1N which suffices.
We should also be able to drop the condition that I is truth directed to some
extent, though continuity by itself is not enough. Continuity is essential to find
the splitting regions.
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Chapter 8
Dutch book Criterion
8.1 Introduction
We shall now consider the Dutch book argument. This says that a rational
agent should have a credal state which has the feature that if he buys bets at
prices governed by his credences then he will not buy a bet that will guarantee
him a monetary loss.1
In the framework that we are working in, there are sentences that talk about
probabilities. This means that the truth of such sentences depends on what the
agent’s credences are. Moreover we have sentences that talk about their own
probabilities, such as π, whose truth therefore depends on what the agent’s
credences are in that very sentence. What this can then lead to is the result
that whatever the agent’s credence in π is, if he bets in accordance with that
credence then there is a bet he will accept but which will lead him to guaranteed
loss of money.
So even if an agent values money positively and linearly and values nothing
else, he might be better not to bet at his credences. There are other cases
where it has been argued that an agent’s betting odds are not, or should not be,
identical to his degrees of belief even when the agent values money positively and
linearly and values nothing else. For example if the agent has less information
than the bookie (Talbott, 1991), the agent’s utilities are not linear in money
(Seidenfeld et al., 1990; Maher, 1993), he will be irrational at a future time
(Christensen, 1991), he is aware that the size or existence of a bet is correlated
with the truth of the propositions the bet is in (Bradley and Leitgeb, 2006),2
or when the proposition is unverifiable (Weatherson, 2003). We will add the
additional case: when the truth value of the sentence the agent is betting on
depends on his credences. It is a particularly non-pragmatic case of when betting
odds and degrees of belief may fall apart.
What we will do in this chapter is to see how far we can go under the
assumption that the agent does bet with his credences and try to determine what
the resulting rationally required credences are.3 In developing this criterion we
1Hájek (2008) can be consulted for an introduction to Dutch book arguments.
2These different cases are presented in Bradley and Leitgeb (2006).
3This could also be seen as an analysis of what the agent’s fair betting odds should be if
there are sentences which talk about his betting odds. So instead of considering a language
which can talk about the agent’s credences we instead consider a language which can talk
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will be expanding on ideas from Caie (2013). Caie does not think that Dutch
book arguments in fact have any normative force and I will not be arguing that
they do, but it is nonetheless an interesting question to consider for if one thinks
that they do have normative force. Certain interesting features may also arise
from considering this, for example, there turns out to be a connection between
self-inaccuracy and minimizing possible overall Dutch book losses (Section 8.5).
Since we want to reject both, it would in the future be interesting to see if how
the justification for rejecting them can be connected.
In this chapter we first present this result that any credal state can be
Dutch booked (Section 8.2). In Section 8.3 we consider how one can find a
Dutch book criterion that doesn’t fall silent too often and in Section 8.4 we
present our suggested proposal. This is that an agent should minimize her
overall guaranteed losses, which we understand by her minimizing her average
guaranteed losses on bets where there is just £1 at stake. In Section 8.5 we
present the aforementioned result that this criterion turns out to be the same
as Minimize Self-Inaccuracy using the inaccuracy measure AbsValDist. Finally
in Section 8.6 we return to the possibility that this is a case where an agent
should not bet with his credences, discussing how the agent’s credences should
determine her betting odds.
8.2 Any credal state can be Dutch booked
We write a bet on ϕ with stake r as (r, ϕ). This is the bet that gives the agent
£r if ϕ is true, and nothing if ϕ is false. For example for the bet (−1, ϕ), if ϕ
is true then the agent will receive £−1, i.e. have to pay £1.
The possible sets of bets over the agenda A = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} are of the form
B = {(r1, ϕ1), . . . , (rn, ϕn)} for any ri ∈ R. A Dutch book is some set of bets
where if the agent considers each individually he will decide to pay a certain
amount for each, but where if he pays that much the bets together lead him to
be guaranteed-ly out-of-pocket.
To formulate this, we will assume that the agent evaluates the individual
bets by using his credences, so an agent who has c(ϕ) = 0.7 will be willing to
pay any amount of money less than £0.70 for the bet (1, ϕ). More generally:
an agent who has credences c and bets with them will be willing to pay any
amount less than £rc(ϕ) to receive the bet (r, ϕ). He is indifferent between
paying £rc(ϕ) to receive the bet (r, ϕ) or not paying anything and not receiving
anything. We will make the simplifying assumption that he will always take a
bet at the fair-prices, which are the prices at which he is indifferent between
buying the bet or not. This assumption won’t play an essential role in the
discussion but will allow us to set things up more easily.
To keep the language simple we assume that he will also take collections
of such bets at the same prices. He will therefore pay anything less than
£
∑
i=1,...,n ric(ϕi) to receive the collection of bets {(r1, ϕ1), . . . , (rn, ϕn)}. How-
ever, the way we think this should be understood is not that he will actually
evaluate the collection at that price but instead that this measures the collection
of the individually evaluated prices, and a Dutch book shows the incoherence
about the agent’s fair betting odds. The question then becomes: consider the sentence,
πBetting ↔ FairBettingOddspπBettingq < 1/2. What should the agent’s fair betting price in
πBetting be?
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of an agent’s judgements of value: he evaluates the collection of these bets to
be worth less than the sum of the values of the individual bets.
If our agent has bought the collection of bets {(r1, ϕ1), . . . , (rn, ϕn)}, and
w is the actual world, then he will win £
∑
i=1,...,n riw(ϕi). The limit of his
potential loss on this collection of bets in w are therefore given by
Amount paid−Amount won
=
∑
i=1,...,n
ric(ϕi)−
∑
i=1,...,n
riw(ϕi)
=
∑
i=1,...,n
ri(c(ϕi)− w(ϕi))
We therefore define:
Definition 8.2.1. Let A = {ϕ1, . . . ϕn}. For c ∈ CredsA, w ∈ WorldsA, and
r1, . . . , rn ∈ R, define:
Loss{(r1,ϕ1),...,(rn,ϕn)}(c,w) =
∑
i=1,...,n
ri(c(ϕi)− w(ϕi))
Here we are using WorldsA as defined in Definition 6.2.6, i.e.
WorldsA = {MA | M ∈ ModPA,ROCFLP }.
Definition 8.2.2. Suppose A ⊆ SentL and c ∈ CredsA. A Dutch book against
c is some B, such that
for each w ∈WorldsA, LossB(c,w) > 0.
I.e. it is given by some ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ A and r1, . . . , rn ∈ R such that
for each w ∈WorldsA, Loss{(r1,ϕ1),...,(rn,ϕn)}(c,w) > 0
Here we have only defined Dutch books for agendas that do not depend on
the agent’s credences.4 In Definition 8.2.4 we will define Dutch books for self-ref
agendas.5
The standard Dutch book rational requirement says that an agent should
not have credences against which there is a Dutch book. We state that here,
again just for agendas that do not depend on the agent’s credences.
Rationality Criterion 3 (Usual Dutch Book Criterion). Suppose A ⊆ SentL
and c ∈ CredsA. An agent should not have credences c if there is a Dutch book
against c.
I.e. Fix A = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} ⊆ SentL. If there are some r1, . . . , rn ∈ R such
that for all w ∈WorldsA,6
Loss{(r1,ϕ1),...,(rn,ϕn)}(c,w) > 0
then c ∈ CredsA is irrational.
4We formalised this by restricting it to agendas which are ⊆ SentL. In fact we could apply
the same criterion whenever A doesn’t depend on P, i.e. if M,M′ ∈ ModPA,ROCFLP such that
for all ϕ ∈ SentL, M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ M′ |= ϕ, then for all ϕ ∈ A, M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ M′ |= ϕ. This
would, for example, also allow Ppϕq > r ∨Ppϕq < r to be a sentence in A. We do not do this
because it would just add complication without much additional benefit.
5This does not cover all agendas and a general characterisation of a Dutch book is desirable,
but we do not yet have that.
6We could instead define this to be > ε for some ε > 0, however this won’t essentially effect
our discussion here.
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There is a well-known that says that there is a Dutch book against c if and
only if c fails to satisfy the axioms of probability (over PA and ROCF, since we
have only allowed models of these theories to give WorldsA). So this implies that
to be rational according to Usual Dutch Book Criterion must have probabilistic
credences.
This theorem relies on the assumption that WorldsA is fixed as c varies, an
assumption that is legitimate for agendas that do not depend on the agent’s
credences. For sentences like π, a choice of the agent’s credences affect the
truth of π, and therefore the payoff of the bet. So the only loss that the agent
should care about is those in the worlds where the agent has the credences she
is considering. And betting at some values is basically choosing some credences,
since we are making the assumption that an agent must bet with his credences.
So for a credal state c, we should not focus on all of WorldsA, but just on those
members which cohere with c. If we are considering a self-ref agenda, this will
say that when an agent is considering c, he should only care about his losses in
wc.
So it turns out that the formulation of Dutch books is wrong when we
consider such sentences. We will now work through an example of how the
agent’s losses look when he bets on π.
Example 8.2.3. Consider π ↔ ¬Ppπq > 1/2.
Suppose c(π) > 1/2. Then the agent will pay £c(π) for (1, π). But since
c(π) > 1/2, π will be false. So he will lose the bet, and get £0, resulting in a
total loss of £c(π).
More precisely: Since we have supposed that c(π) > 1/2, we must be in a
world w where w(π) = 0. So then
Loss(1,π)(c,w) = c(π)− w(π) = c(π) > 1/2 > 0
And this holds for all ws where the agent has those credences.
Now suppose instead that c(π) 6> 1/2. Then π must be true. Consider his
loss in the bet (−1, π). We are then in some w where w(π) = 1 and his loss will
be:
Loss(−1,π)(c,w) = −c(π)− (−w(π)) = −c(π) + 1 > 1− 1/2 = 1/2 > 0
I.e. he will pay £−c(π) for the bet, and will win £−1 since then π would be
true.
So once the agent’s credences are fixed, he will be led to accepting bets which
guarantee him a monetary loss.
When we consider self-ref agendas, where a choice of credences fix the truth
values of the sentences, the payoff of each bet will depend only on the agent’s
credences. So once an agent fixes his credences, his loss will be a guaranteed
one.
We introduce some notation to refer to this guaranteed loss.
Definition 8.2.4. Suppose A is a self-ref agenda.
The agent’s loss on the set of bets B is:
GuarLossB(c) := LossB(c,wc)
If A is a self-ref agenda, and c ∈ CredsA, then B is a Dutch book against c if
GuarLossB(c) > 0.
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We now have two definitions of what a Dutch book against c is; the first was
given in Definition 8.2.2 and applied to credences defined on agendas which did
not refer to probability, the second was given just now and applies to credences
defined on self-ref agendas.
As a particular example of GuarLossB, consider when A is a δ-agenda.
Proposition 8.2.5. For the case where A is a δ-agenda with δ ↔ ‘ c ∈ R ’, we
therefore have7
GuarLossB(c) =
{
LossB(c,wδ) c ∈ R
LossB(c,w¬δ) c 6∈ R
The losses act nicely under extensions of self-ref agendas.
Proposition 8.2.6. If A′ ⊆ A are self-ref agendas, and suppose c ∈ CredsA
and c′ ∈ CredsA′ are such that c = c′ A, i.e. for ϕ ∈ A, c(ϕ) = c′(ϕ). Let B be
a set of bets defined on A′. Then:
GuarLossB(c) = GuarLossB(c
′)
We saw in Example 8.2.3 that whatever credence the agent had in π, there
is a bet which would lead him to a guaranteed loss. Sentences which have this
feature are undermining.
Undermining sentences are the really problematic ones. Ideally if δ were true,
one would want to have credences corresponding to wδ. But for the undermining
δ, having such a credal state implies that δ is false. And similarly if δ were
false, one would want to have credences corresponding to w¬δ. But for the
undermining δ, this will imply that δ is true. So these are the sentences where
one cannot have the ideal credences without undermining oneself.
Definition 8.2.7. Suppose δ is such that there is some δ-agenda, and let A be
the minimal such δ-agenda.
We say that δ is undermining if
wcδ(δ) = 0
and wc¬δ(δ) = 1
cδ refers to the credal state such that cδ(δ) = 1 and cδ(¬δ) = 0.
Example 8.2.8. • A probabilistic liar, π, with π ↔ Ppπq 6 1/2 is under-
mining.
7Therefore:
GuarLoss{(r,δ),(q,¬δ)}(c) =
{
rc(δ)− r + qc(¬δ) 〈c(δ), c(¬δ)〉 ∈ R
rc(δ) + qc(¬δ)− q 〈c(δ), c(¬δ)〉 /∈ R
|GuarLoss(1,δ)(c)| =
{
|1− c(δ)| c ∈ R
|c(δ)| c /∈ R
|GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c)| =
{
|c(¬δ)| c ∈ R
|1− c(¬δ)| c /∈ R
|GuarLoss{(1,δ),(1,¬δ)}(c)| = |c(δ) + c(¬δ)− 1|
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• A probabilistic truth-teller, η, with η ↔ Ppηq > 1/2 is not undermining.
Undermining δs also lead to guaranteed losses. To state this result we first
state facts about bets:
Definition 8.2.9. For a set of bets B = {(r1, ϕ1), . . . , (rn, ϕn)}, define:
−B := {(−r1, ϕ1), . . . , (−rn, ϕn)}
Proposition 8.2.10. For each collection of bets, B,
GuarLoss−B(c) = −GuarLossB(c).
As a result of this proposition, GuarLossB(c) > 0 iff GuarLoss−B(c) < 0.
Therefore, either B leads to a guaranteed loss, or −B leads to a guaranteed loss,
or both B and −B lead to a guaranteed break-even.
Proposition 8.2.11. The agent’s guaranteed loss on whichever of B or −B
doesn’t lead to a gain is |GuarLossB(c)|.
The agent is not led to a guaranteed loss on either B or −B iff GuarLossB(c) =
0.
So we can now state the result saying that considering some undermining δ
leads an agent to a guaranteed loss. This also says that there is a Dutch book
against every credal state.
Theorem 8.2.12. Let A be a δ-agenda and suppose δ is undermining.
Then for each c ∈ CredsA, there is some ϕ ∈ A where one of the bets (1, ϕ)
or (−1, ϕ) will lead to a guaranteed loss.
Proof. Suppose c doesn’t lead to a loss on any of these unit bets. Then for
each ϕ ∈ A,
0 = |GuarLoss(1,ϕ)(c)| = |Loss(1,ϕ)(c,wc)| = |c(ϕ)− wc(ϕ)|
so c(ϕ) = wc(ϕ) for each ϕ ∈ A, so in fact c = wc.
Since A is a δ-agenda, wc ∈ {wδ,w¬δ}.
wc = wδ =⇒ wδ = wcδ =⇒ wcδ(δ) = 1
wc = w¬δ =⇒ w¬δ = wc¬δ =⇒ wc¬δ(δ) = 0
So either wcδ(δ) = 1 or wc¬δ(δ) = 0, and therefore δ cannot be undermining.
The existence of some agenda that leads to a guaranteed loss was already
shown in Caie (2013), namely the agenda {π,¬π} because of the result described
in Example 8.2.3. We have extended that result by showing a range of situations
where an agent is lead to a guaranteed loss. Since we have shown that the agent
will be to a guaranteed loss on one of the single unit bets, we cannot avoid this
problem by restricting our attention to such bets.
The question, which we will attempt to answer in Sections 8.3 and 8.4, then
is:
Do Dutch book considerations lead to any rational constraints, and
how should Usual Dutch Book Criterion be modified?
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8.3 Failed attempts to modify the criterion
One could of course include an “if possible” constraint so then it is always
satisfiable, resulting in the suggestion:
Rationality Criterion 4 (Usual Dutch Book With “If Possible”). If possible,
an agent should have credences c such that agent is not guaranteed a loss on
some B.
In fact we will add an “if possible” clause to each of our considered rational
requirements, however we want to do more than that because there are situations
where this criterion will then fall silent, but where there are credal states that
look better or worse from a Dutch book perspective.
For example in the case of π, having credence c(π) = 0 will guarantee our
agent a loss of £1 in the bet (−1, π), whereas having a credal state with c(π) =
0.6 will guarantee him a loss of £0.60 in the same bet. So all other things being
equal, he should prefer a credal state with c(π) = 0.6 to one where c(π) = 0. So
perhaps we could give an alternative criterion which still leads to constraints in
some cases where the agent is guaranteed a loss.
Caie does give a suggestion for how to modify Usual Dutch Book With “If
Possible” to do this.
LOSS MINIMIZATION If an agent is guaranteed to value as
fair some set of losing bets, then the agent should, if possible, have
a credal state that minimizes her possible loss. (Caie, 2013, p. 573)
To formalise this we will need to say what it for an agent to minimize his possible
guaranteed losses.
In virtue of Proposition 8.2.11 we can attempt to explicate Caie’s proposal
by saying that an agent should be minimizing the |GuarLossB(c)|. The agent’s
guaranteed loss on a set of bets B is exactly the same as his guaranteed gain on
−B. So by minimizing his possible losses, he also minimizes his possible gains.
A risk-seeking agent might take that chance and just hope that the bookie will
choose the bets which he will be able to achieve a guaranteed gain from. So in
stating Minimize Loss With All B we are in a sense assuming that our agent is
risk-avoiding.
Caie does not explicitly mention which bets to consider, but one proposal
might be to minimize |GuarLossB(c)| for all collections of bets B. However, we
will show that that is the wrong collection of bets to consider as it often falls
silent in cases where it shouldn’t.
Rationality Criterion 5 (Minimize Loss With All B). Suppose A is a self-ref
agenda. An agent should, if possible, have credences c such that for each B,
the agent minimizes his loss on whichever of B and −B do not lead to a gain.
I.e. such that |GuarLossB(c)| is minimized.
We can show that Minimize Loss With All B is also very often not satisfiable.
In fact we can show that it is never satisfied for undermining δ, at least whenever
{δ,¬δ} is a δ-agenda. So it hasn’t achieved much gain, if any, over the original
Usual Dutch Book Criterion. This result is Corollary 8.3.3.
Proposition 8.3.1. Let A ⊇ {δ,¬δ} be a self-ref agenda. If the agent mini-
mizes both |GuarLoss(1,δ)(c)| and |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c)| then c(δ) ∈ {0, 1} or c(¬δ) ∈
{0, 1}.
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Proof. Suppose that b with b(δ) /∈ {0, 1} minimizes both of these. We have
two cases to consider: firstly if wb(δ) = 1, we will show that then b(¬δ) = 1,
secondly if wb(δ) = 0, we can then show that b(¬δ) = 0.
Suppose wb(δ) = 1. Then |GuarLoss(1,δ)(b)| = |b(δ) − wb(δ)| = |b(δ) − 1| > 0.
Let c〈1,1〉 refer to some credal state in CredsA with c〈1,1〉(δ) = 1 and c〈1,1〉(¬δ) =
1. Observe that, since b is assumed to minimize |GuarLoss(1,δ)(c)|, we must
have:
|GuarLoss(1,δ)(c〈1,1〉)| > |GuarLoss(1,δ)(b)| > 0
so 0 < |c〈1,1〉(δ)− wc〈1,1〉(δ)| = |1− wc〈1,1〉(δ)|
so wc〈1,1〉(δ) 6= 1
so wc〈1,1〉(δ) = 0
Now, consider (1,¬δ).
|GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c〈1,1〉)| = |c〈1,1〉(¬δ)− 1| = 0
So, since b is assumed to minimize |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c)|, we have:
so 0 = |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(b)| = |b(¬δ)− 1|
so b(¬δ) = 1
A similar argument holds for wb(δ) = 0. Suppose wb(δ) = 0. Since GuarLoss(1,δ)(b) =
0, it must be that GuarLoss(1,δ)(c〈0,0〉) > 0, so wc〈0,0〉(δ) = 0, and therefore
GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c〈0,0〉) = 0. It must therefore be that 0 = GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(b) =
|1− b(¬δ)|, so b(¬δ) = 1.
Proposition 8.3.2. Let A be a self-ref agenda and c ∈ CredsA. If c minimizes
|GuarLoss{(1,δ),(1,¬δ)}(c)| then c(¬δ) = 1− c(δ).
Proof. |GuarLoss{(1,δ),(1,¬δ)}(c)| = |c(δ) + c(¬δ) − 1|. This is equal to 0 iff
c(¬δ) = 1− c(δ), so it is minimized at exactly these points.
Corollary 8.3.3. Suppose δ is undermining and {δ,¬δ} is a δ-agenda. Then
for each c ∈ Creds{δ,¬δ} there is some
B ∈ {(1, δ), (1,¬δ), {(1, δ), (1,¬δ)}}
such that c does not minimize |GuarLossB(c)|.
Proof. Suppose b minimizes each of |GuarLoss(1,δ)(b)|, |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(b)| and
|GuarLoss{(1,δ),(1,¬δ)}(b)|. Then by Propositions 8.3.1 and 8.3.2, it must be
that b(¬δ) = 1 − b(δ) and either b(δ) ∈ {0, 1} or b(¬δ) ∈ {0, 1}. It must
therefore be that b = wδ or b = w¬δ. But, we have assumed that δ is under-
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mining, we can see that |GuarLoss(1,δ)(b)| = |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(b)| = 1,8 whereas
|GuarLoss(1,δ)(c〈0.5,0.5〉)| = |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c〈0.5,0.5〉)| = 0.5. So b does not min-
imize each of these.
Corollary 8.3.5. Suppose {δ,¬δ} is a δ-agenda and δ is undermining. If A ⊇
{δ,¬δ} then for each c ∈ CredsA there is some B ∈ {(1, δ), (1,¬δ), {(1, δ), (1,¬δ)}}
such that c does not minimize |GuarLossB(c)|.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 8.3.2 using Proposition 8.2.6.
The first way we consider altering this requirement is to restrict the kinds
of bets considered. Caie might have had this kind of restriction in mind as he
only explicitly considers the single bets on δ and ¬δ and not sets of bets.
Definition 8.3.6. For a set of bets B = {(r1, ϕ1), . . . , (rn, ϕn)}, define:
q · B := {(q · r1, ϕ1), . . . , (q · rn, ϕn)}
If we are only interested in losses on single bets, we only need to consider
the unit bets because of the following result.
Proposition 8.3.7.
GuarLossrB(c) = r · GuarLossB(c)
Therefore,
|GuarLoss(r,ϕ)(c)| = |r| · |(1, ϕ)|.
Note that we also have:9
GuarLoss{(r1,ϕ1),...,(rn,ϕn)}(c)
= r1 · GuarLoss(1,ϕ)(c) + . . .+ rn · GuarLoss(1,ϕn)(c).
This shows that we only need to consider the |GuarLoss(r,ϕ)(c)| for r = 1,
i.e. only consider unit bets, as minimizing this will lead to minimizing the losses
on single bets at any stake.
Rationality Criterion 6 (Minimize Guaranteed Losses Unit Bets). Suppose
A is a self-ref agenda.An agent should if possible have credences c such that
agent minimizes each of |GuarLoss(1,ϕ)(c)| for ϕ ∈ A.
8Because:
Proposition 8.3.4. Suppose A ⊇ {δ,¬δ} is a self-ref agenda and δ is undermining. Then
for b ∈ {wδ,w¬δ} and ϕ ∈ {δ,¬δ}, we have
|GuarLoss(1,ϕ)(b)| = 1
Proof.
|GuarLoss(1,δ)(wδ)| = |wδ(δ)− wcδ (δ)| = |1− 0| = 1
|GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(wδ)| = |wδ(¬δ)− wcδ (¬δ)| = |0− 1| = 1
|GuarLoss(1,δ)(w¬δ)| = |w¬δ(δ)− wc¬δ (δ)| = |0− 1| = 1
|GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(w¬δ)| = |w¬δ(¬δ)− wc¬δ (¬δ)| = |1− 0| = 1
9But note that |GuarLoss{(r1,ϕ1),...,(rn,ϕn)}(c)| is not necessarily equal to r1 ·
|GuarLoss(1,ϕ)(c)|+ . . .+ rn · |GuarLoss(1,ϕn)(c)|.
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This is satisfiable in more situations. For example it is satisfiable in the case
of π ↔ ¬Ppπq > 1/2, and in fact whenever {δ} is a self-ref agenda.
Example 8.3.8. Consider π ↔ ¬Ppπq > 1/2 and A = {π,¬π}.
Observe that
|GuarLoss(1,π)(c)| =
{
|1− c(π)| c(π) 6> 1/2
|c(π)| c(π) > 1/2
|GuarLoss(1,¬π)(c)| =
{
|c(¬π)| c(π) 6> 1/2
|1− c(¬π)| c(π) > 1/2
So we can consider the losses geometrically to be the horizontal and vertical
distances as in Fig. 8.1.
w¬δ
wδ
10
1
0
c(¬π)
c(π)
GuarLoss(1,π)(c)
GuarLoss(1,π)(c)
GuarLoss(1,¬π)(c)
GuarLoss(1,¬π)(c)
Figure 8.1: A visualisation of GuarLoss(1,π)(c) and GuarLoss(1,¬π)(c).
It is then clear that the horizontal and vertical distances are both minimized
at the point 〈0.5, 1〉.
Working through non-geometrically we have:
If c(π) < 1/2, then |GuarLoss(1,π)(c)| = |1− c(π)| > 1/2.
If c(π) > 1/2, then |GuarLoss(1,π)(c)| = |c(π)| > 1/2.
So the minimal guaranteed loss on (1, π) is 1/2, which is obtained whenever
c(π) = 1/2.
For c(π) = 1/2, then |GuarLoss(1,¬π)(c)| = |1−c(¬π)|, which = 0 iff c(¬π) = 1.
So by having credal state c(π) = 1/2 and c(¬π) = 1 the agent can minimize
his guaranteed losses on both (1, π) and (1,¬π).
However, due to Proposition 8.3.1, to be rational one must have extremal
credences. This is an undesirable feature.
We also know that in some situations this criterion falls silent, for example:
Proposition 8.3.9. Consider
δ ↔ (Ppδq 6 0.5 ∨ (Ppδq 6 0.55 ∧ Pp¬δq > 0.2)).
There is no c that minimizes both |GuarLoss(1,δ)(c)| and |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c)|.
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Proof. We represent this situation diagrammatically in Fig. 8.2.
b
b′
c(¬δ)
c(δ) 10
1
0
GuarLoss(1,δ)(c)
GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c)
b(δ) = 0.5
b(¬δ) = 0
b′(δ) = 0.55
b′(¬δ) = 0.2
Figure 8.2: Example of δ where no credal state minimizes both GuarLoss(1,δ)(c)
and GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c).
Then
• |GuarLoss(1,δ)(b)| = 0.5
• |GuarLoss(1,δ)(b′)| = 0.45
• |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(b)| = 0
• |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(b′)| = 0.2
So neither b nor b′ minimizes both.
|GuarLoss(1,δ)(c)| can, as in Example 8.3.8, be visualised as the horizontal dis-
tance between the credal state and the appropriate vertical axis (depending
on whether wc(δ) = 1 or not). So the minimal such distance is obtained at
credal states 〈0.55, y〉 with y > 0.2.
But for such credal states |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c)| > 0.2, whereas |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(b)| =
0.
The way that we propose to instead weaken Minimize Loss With All B is
to ask that the agent should minimize his overall guaranteed loss (over the
bets that do not guarantee a gain). This will play a role when the agent can-
not simultaneously minimize each of the guaranteed losses, as for example in
Proposition 8.3.9.
8.4 The proposal – minimize the overall guar-
anteed loss
We now need to characterise what it is for an agent to minimize his overall
guaranteed loss.
If we only consider single bets and not collections of bets, we just need to
evaluate the agent’s guaranteed losses on the unit bets, i.e. |GuarLoss(1,ϕ)(c)| for
ϕ ∈ A. This is because GuarLoss(r,ϕ)(c) = r · GuarLoss(1,ϕ)(c).
There are two natural ways to measure the agents overall losses on the unit
bets. The first is to minimize his average losses, and the second is his maximum
losses. This leads us to the following two possible criteria:
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Rationality Criterion 7 (Minimize Average-Unit-Guaranteed-Loss). Suppose
A is a (finite) self-ref agenda.
An agent should, if possible, have credences c such that he minimizes his
average-unit-guaranteed-loss, which is:∑
ϕ∈A|GuarLoss(1,ϕ)(c)|
|A|
Rationality Criterion 8 (Minimize Maximum-Unit-Guaranteed-Loss). 10 Sup-
pose A is a (finite) self-ref agenda.
An agent should, if possible, have credences that minimize his maximum-
unit-guaranteed-loss, which is:
max{|GuarLoss(1,ϕ)(c)| | ϕ ∈ A}
Consider again the example from Proposition 8.3.9.
Example 8.4.1. Consider
δ ↔ (Ppδq 6 0.5 ∨ (Ppδq 6 0.55 ∧ Pp¬δq > 0.2)).
And the agenda {δ,¬δ}. Let b = 〈0.5, 0〉 and b′ = 〈0.55, 0.2〉 as in Fig. 8.2.
We have:
• |GuarLoss(1,δ)(b)| = 0.5
• |GuarLoss(1,δ)(b′)| = 0.45
• |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(b)| = 0
• |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(b′)| = 0.2
So neither b nor b′ minimizes both guaranteed losses and also neither does any
other credal state.
The agent’s average-unit-guaranteed-loss is:
• At b:
0.5 + 0
2
= 0.25
• At b′:
0.45 + 0.2
2
= 0.325
So Minimize Average-Unit-Guaranteed-Loss says that b is better than b′, and
in fact it will lead to b as being required by rationality because there is no other
credal state that has lower average losses.
The agent’s maximum-unit-guaranteed-loss is:
• At b:
max{0.5, 0} = 0.5
• At b′:
max{0.45, 0.2} = 0.45
10This suggestion was made to me by Patrick LaVictoire.
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So Minimize Maximum-Unit-Guaranteed-Loss says that b′ is better than b, and
in fact it will lead to b′ as being required by rationality because there is no other
credal state that has lower maximum losses.
The problem with Minimize Maximum-Unit-Guaranteed-Loss is that it does
not require the agent to minimize both of |GuarLoss(1,δ)(c)| and |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c)|
if he can do so. So it does not imply Minimize Guaranteed Losses Unit Bets.
For example:
Example 8.4.2. Consider again
π ↔ ¬Ppπq > 1/2
and A = {π,¬π}.
As in Example 8.3.8, |GuarLoss(1,π)(c)| > 1/2 and = 1/2 iff c(π) = 1/2.
Now, for the credal states with c(π) = 1/2, π is true, so |GuarLoss(1,¬π)(c)| =
|c(¬π)| which is minimized (and = 0) at c(¬π) = 1.
So the credal state 〈1/2, 1〉 minimizes the agent’s losses on bets on π and
¬π. However, for all the credal states 〈1/2, r〉 with r ∈ [1/2, 3/2], The agent’s
maximum-unit-guaranteed-loss is:
max{|1− r|, 1/2} = 1/2
So this measure sees each of these credal states as equally good. It therefore
would not lead to the requirement to have credal state 〈1/2, 1〉 but would count
as rationally permissible all these credal states. If our agent is in fact keen to
minimize his overall losses, this would seem to be a bad way to do it as he leaves
himself open to more possible guaranteed losses. See Fig. 8.3.
w¬δ
wδ
10
1
0
c(¬δ)
c(δ)
GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c)
GuarLoss(1,δ)(c)
Figure 8.3: The credal states that are permissible according to Minimize
Maximum-Unit-Guaranteed-Loss
If one is interested in minimizing overall guaranteed loss, this then seems to
be a bad measure. We therefore suggest that we should focus on minimizing
the expected loss, as given by Minimize Average-Unit-Guaranteed-Loss.
In this criterion we focused only on single bets and not on collections of bets.
That allows us simplicity, but perhaps would lead to undesirable consequences
as it might deem one credal state rationally required which is good when only
single bets are considered but very bad according to sets of bets. If an agent
is up for taking sets of bets he should also try to minimize his losses on these.
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In Section 8.A we have presented some suggestions for how one could minimize
losses also on collections of bets, but we will not study these further.
This kind of question of how to minimize his overall guaranteed loss may
connect to the question of measuring how incoherent a credence function must
be by determining what Dutch book losses he is susceptible to. This is a question
studied by Schervish et al. (2000, 2002, 2003) and discussed in De Bona and
Finger (2014); Staffel (2015). Further analysis on the connection between these
is left for future work.
8.5 The connection to SelfInacc
We first show that in fact the Dutch book criterion that we have suggested is a
version of the accuracy criterion using particular inaccuracy measures. This is
an interesting connection.
The definition in Minimize Average-Unit-Guaranteed-Loss means that we
can consider his overall loss as a measure of inaccuracy of the agent’s credences
in terms of the distance from world where he has those credences.
Definition 8.5.1. The absolute value distance, AbsValDist is
AbsValDist(〈x1, . . . , xn〉 , 〈y1, . . . , yn〉) :=
∑
i=1,...,n |xi − yi|
n
We use the same name to denote the inaccuracy measure, so for A =
{ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} and c ∈ CredsA,
AbsValDist(c,w) := AbsValDist(〈c(ϕ1), . . . , c(ϕn)〉, 〈w(ϕ1), . . . ,w(ϕn)〉)
=
∑
i=1,...,n|c(ϕi)− wc(ϕi)|
n
The un-normalized variants have also been called the taxicab distance, `1-
distance and Manhattan distance.
Proposition 8.5.2.∑
ϕ∈A|GuarLoss(1,ϕ)(c)|
|A|
=
∑
ϕ∈A|c(ϕ)− wc(ϕ)|
|A|
= AbsValDist(c,wc)
= SelfInaccAbsValDist(c)
Therefore the rationality constraint from Minimize Average-Unit-Guaranteed-
Loss is the same as Minimize Self-Inaccuracy with the inaccuracy measure AbsValDist.
This means that one can consider this as a version of Minimize Self-Inaccuracy.
So for self-ref agendas, minimizing overall Dutch book loss corresponds to min-
imizing self-inaccuracy. AbsValDist is not a proper inaccuracy measure and so
it generally taken to be an illegitimate inaccuracy measure. It cannot be used
for the traditional accuracy argument because in the traditional accuracy setup,
some non-probabilistic credal states will not be dominated. But it does have
some prima facie intuitive appeal and it has been argued for in Maher (2002).
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AbsValDist satisfies TruthDirectedness and Normality, so we have that the
results from Section 7.2 still hold, so it leads to the failure of probabilism,
rational introspection and logical omniscience and leads to the requirement to
explicitly restrict credences to being in the unit interval.
There is also an interesting connection between Minimize Self-Inaccuracy
and Minimize Maximum-Unit-Guaranteed-Loss.
Proposition 8.5.3.
max{GuarLoss(1,ϕ)(c) | ϕ ∈ A} = SelfInacc`
∞
(c)
Therefore the rationality constraint from Minimize Maximum-Unit-Guaranteed-
Loss is the same as Minimize Self-Inaccuracy with respect to inaccuracy measure
`∞, where
`∞(〈x1, . . . , xn〉 , 〈y1, . . . , yn〉) := max{|xi − yi| | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}.
The other suggestions in Section 8.A will lead to similar correspondences
with other I, but it is not yet clear that the I corresponding to these will
satisfy any nice properties.
In fact for any criterion that assigns to each possible credal state some single
value of utility, or in fact we consider the disutility, called D, for example the
expected loss on bets, or maximum loss on bets, we can understand the criterion
of minimizing D as to be the same as minimizing SelfInaccID for ID defined by:
ID(c,wc) := D(c)
What is particularly interesting about the criteria that we consider is that they
correspond to natural inaccuracy measures.
In Section 7.2.5 we showed that Minimize Self-Inaccuracy was inaccuracy
measure dependent, so we see that if we choose an alternative inaccuracy mea-
sure, like, e.g., the Brier score or the logarithmic score, (self-)accuracy and
Dutch book considerations lead to different rationally required credences.
8.6 Don’t bet with your credences
A natural response to the challenges faced by the Dutch book criterion is to
drop the assumption that the agent should bet with his credences. This is an
example of where even an agent who values money positively, in a linear way and
does not value anything else at all, positively or negatively, should sometimes
not sanction as fair monetary bets at odds matching his degrees of belief.
This is an assumption that could not be dropped if we take the traditional
behaviourist perspective that all credences are defined or characterised by an
agent’s betting behaviour: where what it means for an agent to have credence
1/2 in ϕ is that he will pay anything up to £0.50 for (1, ϕ). However, we do not
assume that that is all there is to an agent’s credences.
Let’s now consider what happens if we drop the assumption that the agent
bets with his credences.
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8.6.1 How degrees of belief determine the fair betting
odds
There are still connections between the agent’s degrees of belief and her rational
betting behaviour, but the fair betting odds may not be equal to the credences
in cases of self-ref agendas.
For example: If an agent currently has b(π) = 0, then π would be true, so
if we are assuming the agent is introspective and aware of this, he should be
willing to pay anything up to £1 for (1, π). So
FairBettingOddsb(π) = wb(π)
More generally, if we take a self-ref agenda A, and b ∈ CredsA we have
FairBettingOddsb(ϕ) = wb(ϕ).
And so when offered a collection of bets, the agent should be willing to pay
anything up to:11
FairBettingOddsb({(r1, ϕ1), . . . , (rn, ϕn)}) =
∑
i=1,...,n
ri · wb(ϕi).
This is because that is exactly the amount that the agent knows he will win by
taking this collection of bets so he should be willing to pay anything up to this
value to buy that collection of bets.
We would like to provide a general account of how an agent’s fair betting
odds should match his credences. This special case where A is a self-ref agenda
is given by FairBettingOddsb(ϕ) = wb(ϕ). The special case where A doesn’t refer
to P, we should have
FairBettingOddsb(ϕ) = b(ϕ)
i.e. the agent should bet in accordance with his credences. But what about for
Heads ∨ π? Perhaps
FairBettingOddsb(Heads ∨ π) =
{
b(Heads) b(π) > 1/2
1 otherwise
.
It is left to future work to see whether this is the appropriate answer and
how this might be generalised.
8.6.2 Moving to the credal state corresponding to the fair
betting odds?
So what we have been suggesting in this section is: instead of betting with his
current degrees of belief, the agent should instead bet at the fair betting odds.
The fair betting odds correspond to some credal state which will be different
to his current degrees of belief. Insofar as the pay-off of the bets depend on
the agent’s credences, they depend on his current degrees of belief instead of
the function which corresponds to his betting prices. In this way he can avoid
11Note that we are abusing terminology because we are using FairBettingOddsb() for both
sentences and collections of bets. This should not cause confusion because we can say that
what we mean by FairBettingOddsb(ϕ) is FairBettingOddsb((1, ϕ)).
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being led to a guaranteed loss. For the case of self-ref agendas and introspective
agents, if the agent is in credal state b, this then says that he should bet at the
odds determined by wb.
12
A further step might be to ask the agent to shift his beliefs in accordance
with the appropriate fair betting prices. So if he currently in credal state b,
then he will want to bet in accordance with credal state wb, i.e. assign degree
of belief 1 or 0 to each sentence depending on whether it is true or not if b is
the interpretation of P. However, if he does shift his beliefs in this way, once
he has shifted he will again wish to shift: no credal state is stable. We showed
this in Theorem 8.2.12 by showing that for every credal state (at least those
which assigns a numerical degree of belief to some undermining sentence, for
example π), there will be some bet where the credences which he should bet
with are different from his current credences. So instead we suggest that he
should perhaps be content with the situation and just bet with some credal
state that is not his own one.
Appendix 8.A Options for Dutch book criteria
We here present some alternatives to Minimize Average-Unit-Guaranteed-Loss
that also consider sets of bets.
Our first suggestion is that the agent should minimize his expected losses
on the bets of the form {(r, δ), (1 − r,¬δ)} with r ∈ [0, 1]2. These are the bets
where there is £1 at stake.
Rationality Criterion 9. Suppose A is a self-ref agenda. An agent should
have credences that minimize
1/2 ·
( ∫ 1
0
|GuarLoss{(r,δ),(1−r,¬δ)}(c)|dr
+
∫ 1
0
|GuarLoss{(−r,δ),(1−r,¬δ)}(c)|dr
)
Another possible suggestion is to focus on the bets (1, δ), (1,¬δ), {(1, δ), (1,¬δ)}
and {(1, δ),−(1,¬δ)}.
Rationality Criterion 10. Suppose A is a self-ref agenda. An agent should
have credences that minimize
1/4
(
|GuarLoss(1,δ)(c)|+ |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c)|
+ |GuarLoss{(1,δ),(1,¬δ)}(c)|+ |GuarLoss{(1,δ),−(1,¬δ)}(c)|
)
Alternatively we could consider not minimizing the expected, or average,
guaranteed loss but instead minimizing the maximum guaranteed loss, so more
similar now to Rationality Criterion 8. We would have to restrict to bets of a
certain “size” to ensure that the guaranteed loss is bounded in order to obtain
some rational requirement.
12We can now observe a connection between this don’t-bet-with-your-credences analysis
and the accuracy considerations. Our proposal when we considered the accuracy criterion
was that was that of 2b from Section 7.3 where (for introspective agents and self-ref agendas)
the inaccuracy should be evaluated as Estb(I(c, ·)), which for any inaccuracy measure that
is truth-directed will also be minimized at the credences corresponding to wb. Perhaps this
connection could also be generalised, also using the observations in Section 8.5, but that is
left for future work.
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Rationality Criterion 11. An agent should have credences that minimize
max{GuarLoss{(r,δ),(q,¬δ)}(c) | |r|+ |q| 6 1}
A bet of the form {(r, δ), ((1− r),¬δ)} gives a weighted average of the bets
(1, δ) and (1,¬δ). However, the guaranteed loss on the set of bets is not a
weighted average of the guaranteed loss on the single bets. As a result, the
rational requirements in Minimize Average-Unit-Guaranteed-Loss and may dif-
fer.13
However, the fact that the bets of the form {(r, δ), (1− r,¬δ)} are weighted
averages of the unit bets, this suggests that the unit bets are the primitive ones.
The motivations between all these three suggestions are the same so we should
focus on the one where we consider just unit bets. The result of considering
either Rationality Criterion 9 or 10 is that the expected loss is pulled towards
favouring the probabilistic credences.
These options should be further studied but we will not do that in this thesis.
13If it were the case that |GuarLoss{(r,δ),(q,¬δ)}(c)| = r · |GuarLoss(1,δ)(c)| + q ·
|GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c)| then one would have that∫ 1
0
|GuarLoss{(r,δ),(1−r,¬δ)}(c)|dr =
|GuarLoss(1,δ)(c)|+ |GuarLoss(1,¬δ)(c)|
2
and therefore that Minimize Average-Unit-Guaranteed-Loss and in fact give the same rational
requirements.
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Conclusions
In this thesis we have been studying frameworks which have sentences that can
talk about their own probabilities. We have seen that these face a number of
challenges.
In Part I we focused on developing semantics and theories for this language.
We developed a number of different semantics, which each have their advantages
and disadvantages. We have therefore not provided a definitive answer to the
question of which sentences are true or not, i.e. which is the correct semantics,
but have presented a number of interesting options.
In Chapters 3 and 4 we developed a Kripke-style semantics that worked over
probabilistic modal structures in a similar manner to that developed in Halbach
and Welch (2009). This allows for fixed points which are in a sense stable or look
best from their own perspective. This informal way of talking is hopefully made
precise by saying that these fixed points minimize the estimated inaccuracy from
their own perspective. This was considered in Section 7.3.4.
A feature of the semantics from Chapter 3, which uses a strong Kleene
evaluation scheme, is that we can see it as assigning sentences intervals as prob-
ability values instead of single numbers. Certain axioms of probability have
to be dropped, for example P=1pλ ∨ ¬λq is not satisfied in the construction.
This means that the intervals of probabilities are not the same as those stud-
ied the imprecise probability literature. The intervals can instead be seen as
non-classical probabilities over (logics arising from) strong Kleene evaluation
schemes. A advantage of using this evaluation scheme is that it is composi-
tional and we are able to obtain an axiomatisation which carries a completeness
aspect to it once one accepts the ω-rule to fix the standard model of arithmetic.
We obtain imprecise probabilities in Chapter 4, where we consider a super-
valuational variant of the Kripke style semantics. In fact there we did not then
do something directly analogous to that in Chapter 3 which would have also
resulted in assigning intervals of probabilities to sentences.1 Instead we worked
with understanding an agent’s credal state as a set of probability functions.
This is a variant of imprecise probabilities that has been well studied and it
is more general version than just considering intervals. A very nice feature of
working with this (possibly non-convex) sets-of-probabilities version of imprecise
probabilities is that we obtain the result that in the relevant fixed points every
1That would have still been different to Chapter 3 because for example λ∨¬λ would have
been assigned a precise probability 1.
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member of the credal state looks best from some (possibly different) member’s
perspective. We again suggest that this can be made precise using minimizing
estimated inaccuracy considerations, where estimated inaccuracy is calculated
by deferring to the probabilistic modal structures, though the exact details and
interpretation of this need to be further studied in future work.
In Chapter 5 we considered a revision semantics instead of a Kripke-style
semantics. A major advantage of these semantics is that one retains classical
logic and traditional probability theory but the price to pay is that one obtains
a transfinite sequence of interpretations and identifying any particular interpre-
tation as “correct” is problematic. In the chapter we paid careful attention to
finding limit stages that can themselves be used as good models for probability
and truth. This is a focus that is not usually present when revision theories are
studied. This lead to limit stages where the probability function satisfies the
usual (finitely-additive) probability axioms and the truth predicate is maximally
consistent; these are features which are not obtained in the usual revision con-
struction. In this chapter we suggested a number of different revision sequences.
The style of sequence considered in Section 5.2 used the idea of relative frequen-
cies in the revision sequence up to that stage to define the next interpretation
of probability, extending ideas from Leitgeb (2012). This results in an interest-
ing construction that is best understood as providing something like semantic
probabilities but isn’t suitable for providing a semantics for modelling subjective
probabilities. We therefore considered, in Section 5.3, using probabilistic modal
structures to develop a revision sequence, which allows for this subjective in-
terpretation of the probability notion. In giving this we provided a few options
for how to characterise the limit stage. To allow Probabilistic Convention T to
be satisfied we gave a limit definition which we showed to be satisfiable using
generalised Banach limits. However the revision sequence that we favour rejects
Probabilistic Convention T and instead requires the limit stage to sum up the
results from the previous stages in a strong way.
One reason to develop a semantics is to better understand these languages.
In all the semantics we developed using probabilistic modal structures, we can
then see that certain principles may need to be reformulated. For example we
noted that if a principle of introspection is instead expressed using a truth pred-
icate to do the job of quotation and disquotation we obtain a principle which
is satisfied in exactly the probabilistic modal structures that are introspective
(which is exactly those that satisfy the usual introspection principle in the op-
erator language). This style of reformulation was suggested in Stern (2014a,b)
for the case of (all-or-nothing) modalities.
In Part II we focused on the subjective interpretation of probability and
considered how arguments for rationality requirements apply in such a frame-
work. For self-referential sentences, a choice of the agent’s credences will affect
which worlds are possible. Caie (2013) argued that the accuracy and Dutch
book arguments should be modified because the agent should only care about
her inaccuracy or payoffs in the world which could be actual if she adopted the
considered credences. We considered the accuracy argument in Chapter 7 and
the Dutch book argument in Chapter 8. Both these accuracy and Dutch book
criteria mean that an agent is rationally required to be probabilistically incoher-
ent, have negative credences and to fail to assign the same credence to logically
equivalent sentences. We also showed that that accuracy criterion depends on
how inaccuracy is measured and that it differs from the Dutch book criterion (at
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least when the inaccuracy measure is not AbsValDist). We end up rejecting the
proposed modification of the accuracy criterion and the Dutch book criterion.
In Section 7.3, we reconsidered the accuracy criterion and instead suggested that
the agent should consider the estimation of how accurate her credences are, from
the perspective of her current credences, where the estimation is taken using the
probabilistic modal structure. We also discussed how to generalise this version
of the accuracy criterion and presented ideas suggesting that it connects to the
semantics developed in Part I. This can then provide some formal meaning to
the discussion in Part I that fixed points look best from their own perspectives.
In Section 8.6 we suggested that this is a case where an agent should not bet
with his credences.
There are still many open questions that this thesis has left, but we hope
to have given some clarity to the question of how languages with self-referential
probabilities may work.
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FormL, 18
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`∞, 211
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GuarLossB(c), 200
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N, 17
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N-model, 11
NAddPr, 45
T, 24
LT, 24
LT, 24
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LP> , 24
LP>,T, 57
Momn, 36
p as given by M, w and f , 67
BanLimµ, 142
IntroNAddPr, 45
PA, 17
T, 24
depth(ϕ), 69
lfp, 65
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−B, 202
CredsA, 162
CredsSentP , 162
(M,p)(w), 41
σ-algebra, 10
.. , 18
ϕ is closed, 123
ϕ is stably satisfied, 126
ζα+1, 121
◦, 18
f evaluates ϕ positively at w, 58
kα+1, 121
LPA, 17
tN, 18
δ-agenda, 163
absolute value distance,
AbsValDist, 210
additive and continuous strictly
proper inaccuracy
measure, 188
agenda, A, 161
average-unit-guaranteed-loss, 208
Boolean algebra over Ω, 10
C ⊆ Mod is closed, 123
C ⊆Mod is closed, 140
consistent evaluation function, 64
countably additive, 10
credal committee, 110
Dutch book for agendas not
involving P, 199
Dutch book for self-ref agendas,
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evaluation function, 58
finite intersection property, 130
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finitely additive probability
measure, 10
fixed point evaluation function, 64
frame, 34
full agenda, 187
imprec-prob-eval function, 107
imprecise probabilistic modal
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inaccuracy measure, I, 167
liar, λ, 19
maximum-unit-guaranteed-loss,
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merely finitely additive probability
measure, 10
nearly stable, 126
numeral, 18
omniscient, 36
prob-eval function, p, 41
Probabilistic Convention T, 133
probabilistic liar, π, 19
probabilistic modal structure, 34
probabilistic over a theory Γ, 11
probabilistic truthteller η, 19
probabilistically coherent, 10
probability space, 10
propositional quantification, 5
revision sequence, 127
revision sequence over a
probabilistic modal
structure M, 141
revision sequence using stability,
127
Robinson arithmetic, or Q,, 17
sample space, 10
self-ref agenda, 162
stable, 126
stable state, 107
stable states, 112
strongly introspective, 39
the induced model given by M and
f at w, 66
truthteller, τ , 19
undermining, 201
valuation, M, 34
weakly introspective, 39
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ties. Publications de l’Institut Mathématique. Nouvelle Série, 60:1–4, 1996.
Jeff B. Paris. A note on the dutch book method. In Proceedings of the Second
International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and their Applications,
ISIPTA, pages 301–306, 2001.
223
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Richard Pettigrew. Epistemic utility arguments for probabilism. In Edward N.
Zalta, editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 2011 edition,
2011.
Richard Pettigrew. Accuracy and the laws of credence. Forthcoming with Oxford
University Press, ms.
Frank P. Ramsey. Truth and probability (1926). The foundations of mathematics
and other logical essays, pages 156–198, 1931.
Jan-Willem Romeijn. Conditioning and interpretation shifts. Studia Logica, 100
(3):583–606, 2012.
Mark J Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld, and Joseph B. Kadane. How sets of coher-
ent probabilities may serve as models for degrees of incoherence. International
Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems, 8(03):347–
355, 2000.
Mark J Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld, and Joseph B. Kadane. Measuring inco-
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